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9During the period from 1999 to 2004, Turkey’s path toward European Union accession promoted important advances 
in the consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights. Turkey’s long-standing democratization problems -- 
such as the treatment of minorities, the lack of democratic oversight of the security sector, and the failure to resolve the 
Kurdish question, the Armenian question and the headscarf issue -- have come to surface and been widely discussed.  Yet 
pro-status quo groups, including political parties, some “civil society” organizations, and governmental institutions have 
harshly reacted to the public discussion of these issues.  Since 2004, the momentum of the democratization process has 
slowed down, and 2007 brought to the Turkish agenda a critical debate over presidential elections. According to the pro-
status quo, elitist groups the chair of the presidency is representation of the modern Turkish republic, and the government 
party’s candidate will not have the capability of representing the Turkish Republic with a first lady with headscarf. Since 
May 2007, the discussions over the presidential relations and the candidacy of a deputy from the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) have dominated the political agenda in Turkey. While the tension is represented as between religious people 
and secularism, in fact, this tension is more accurately one between the possibility of departing from the status quo, 
through democratization efforts, and thus confronting the deep-rooted democratization problems of Turkey. 
While all the discussions seem to be on the axis of religiosity and secularism, during the general election process, most 
of the opposition parties claimed that Turkey was under threat from internal and external enemies – whether Shari’a, 
Kurds, Armenians trying to divide and weaken it, or foreign powers like the EU and USA seeking Turkey’s economic 
subordination – and that the AKP was to blame. The opposition parties also blamed the AKP for the presidential election 
crisis, due to the fact that the AKP had not sought a consensus candidate. 
At this moment, the results of the elections show that approximately one-half of the country supports the AKP government 
and the majority of the people are opposed to any military intervention in the country’s democratic life. Although the 
prospective presidency of Mr. Gül should be evaluated through the lens of citizenship and even though Mr. Gül meets 
the requirements for being President, his candidacy has still been discussed in terms of the capacity of a man whose wife 
wears a headscarf --  which is seen as a symbol of the so-called “threat to the secular regime” -- to represent Turkey. 
Because the aforementioned agenda is very related to the problematic nature of Religion-State-Society Relations in 
Turkey, TESEV’s Democratization Program has been working on the issue since 1999. The project on Religion-State-
Society relations, through research, publication, outreach, and advocacy, aims to contribute to the understanding of 
the changing dynamics between religion, state, and society in today’s world and specifically in the Turkish context.  In 
addition, the project aspires to create dialogue and to increase mutual understanding between groups in Turkish society 
who have increasingly become polarized around the issues of secularism and religiosity.
Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey, by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, is an output of a survey of 1492 voting-
age individuals that was carried out in rural and urban areas between May 6th and June 11th 2006.  The survey report 
observes and compares the changing nature of Turkish people’s attitudes towards issues such as religion, democracy, 
terrorism and minorities.  The Turkish-language edition of the study was received with high interest by the public and the 
media in November 2006.  The study provoked an engaging debate as it was published during the controversy around 
the fact that presidential candidate Abdullah Gül’s wife wears a headscarf. TESEV hopes that the English version of 
the report will contribute to the debates over Turkey’s practice of Islam, people’s preferences to identify themselves, 
understanding of democracy and multi-culturalism in Turkey, and the political and sociological stance towards the 
headscarf controversy. 
Derya Demirler
TESEV Democratization Program
August, 2007
Foreword to the English  Edition
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The most significant handicap of Turkey, a country that has defined modernization as its national mission since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, is that it has perceived modernism by means of rigid models. Whilst this approach, 
which has prevailed up to the present day, pushed certain modes of existence deemed inappropriate for modernization 
to the margins of the public sphere, it also deepened the gap between state and society.
Consequently, in Turkey, a society emerged where different modes of living were transformed into segregated 
communities, amongst which an inevitable estrangement was continuously harbored. On the other hand, secularism, 
which should be an institution that performs the role of arbitrator, resulted in the definition of religiosity in legal terms 
by the state. 
The most grievous consequence of this situation was that lifestyles different from “ours” were reduced to simple 
patterns and often condemned as “pre-modern/anachronistic/archaic”. Thus, while different segments of society had 
fewer opportunities to know and understand each other, the public sphere began to be perceived as an environment 
laden with conflicts.
Cognizant of the aforementioned danger, in 1999 TESEV presented the public with its first field study that aimed to 
produce a comprehensive research of religiously devout people. While the study, conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz 
Toprak, initiated the removal of much misapprehension and bias through its findings, it also realistically displayed the 
relationship between religion and politics. 
Seven years after the study mentioned above, TESEV approaches the same subject once again with the same academics. 
During the time between the two studies, Turkey has undergone important changes. We live in an intellectual 
environment where identities have acquired self-confidence, and where public participation has come to be perceived as 
an indispensable citizenship right. Without doubt, the standpoint of the people of Turkey in respect to these disclosures, 
its perception of religion and religiosity, and the relationships it establishes between beliefs and values, is of vital 
importance for the democratic requirements of the present day.
In addition to giving us the opportunity to take a closer look at ourselves and confront our walls of prejudice, we also 
hope that this study will constitute a valuable contribution to social harmony that Turkey direly needs, through enabling 
us to better understand ways of living different from ours.
Etyen Mahçupyan
TESEV Democratization Program
November, 2006
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Foreword to the Turkish Edition
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This research is a follow-up of a study we conducted in 1999 about religion, society and politics in Turkey. The 1999 study, 
also supported by TESEV, was based on a survey of a nationwide representative sample of the Turkish population at 
voting-age.  During the seven years between 1999 and 2006, Turkey underwent important changes. The most significant 
of these changes was the recovery from economic crisis that peaked in February 2001, resulting in massive unemployment 
and high rates of inflation. During the last two years, the economy has shown high rates of growth and inflation has been 
reduced from rates in excess of 50% to less than 10%. At the same time, a one-party government came to power in 2002 
for the first time in decades, which put an end to unstable coalition governments. Between 1999-2002 and thereafter, a 
series of reform packages that aimed to comply with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria moved Turkish democracy towards 
greater consolidation. As a result, Turkey started membership negotiations with the EU at the end of 2005.
Despite these positive changes, at the time we conducted this study in May 2006, there were already signs of an 
increasing polarization between what one might call the “secularists” and the “Islamists.” The fact that the governing 
party, AKP, has its roots in the Islamist Milli Görüş movement made it suspect in the eyes of both the military and the 
secular establishment. Although this polarization has increased since May 2006, we nevertheless felt that its level was 
not as high as it had been in 1999, when the now-banned Refah Partisi had divided the country into two camps. Hence, 
what we wanted to find out in this study were the changes in the attitudes and preferences of the people of Turkey 
concerning secularism, Islam, and politics.
One of the major findings of our study is that religiosity is increasing in Turkey. Between 1999 and 2006 the percentage of 
people who consider themselves “very religious” and those who define their identity primarily as Muslim has increased 
from 6% to 13% and from 36% to 46%, respectively. Although the percentage of people who approve of religious parties 
has also increased, this cannot lead to the conclusion that the support for a secular system is on the decline. Both our 
1999 and 2006 surveys show that Turkish people do not perceive secularism to be under threat and do not think that 
there is a real possibility of a Shari’ah-based religious regime in Turkey. Moreover, there is no finding in our study that 
indicates a rising support for a religious state. On the contrary, when specifically asked if they are in favor of a Shari’ah 
state, the number of those who gave an affirmative answer has declined from 21% in 1999 down to 9% in 2006.
Nevertheless, there is significant tension around the issue of secularism or laicism in the country. When asked to place 
themselves on a hypothetical continuum that has Islamists on one side and secularists on the other, 20% placed 
themselves closer to the secularist end, while 49% placed themselves closer to the Islamist side, leaving about 23% in the 
middle. Evaluating the recent political developments in the country, about 32% indicated that religious fundamentalism 
that is supportive of a religious state is on the rise, while 23% thought that there is a major threat to secularism in the 
country. Cross-tabular analysis suggests that a bi-polar distribution defines these evaluations. Those who are relatively 
well-off, better educated and live in urban areas tend to be on the secularist end.
On the other hand, reactions to strict secularist policies have also declined. Those who indicate that religious people are 
subject to state repression declined significantly, from about 43% to 17%. However, the findings show that 8% to 11% 
of secularists, depending on the question asked, believe that religious people threaten their lifestyles. These findings 
show that the kind of tension mentioned above is similarly felt in the daily lives of common people.
Related to the above, 77% of Turkish people believe that democracy is the best form of government, and that secularism 
can be protected by democratic means (54%). The military is not given a primary and indispensable role for this task. 
Nevertheless, the military is seen to have a special role, and the view that the military can criticize civilian governments 
is supported by 59% of respondents. In all these evaluations, about 20 to 25% of the respondents give support to military 
13
Summary
intervention in the affairs of civilian governments. It is worthy of note that those who are critical of the role of the military 
in Turkish politics, and thus support full control of the executive branch by civilians, are densely found not amongst the 
conservative, religious masses of lower socio-economic status, but rather amongst the left-leaning, socio-economically 
better off and well-educated groups. Those of Kurdish descent least support a role for the military in politics.
There is very little support amongst the respondents for terrorist activities, even under conditions of resistance to an 
occupying military force. Suicide bombings against occupiers or against civilians are equally condemned. Even when 
specific references to Iraqi resistance forces or to Palestinians are given, this finding does not change, even though it is 
widely known that the people of Turkey are sympathetic to the cause of both these groups. 81% of Turkish voters think 
that such violence is contrary to the teachings of Islam.
In accordance with rising religiosity, we also observed rising tension between Sunni and Alevi groups.  Inter-sectarian 
marriages are opposed at a significantly higher level compared to seven years ago. Equally importantly, Alevis and 
Sunnis remain at opposing positions on all significant policy issues. Alevi preferences are closer to positions taken by 
voters who are relatively better educated, have higher socio-economic status, ideologically lean towards the left, do not 
consider themselves to be very religious, and define themselves as secularist.
Another important observation is that a multi-cultural and pluralist democratic understanding is not well-rooted. 
Issues of importance to citizens of Sunni Muslim faith and of ethnic Turkish background, such as İmam Hatip High 
Schools or the headscarf ban in universities, are evaluated as part of basic human rights; but when asked about issues of 
relevance to Alevis, non-Muslim Turkish citizens or citizens of Kurdish origin, the same sensitivity to their basic rights is 
not shown. Sensitivity to any kind of minority rights is severely lacking. Such an overall approach provides ample ground 
for hampering the reforms that aim to consolidate democratic rule of law in the country.
In tune with this sectarian and parochial approach to basic rights, one could also talk about an underlying conception 
of “us” versus “the other”. Such a distinction between citizens of different religious beliefs or cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds is a reflection of an inward-looking general mindset in society, and provides the most important basis for 
resistance to developing a multi-cultural and tolerant political milieu in the country. “Us” in this context refers to Turk-
Muslim-Sunni, and “other” refers to Kurd-Alevi-non-Muslim. Such a perspective creates a distorted view of the outside 
world, in which only citizens of Muslim countries are seen as friends, whereas many of Turkey’s long-time allies in 
the international arena, or neighboring countries rank lower on the “friendship” scale. Not surprisingly, restrictions on 
Christian missionary activities and Jewish business interests are approved. Such a background provides fertile ground 
for xenophobia, and there exists a rising Muslim communitarian approach to business activities.
Another important finding of our research is that there is a gap between commonly held views about the covering of 
women and the actual reality. Public impressions to the contrary, the percentage of women who cover themselves is 
not on the increase but is, in fact, declining. In addition, the covering of women is not a priority issue for the layman. 
Economic issues top the mass public agenda, and women’s covering is prioritized only when included together with other 
identity issues such as the rights of Alevi and Kurdish minorities. Uncovered women are more likely to be found amongst 
the urban, relatively better off and better educated segments with a left ideological leaning. As income increases the 
likelihood of being covered significantly declines. The veil is increasingly marginalized (those who wear the veil are only 
1% of the population) and is almost never preferred amongst the younger generation.
Covered women argue that the most important reason why they cover is because Islam demands it. Neither parental/
spousal pressure, nor identity issues, are given as reasons for covering. Covering as a sign of participation in a political 
movement, often put forth as a major reason for covering by secularists, is also not perceived as such by these women. 
Nevertheless, covered women admit that they would be pressured primarily by their close relatives to cover up if they 
were to remove their head cover. Yet, when asked if they would remove their head cover if most women around them 
were to do the same, nearly all say that they would not.
Slightly more than two-thirds of our sample is supportive of lifting the headscarf ban in universities and public 
employment. Although the level of support has declined since 1999, the majority still express that they would not feel 
“uneasy” about, for example, a covered judge or a covered primary school teacher.
A significant finding that surfaces at all critical junctures in our research is that Turkish society has a clear dual structure. 
Similar to arguments about a “center-periphery” cleavage, we found that two clearly distinguishable groups oppose 
one another on almost all important issues. On the one side, we have urban dwellers of better socio-economic status 
and education, who do not feel bound by the Sunni religious belief system. On the other side, we have religiously devout 
people of lower education and socio-economic status, who feel closer to the Islamists than the secularists. These 
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distinct groups could merge with urbanization, economic development, and modernization. However, given that these 
cleavages have deepened over the last century despite remarkable economic development and urbanization, it may be 
unrealistic to assume that economic growth and urbanization on their own will automatically lead to the closing of the 
gap between these two groups. In other words, the exact kind of economic development and urbanization that would 
foster such rapprochement between the two ends of this cleavage needs to be diagnosed and implemented.
We would like to emphasize that many of the issues that define the deepening of this cleavage revolves around 
educational policy. All research that we know of indicates that additional years spent in school not only increases the 
likelihood of support for liberal democratic values, but also integrates individuals to a larger commonly-held view of 
a multi-cultural national identity. Increased resources and attention to the content of the curriculum is key to further 
human capital development, as well as to the deepening of the roots of a democratic system in the country.
15
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Social life in Turkey is rapidly being transformed.  Economic and social changes, rooted in the Westernization movement 
of Ottoman society in the 19th century, have strengthened each other since then but have also brought along their own 
internal conflicts. After the Turkish Republic was established, the gradual momentum of Turkey’s Western oriented 
transformation sharpened these conflicts.  This process incited a controversy between the advocates of Western-style 
modernization and the movements of reaction against it, which has prevailed up to the present day.  Formed around the 
themes of secularism and radical Islamic fundamentalism, this controversy continued incessantly during the history of 
the Republic. Since its foundation, the Republic has always felt itself to be under the threat of a reactionary religious 
opposition.
This perceived threat gradually came to dominate the political discourse following the transition to multi-party 
democracy, and constituted the base of the controversy from 1950 to 1960 between the governing Demokrat Parti 
(Democratic Party, DP) and the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), the party of the elite that 
established the Turkish Republic but that was in the opposition during this period.  Between 1960 and 1980, the shift 
of politics to the left-right axis pushed the secularism discourse into the background.  The CHP established a coalition 
government in 1973 with Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP), which at the time seemed closer to the 
left compared to other parties due to its discourse that underscored poverty.  The issue of secularism took its place on 
the agenda once again after 1980. The Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement that developed under the leadership 
of Necmettin Erbakan from 1970 on, was reorganized around Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP)1 after the military coup in 
1980. As the party that received the highest percentage of votes in the 1994 elections, Refah succeeded in making a party 
with an Islamic reference the strongest party in the Turkish political system.
The Milli Selamet/Milli Görüş tradition became highly supported by voters and in turn expedited the process of 
perceiving political Islam as a threat in the country. RP, the successor of MSP, which was supported by a marginal 
societal segment in the 1970s, led an active party organization and filled the gap created by the leftist movement that 
had become unattractive to lower urban classes. This movement, which was traditionally supported by the small 
peripheral communities in Anatolia, also gained the support of the urbanized electoral base, as well as the peripheral 
capital holders that developed in opposition to the central capital circles. This movement enabled the emergence of a 
“counter-elite” that seemed to have united around Islamic symbols and a conservative, moral framework. Using Şerif 
Mardin’s terminology, this transformation enabled the marginal Islamic movements of the “periphery” to be more fully 
integrated in public life that was under the control of the “center”.
During the tenure of RP as the stronger partner of the coalition government established after the 1995 election, the 
political polarization in the country gravely increased. This polarization eventually dragged the country into the 
“February 28th” period and resulted in the banning of the Refah Partisi by the Constitutional Court.  Fazilet Partisi (Virtue 
Party, FP) was then established to replace RP, but this party was also closed down.  The outlawing of Fazilet prompted 
the division of the Milli Görüş movement.  The cadres that had united around ‘Milli Görüş’ took their place in the newly 
established Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party, SP) whereas the ‘reformist’ wing of the Islamic movement established the 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP). The latter came to power alone in the 2002 elections 
by winning an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament.  
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1. Introduction
1  In 1972, Necmettin Erbakan founded Milli Selamet Partisi (the National Salvation Party - MSP), which became the third largest party in parliament in 1973. 
The MSP openly supported a religious political agenda calling for the restoration of traditional “morals and virtues” - widely interpreted as meaning Islamic 
morals and behavior - and a reduction of economic ties to the “Christian” countries of Western Europe. Following the 1980 coup, the military not only 
dissolved the MSP, along with other political parties, but also prosecuted Erbakan and other MSP leaders for violating a law forbidding the use of religion for 
political purposes. When new political parties were authorized in 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party on a platform stressing themes similar to those 
espoused by the defunct MSP. 
The Milli Görüş movement emerged with the establishment of the Milli Nizam Partisi in the 1970s, under the leadership 
of Necmettin Erbakan. Following the closing down of this party by the Constitutional Court after a year, successive 
political parties, based on a similar Islamic ideology, were founded under the same movement.  These parties strongly 
separated themselves from other parties that Erbakan referred to as the “Western Club”.  AKP followed a different 
path.  Unlike the parties of the Milli Görüş movement, it based both its program and its policies on the integration of 
Turkey with the Western world. Described as “conservative democratic” by its leaders, AKP emerged as a party that is 
devoted to Islamic tradition and that advocates conservative values, but that nevertheless exerts its authority in favor 
of Western style modernism in the controversy between “Western style Modernism vs. Return to Islamic Past” that has 
divided Turkey since the 19th century.
As we have stated below, this study was completed in a period when we witnessed the transformation of Political Islam in 
parallel to the changes Turkey has undergone. This research, based on surveys, was supported by the Turkish Economic 
and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), and used a nationwide representative sampling in May 2006. It is a follow-up 
of a study we conducted in 1999, also executed with the support of TESEV2. Our initial study, which we had conducted 
shortly after the Refahyol (coalition of the Refah and Doğru Yol parties) government was dissolved and immediately before 
the elections in March 1999, garnered great interest from the public and proved that the “Secular vs. Islamist” conflict 
that seemed to gradually deepen during that period did not have an equivalent reflection in Turkish society.
The “Islam factor”, which has been widely discussed in Turkey throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, and the 
assertion that it constitutes a serious threat against the secular state, was generally based on impressions at the time 
we publicized the results of our study in 1999. Until then, there was no significant research, based on surveys, available 
on the issue. Presented to the public as a “first” example of its kind, our study expressly stated that the majority of the 
public was religious, but that this religiosity included a great tolerance towards individuals who have adopted different 
lifestyles; that the Republican reforms were supported; that the public believed that these reforms had enabled the 
country to progress; that the people of Turkey did not favor a Shari’ah-based religious regime; that people were not 
supportive of using religion for political motives; that, in this context, political parties based on religion were not favored; 
and that people were against the mixing of state and religion. For instance, 85% of Turkish people accepted that a 
woman, even if she does not cover, should be considered a Muslim if she believes in Allah and the Prophet Mohammad; 
nevertheless, 75% believed that university students should be allowed to cover if they chose to. On the other hand, 
people who supported Refah Parti’s “turban” policy made up a lower percentage of 46%.
The answers that were given to questions we asked about Refah Partisi in 1999 were indicative of the “Islamist vs. 
Secular” cleavage among Turkish people in that period. For example, the rate of people who thought that Refah Partisi 
had separated the public into two groups - as “believers” versus “non-believers” – and the rate of people who did not 
agree with this opinion were almost equal, at 37% and 40% respectively. Similarly, 37% of the public approved the 
closing down of Refah Partisi, while 39% were against it. The most significant proof of the fact that this kind of tension 
was not approved by the public was that those who believed that religion-based parties should not be a part of the 
Turkish political party system formed a majority of 61%.  Advocates of the opposing viewpoint constituted only 25%, 
which was proportionate to the votes received by Refah Partisi in that period. In general, 79% of the adult population 
of Turkey believed that the Republican reforms enabled the progress of the country. The percentage of those who were 
against this viewpoint constituted only a small minority, at 8%. 
The transformation that Political Islam has undergone after Refah Partisi was outlawed, especially the policies Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi pursued after the 2002 elections, its moderate style towards reconciliation on issues such as the 
“adultery crisis” and “turban issue” – towards which the secular circles were highly sensitive - as well as the serious 
efforts it put into Turkey’s integration with the European Union (EU), alleviated to a great degree the tension around 
secularism, which had mounted in Turkey starting from the second half of the 1980s and had reached its peak in the 
1990s. When compared to Refah Partisi, which had approached democracy and liberal values only through addressing 
the problems of its own followers but seemed indifferent when the rights of other sectors were violated – and, therefore 
was believed to use the method known as “takiyye” i.e., hiding one’s true intentions, – AKP looked more like a party 
that had absorbed liberal democracy. 
The aim of this study was to find out whether the viewpoint of the people of Turkey had gone through a change in the 
seven years since 1999 when we had conducted our first study, and what the people of Turkey thought about some of 
the more recent items on the public agenda. During these seven years, Turkey has undergone significant changes. The 
chronic economic crises of the 1990s were replaced by a stable and growing economic structure. For the first time since 
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2  Ali Çarkoğlu & Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset, İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000.
1980, inflation in Turkey dropped to a single figure in May 2006, when we conducted our research. Similarly, a party 
was able to obtain enough seats to establish a government for the first time, after decades of coalition governments; 
thus, a single-party government that could secure political stability was established. Due to the policies of both the 
governments that ruled the country between 1999-2002, and of the AKP government after 2002, important legal changes 
took place towards liberalizing Turkish democracy, enabling it to attain a more civilian character. The prospect of Turkey’s 
membership to the EU gained ground after the decision to initiate the negotiation process in December 2005.
On the other hand, in May 2006, when we conducted our research, the changes that took place in Turkey had begun 
to cause reactions from certain sectors of society. Identity politics that surfaced during the process of harmonization 
with the EU and which particularly revolved around Kurdish and Alevi citizens; the issue of minorities; the new strategy 
Turkey adopted in solving the Cyprus crisis; Armenian “genocide” allegations that were voiced in various European 
countries; and the developments in the Middle East, caused both “leftist” and “rightist” circles to fear that national 
sovereignty was being lost and that the country could be divided. In this context, numerous theses claimed that Turkey 
was once again open to foreign invasion, that the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres were being put into effect again, 
and that the public would gradually be Christianized through the activities of foreign missionaries. The expansion of 
the Turkish economy to global markets began to be considered within the scope of a new imperialism, while foreign 
investments and real estate purchases by foreigners caused skepticism. 
The debate about “Radical Fundamentalism” that flared up again – and that was voiced among the highest ranks of 
the state starting from September-October 2006 – was not yet on the agenda at the time the study was conducted. 
However worries that were expressed, especially concerning “clientelism”, the headscarf and the election of the 
president, were harbingers of a new crisis on the issue of secularism. Despite the fact that the skeptical approach of 
secular circles towards the AKP government continued, in May 2006, when we conducted our research, the “Secular 
versus Islamist” tension in Turkey seemed to have moderated in comparison to the 1990s. On the other hand, among 
circles that considered the successful completion of the EU process to be of utmost importance, worries that the AKP 
government no longer gave full weight to this issue as they had in the period before 2005, and that this caused the 
process of harmonization with the EU to slow down, began to emerge.
We conducted our study at a time when these and similar disputes gradually picked up speed. In light of the changes 
Turkey has undergone from February 1999 when we conducted the first research, to May 2006, as well as the social 
reactions that were formed parallel to these changes; we tried to reveal the ideas of the people of Turkey about these 
issues. Questions on many of the issues stated above were included in our survey. Instead of collecting personal 
impressions based on individual worldviews, we aimed to put forth a study that directly asked the public what they 
thought about these issues and that interpreted the obtained results by applying statistical analyses.  We then hoped 
to present this study for public debate.
Just like in our previous study, instead of focusing on impressions presented by certain sectors to the public as facts, our 
decisive goal here was to cast a new light on the different viewpoints of the public based on data, as part of a process 
designed to solve the problems of the country.
Doubtlessly, similar to all research based on a survey, our study aims to determine general, nationwide inclinations. 
Other than these general inclinations, the viewpoints, beliefs, fears, feelings, etc., of the various sectors of society can 
only be determined through in-depth interviews.  Our research targets the voting age population and therefore some 
groups that are influential in society because of their position, economical influence or their roles as opinion leaders, 
can only be represented to an extent proportionate to their size within the population. As the number of representatives 
of such groups in our sample is more or less proportionate to their percentage in the voting age population, the sample 
numbers for some of them are relatively low. Therefore, generalizing about the subgroups in our sample is, in this 
respect, more difficult, and even impossible for groups that are very small compared to the general population. For 
instance, the female-male ratio in the voting age population in Turkey, as well as in our sample has an approximate 
50%-50% proportion. However, since the sample magnitude of male voters and female voters each constitutes half 
of our total sample, the statistical significance of what we can state with regard to these two groups is lower than 
the validity of the entire sample. Similarly, as voters of Kurdish ethnic origin, voters for “x” party or Alevi citizens also 
constitute only a subgroup of the entire sample, the significance of what we can say about each of these groups is lower 
than that of the entire sample.
As we have stated above, survey studies are neither suitable for asking questions on any subject in depth, nor for further 
questioning with regard to the nuances of any of the initial questions. Because nationwide surveys are oriented towards 
the general population, they cannot provide a profound analysis of the viewpoints of social groups. However, when 
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the answers given to particular questions are compared to the other characteristics of the individuals, they can give us 
statistical clues about the groups. In survey studies, varied inquiries that can be carried out according to the answers 
provided by respondents are rather limited in number. Moreover, an evaluation based on a reciprocal procedure of 
asking and answering questions, that could shed light on the feelings and the mindset of individual respondents while 
focusing on the nuances in their answers, is not possible. A person interviewed during a survey is a passive respondent, 
and utmost care must be shown to make sure that he or she has the minimum possible interaction with the interviewer. 
To this end, the questions must be as clear as possible, requiring as few explanations by the interviewer as possible.
Through this type of survey, for example, whether the people who support the ban on wearing a headscarf in universities 
are more likely to be in the older or the younger population group, or how these people are distributed concerning gender/
settlement type/party preference/ethnic-religious origin etc., can be determined by applying statistical methods. Such 
findings are included in our study. However, these findings are obtained through questions which are designed towards 
this aim and are assumed to be understood by everyone in the same way within the format of multiple-choice and close-
ended questions. In this type of a study, inquiries are made within a simple framework, which assumes that the feelings 
and evaluations of individuals are comparable. The data are not collected in a mutual conversation that can put forth 
the character and sense of each personal experience. Thus, an analysis framework that is directed towards determining 
only the highest macro level inclinations is formed.
One issue often discussed concerning the survey work performed in our country is about how representative the 
achieved results are. Researchers who conduct this type of study often face criticism from people who do not see a 
match between their personal observations and the study results. As can be understood from the research method that 
we explain in detail below, statistical studies certainly include a margin of error. However, the magnitude of this margin 
is clearly mentioned in the study, which is comparably low and therefore acceptable.
The fieldwork of this research was led by Frekans Araştırma Şirketi, which had also assisted us in our 1999 study. Before 
the employees and interviewers of Frekans went to the field, we informed them about the research and trained them in 
the methods of asking questions and on other subjects, such as the procedure to be followed when they were unable to 
find the people whose names and addresses that were initially determined.  Frekans checked whether the interviewers 
who were sent to different regions of Turkey actually went to the exact addresses they were assigned to visit; and both 
we, as the researchers, and our assistants outside the survey company took part in this verification procedure. We have 
full confidence that all appropriate procedures were followed at all stages of the fieldwork by this organization.
One other uncertainty that emerges among the public about this kind of research is whether the respondents who take 
the survey tell the truth or not. It is, naturally, impossible for any researcher to be truly certain about this. As a matter 
of fact, the method of dealing with this sort of problem is one of the most important subjects discussed in research 
methods circles. However, there are numerous ways of minimizing this concern. Asking the same question in a different 
way; making sure that the question does not guide the individual; paying attention to not listing the questions related 
to the same subject in succession; checking if the results derived from questions with definite answers are true; and 
comparing the obtained results with other research findings that were conducted in the same time period, are some 
of these methods. For instance, if there is a significant difference between the percentage of people who said “I voted 
for x party” and the actual votes that the party received in the election, or if a respondent who chose the “I am very 
religious” option in one question states that he had never fasted in another one, the researcher can have an idea about 
the reliability of the answers provided by that specific respondent. Moreover, even if we assume that respondents gave 
a certain answer because they thought the correct answer is “x”, this is still considered a finding that meaningful and 
significant. For example, if in a study that took up the issue of women in Turkey3, 92% of the public thinks that working 
increases a woman’s self-respect, then, even if we believe that most respondents who gave this answer did not actually 
believe this and that they did not approach this question in all fairness, the 92% figure is still meaningful. To say the 
least, it indicates that the people of Turkey are aware as to what the correct answer to this question must be. And even 
if this kind of awareness has not yet materialized in real life, it shows that modern values are widespread in the country. 
If we suppose that the same question was asked in a nationwide survey that included villages in rural areas in the 1920s, 
’30s or ’40s, we believe that the answer would not reveal a rate of 92%.
Finally, we would like to state that this study was supported by TESEV, but the questions included in the survey, the 
research method, the selection of the research company, and the writing of this report reflect our interpretations and 
were entirely left to our own choice.  As the researchers, we have consulted both TESEV employees and members of 
academic and intellectual circles concerning the selection and formation of the issues we added to our survey. However, 
it was ourselves who made the conclusive decisions on these issues.
3  Ersin Kalaycıoğlu ve Binnaz Toprak, İş Yaşamı, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın, Tesev Yayınları, 2004.
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2.1. General Observations on the Sampling Logic
Our study is based on surveys that were carried out with 1492 voting age individuals who are representative of the 
people of Turkey who live in urban and rural areas.  The interviews were conducted face to face in the homes of the 
respondents, from May 6 to June 11, 2006.
One of the questions often directed after this type of study by various people, including academics, is how the 
percentages presented in the study and the generalizations derived from these percentages can represent the entire 
population when they are limited to a sample of 1000-1500 respondents. In other words, can the preferences and ideas 
based on interviews conducted with 1000-1500 individuals in a population of approximately 70 million citizens reflect the 
viewpoint of the people of Turkey as a whole? In this context, another question is put forth by people who think that the 
results do not match their personal opinion and therefore adopt a questioning approach: why do the study results not 
verify their ideas, even though they have been at many different places in Turkey, led a close relationship with common 
people on the street and “chatted with cab drivers”? To express this attitude in a different manner, if the conclusions of 
a research are different from the general observations of individuals, does this not mar the validity of that research?
Let us give two simple examples in order to answer the first question. When we get a blood test, not all the blood in our 
veins has to be pumped out and tested in order to obtain pathalogical findings. Similarly, we do not check the amount 
of salt in the soup we cook by eating all of the soup in the pot. Naturally, selecting samples is a more intricate process 
than cooking.  However, the fundamental principles of sampling require the same criteria that we apply to testing blood 
or cooking. Essentially, sampling is the gathering of information about a target group and drawing conclusions through 
a limited number of observations.
Our most significant problem is what a “random” sample is. A random sample is not a “coincidental” sample. In a 
random sampling, each member of the target group about whom information is collected has an equal and known 
probability to be selected and included in the survey. However, in this case, a prediction within the scope of calculable 
error margins related to the characteristics of the target group is possible. One of the most important problems here is 
the need to set a clear and definite, categorical limit. Target groups are usually quite extensive.
For example, if we wanted to check whether bread baked in a bakery shop is in line with standards, inspecting each 
loaf of bread one-by-one would, in practice, be impossible. Although we would expect the loaves of bread produced in 
the bakery to be more or less similar, we would also expect, for instance, that the loaves that come out of the oven first 
would be less baked when compared to the ones that come out the last. Likewise, there could be differences in both the 
quality of the dough and the hygiene of the environment. In order to detect such differences in a bakery-full of bread, 
we would need a physical representation system that corresponded to the entire production. For a small bakery shop, 
this could be the list of baskets the bread is placed into. For example, if the bakery produces 1000 loaves of bread, and 
if the bread is distributed in baskets that contain 20 loaves each, this means that there will be 50 baskets holding the 
entire production of the bakery. If these baskets are numbered, our job will naturally be easier. In that case, it would be 
sufficient to look at baskets whose numbers were picked randomly. Most often, baskets do not have numbered labels, 
and all baskets are kept in a room, a storage place or are transported by trucks. Then, we have a physical place that we 
can use as a sampling framework, and we select the samples within that place in accordance with a system designed 
for that purpose.
If we consider the issue of representing the whole of Turkey at this point, it can clearly be said that, similar to the blood 
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2. Method of the Study:
Selection of the Sample and Design of the Survey
test and bakery analogies, the voting population in Turkey does not have a homogeneous structure. We can suppose 
that we have a list of all voters, but practically, such a list is neither obtainable nor utilizable. If it were, then we could 
arrange a sampling through a simple, coincidental selection of samples. However, even in that case, we would probably 
not want to carry out this particular procedure since 1500 people who are selected randomly from a list of more than 
40 million voters could happen to live in 1500 totally different addresses. Going to a mountain village in Artvin for just 
a single interview and then going to a rural village in Adıyaman, Kahta for one interview is practically very difficult and 
expensive. These voters can be separated into relatively more homogenous and broader groups; consequently, the 
same information can be obtained, and a more practical and inexpensive sampling becomes possible through selection 
within these groups.
Therefore, what we have to do is to establish a framework that will allow the physical representation of the votes, 
similar to a storage place in a bakery or to a transport truck. For instance, a suitable framework for our research is 
the geographical map of Turkey. As we have explained below, voters are distributed to administrative provinces, and 
provinces to territories through the use of this map, and then, provinces that represent the voters are selected by taking 
those territories into consideration. The size of the sampling is distributed to each territory according to its population, 
and the representative provinces from each territory are selected in proportion to their percentage in that territory’s 
population. In this way, each and every voter in the population that live in these territories is given an equal possibility 
of being included in our sampling. Thus, this is the main criterium of alignment with the random sampling principle.
In each administrative province, voters are separated to address blocks of the same size; in this way, blocks and voters, 
again, have an equal amount of probability to be selected. After a required number of blocks are randomly selected, the 
houses in each block and the people who are going to be interviewed from amongst each household are also selected 
randomly.
What is the probability of the viewpoint of any particular individual to be included into a sample of 1000-1500 respondents 
when using this type of method? Can an individual’s observation be more reliable than the information obtained through 
this kind of sampling, or can an individual make a precise enough observation that relates to the whole country and that 
reflects the average viewpoint of all individuals? As these questions form the basis of the sceptical attitude against 
sampling-based studies that is prevalent among certain groups that are occupied with monitoring the course of events 
in the country, we are obliged to provide an answer, even if a brief one.
If we know in how many different ways the sample from an adult population of 1500 people who are 18 or older can be 
selected from a total of more than 40 million voters, we can also determine the probability of ourselves being included in 
this kind of sampling. Although not zero, this probability is very close to zero because different samples of 1500 people 
can be arranged in a huge number of ways. Therefore, no one can have a rational reason to doubt the sampling method 
just because he or she is not included in any of the samples. Furthermore, we believe that any given individual has not 
a more acute observation capability and a better capacity to collect data than the systematic data collection method 
described below. The findings here are the averages not of a certain individual or group, but of a sample that includes 
all voters in the country; thus, they should be evaluated within those constraints.
But can samplings of this size represent big countries? If there is a possibility of including every individual in the target 
group into the sampling on an equal basis, then information that is quite reliable concerning the entire target group, on 
condition that the predetermined margin of error remains invariable, can be obtained. It should not be forgotten that 
the behaviors, preferences and attitudes of individuals are like a puzzle that is difficult to solve. However, if individuals 
are set aside, but the groups they constitute, as well as the averages of these groups are taken into consideration, then 
estimation becomes easier. Even if individuals change, the averages will remain more or less constant. Hence, in the 
following analysis, we will discuss not individuals, but groups and group averages.
2.2. Sample Used for the 2006 Study
Although the design logic we have adopted in selecting the sample did not change, when compared to the study we 
conducted in February 1999, it has acquired a form that is closer to the logic of random sampling. As we have done in 
the past, our research universe consisted again of household members who are 18 or older, excluding public residence 
venues such as prisons, hospitals and student dormitories.  Administrative provinces have again been considered 
as the primary sampling unit. However, in the next step, these provinces were determined in accordance with the 
Classification of Statistical Regional Units (İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması - IBBS) established by the Turkish 
Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TUIK). This nomenclature, which was put into effect in 2002, was defined 
according to the NUTS criteria, the territorial nomenclature of the EU, in order to produce data comparable to that 
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of the European Union (EU) and to create possible solutions for the developmental differences between the various 
regions of the country. IBBS consists of three phases: “In the first phase, 81 administrative provinces were defined as 
territorial regions at Level 3. By forming groups – through taking into consideration the provinces that resemble each 
other regarding economical, social, cultural, and geographical aspects, as well as the magnitude of their population – 26 
territorial units were defined at Level 2. In addition, 12 territorial units at Level 1 were defined by grouping the 2nd level 
territorial units according to the same criterium.”1
We have based our study primarily on the number of registered voters in 12 territories at Level 1. Table 2.1 shows the 
percentage of registered voters in these territories. A sample of a total of 1500 respondents in rural and urban territories 
was distributed to the rural and urban areas in each territory. After that, two provinces were selected in each territory 
by taking into consideration their shares in the population of that region (probability proportionate to size). The number 
of interviews to be carried out in the rural and urban settlement areas of each province was determined according to 
the rural-urban population ratio of those provinces in their territory. Up to this point, this study is not different from our 
1999 study, except for the method of selecting samples and the definition of the territories. However, after this stage, we 
asked TUIK to choose blocks that included 150 households each. The total number of blocks was determined to enable 
10 interviews in each block. 10 addresses in each block were randomly visited, and if no interview took place in each 
address after a minimum of two trials, a substitute address, selected also randomly, was visited in order to complete 
the required number of interviews. Within each household, after the members of the household at voting age were 
determined, one of them was randomly selected for an interview.
Table 2.1 Distribution of the sample in TUIK Territory 12 according to the number of registered voters
No. of 
Territory Name of Territory
Sample  Share 
(%) Rural (%) Urban (%)
Total no. of 
Surveys
No. of surveys 
in rural 
territory
No. of surveys 
in  urban 
territory
1 Istanbul 17% 9% 91% 260 23 237
2 Aegean 14% 36% 64% 216 78 137
3 Mediterranean 12% 41% 59% 186 76 110
4 Southeastern Anatolia 7% 39% 61% 109 43 66
5 Western Anatolia 10% 19% 81% 143 28 115
6 Eastern Marmara 9% 32% 68% 142 46 97
7 Western Black Sea 8% 52% 48% 114 59 55
8 Central Anatolia 6% 44% 56% 85 37 48
9 Central Eastern Anatolia 4% 46% 54% 63 29 34
10 Eastern Black Sea 4% 54% 46% 63 34 29
11 Western Marmara 5% 46% 54% 74 34 40
12 Northeastern Anatolia 3% 52% 48% 44 23 21
Total 1.500 510 990
In rural areas, villages with more than 200 residents at the age of voting were visited, and 10 people at voting age from 
10 randomly selected households were asked to participate in an interview. In comparison with the previous study, 
there is no significant diversification in the interviews led in rural territories. However, when the interviews in urban 
territories are compared to the method applied in 1999, it can be said that this time we have come nearer to the principle 
of keeping the probability of including each person at the age of voting into the sampling equal, through selecting 
addresses from blocks. When the simple random sampling method is used, a sample of 1492 respondents has an error 
margin of maximum ± 3.3% (2.5%) with confidence level 99% (95%). As we have noted above, these error margins are 
valid for the entire sample, and they are expected to be higher for the subgroups.
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1  This nomenclature was put into effect in line with the Decree of the Council of Ministers dated 28 August 2002 and with no. 2002/4720. Detailed      information 
is available on TUIK’s web site:  (http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/DIESS/SiniflamaSurumDetayAction.do?surumId=164&turId=7&turAdi=%205.%20Coğrafi%2
0Sınıflamalar)
On the other hand, these margins are only due to sampling errors. There are certainly other causes of error, which 
are harder to control. In order to keep these errors, most of which could originate from the fieldwork, at a minimum 
level, great care was taken to train and inspect the interviewers. All interviews in the provinces where few interviews 
(30 or fewer) were carried out, and 30% of all interviews in other provinces, were checked through calling or revisiting 
the house, in order to make sure that the interviews really took place and that the requested style and sequence of 
asking questions were employed. During these inspections, at least 2 or 3 surveys carried out by each interviewer were 
checked. In this way, whenever a disconformity was determined concerning the manner any interviewer adopted when 
introducing himself/herself or the research to any household, when selecting the respondent amongst the household 
members, or when asking the survey questions in line with the designated sequence and style, all the interviews led by 
that interviewer were cancelled, a new household was selected and a new interview was carried out.
Another important reason that might have broadened the error margin is the measurement mistakes related to the 
design of the survey questionnaire. We took care to keep as many questions in common with our 1999 study as possible 
in order to have the opportunity to make a comparison. However, many questions that were intensely discussed at 
that time were either unimportant or noncurrent at the time this study was made. For example, subjects such as Refah 
Partisi (Welfare Party), Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party), 8-year compulsory education, and obligatory donation of the skin of 
animals sacrified during the religious Feast of Sacrifice were not included in the scope of this research. We also decided 
not to ask questions about worship practice, which was taken up in detail by our study in 1999. Questions designed to 
measure various attitudes described below in detail, and questions related to wearing a turban or headcover, were 
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Table 2.2 Distribution of the sample according to selected cities
Number of Planned Surveys Number of Realized Surveys
Territory no Name of Territory Selected Provinces Rural Urban Rural Urban
1 İstanbul 34-İstanbul 1 23 237 32 231
2 Aegean
20-Denizli 33 16 23 25
35-İzmir 46 122 48 112
3 Mediterranean
01-Adana 32 66 33 67
07-Antalya 44 44 54 34
4 Southeastern Anatolia
21-Diyarbakır 25 28 26 28
27-Gaziantep 17 39 19 40
5 Western Anatolia
06-Ankara 11 90 18 89
42-Konya 16 26 17 27
6 Eastern Marmara
11-Bilecik 6 6 5 10
16-Bursa 40 91 40 87
7 Western Black Sea
55-Samsun 39 3 42 12
67-Zonguldak 16 2 26 23
8 Central Anatolia
38-Kayseri 24 39 24 36
68-Aksaray 14 9 14 6
9 Central Eastern Anatolia
44-Malatya 15 20 15 18
65-Van 13 15 23 7
10 Eastern Black Sea
53-Rize 10 9 10 7
61-Trabzon 24 20 26 21
11 Western Marmara
10-Balıkesir 24 25 19 26
59-Tekirdağ 10 16 13 14
12 Northeastern Anatolia
25-Erzurum 15 16 15 17
36-Kars 8 5 8 5
Total 506 941 550 942
also asked during this research, and thus a comparison with the 1999 study became possible. In addition, many new 
questions were designed about various issues that were on the public agenda in May 2006.
We consulted many specialized academics in Turkey and abroad and took their views and advice into consideration 
while designing our questionnaire. After that, pilot interviews were carried out with 35 people in various provinces, 
and consequently, the mistakes and complications in some questions were ironed out. The final version of the survey 
questionnaire was handed in to the company Frekans at the beginning of May, and two assistants from outside the 
company acted as observers during the inspection procedure of the fieldwork. As the researchers, we also participated 
in the research by talking to many interviewers randomly and observing the inspection procedure during the fieldwork.
The distribution of realized samples is presented in Table 2.2. As a precaution against possible wastage that could 
emerge during the inspections, the number of people who were interviewed was 10% more than originally planned.  Yet 
still, fewer interviews than originally planned were conducted in some of the provinces during the field study. On the 
other hand, more interviews than the planned number took place in some other provinces. Taking these results into 
consideration, the study conclusions will be presented according to weighted results with an emphasis on the rural 
and urban observation plan for each province. The fact that weighted results are not dissimilar to the results obtained 
without a weighted calculation, except for a few minor changes in some of the questions, can be considered as a marked 
observation, proving the applicability of this sampling.
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3.1.  The “Turban” Issue
One of the most significant findings of our study consists of a series of answers given to the question about the issue of 
“turban”, or “tesettür”, that has been fervently discussed by the public during the last few decades. As stated above, the 
study we conducted in 1999 included many questions on this subject. However, we tried to take up this matter in more 
depth in this new study. The results display a picture that is very different than many common public evaluations.
Both “secular” and “Islamist” sectors have deemed the “turban” issue as one of the most serious problems Turkey has 
ever encountered. The secular sector has asserted that the turban is not a type of traditional covering but a political 
symbol; that this issue was carried into the country’s agenda by Islamist parties; that the covering of women reflects 
the longing of political Islam for a Shari’ah state; and that all of these developments have resulted in an increase in the 
number of women wearing a turban. Conversely, the Islamist sector claims that covering is related to one’s religious 
belief and/or identity; that it is not used as a political symbol; that banning covered students from obtaining higher 
education is a breach of human rights; and that finding a solution to this issue is one of the most significant problems 
of Turkey. We must state at once that here we use the phrases “secular sector” and “Islamist  sector” as they are often 
used by the public, and we are not suggesting any other references to their meanings. These sectors, without doubt, 
include other groups. For example, we can say that there is another group in society who define themselves as secular 
but who approach the issue of the turban from a liberal and democratic perspective. In order to simplify the subject 
here, we have used a dual contrast often referred to in public debates.
One conclusion we have reached through our research is that, contrary to the assertions of both the “secular” and 
the “Islamist” sectors, the turban issue is not on the agenda of the people of Turkey. Various studies conducted in 
recent years have reached the same result. The answers given within the scope of our survey indicate that Turkey’s 
five most significant problems are unemployment (38.2%), inflation/cost of living (12.1%), terrorism/national security/
southeastern Turkey/Kurdish issue (13.8%), education (10.2%), and economical instability/crisis (6.5%). Only 3.7% of 
the respondents pointed out ‘headscarf/turban’ as an important issue. The answers given to the same question during 
a research conducted by Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu shortly before the 2002 elections had shown that less than 1% of the 
public considered the headscarf issue significant.1  Therefore, the rate of people who deem it important has multiplied 
by approximately 3.5 in May 2006 – in other words, after three-and-a-half years with the AKP government. However, 
the answers given to such questions may rapidly alter in accordance with the current public agenda. While the perceived 
importance of some problems becomes greater subsequent to certain events, others begin to be perceived as less 
important. What needs to be emphasized here is that the headscarf and related issues do not have a position of priority 
on the current agenda of the country. This issue may hold great importance for the country’s intellectuals, but the 
representation of intellectuals in the general public is very low.  In general, people do not seem to consider this issue 
significant.
The aforementioned question, that required respondents to state Turkey’s most important problem, was an open–
ended question. In other words, we did not provide respondents with multiple-choice answers, and we categorized the 
given answers ourselves.  However, in another question, five problems Turkey faces were listed and respondents were 
asked to state which of these should be solved before all else. We determined these issues beforehand, as unemployment, 
southeastern Turkey/Kurdish issue, the ban on women wearing headscarves in universities, issues related to education, 
and health problems. The response rates were 70.3%, 12.1%, 5.7%, 7.9%, and 2.7% respectively, while 0.5% of the public 
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26
27
chose the “none” option. As indicated by these answers, the headscarf issue was again not prioritized amongst the 
predetermined problems and was not in the first three in ranking order.
However, compared with other “identity” issues related to Kurdish or Alevi citizens, the problems of the Sunni Islam 
social segment seem to stand at the forefront. In a third question, issues concerning the economy and education were 
excluded, and respondents were asked which of the policies relating to four identity issues the government should 
implement before all else. These policies were stated as allowing people of Kurdish origin to learn their mother tongue 
in state schools, lifting the ban on university students who wear a headscarf, enabling graduates of İmam Hatip high 
schools to be assessed with the same scoring system applied to normal high schools, and the financial assistance 
of the state to Cem Houses (Alevi houses of worship). The response rates came out as 11.4%, 43%, 17.6%, and 5.3% 
respectively, and 22.8% of the respondents did not answer this question. As can be observed from the answers, when a 
direct question about identity was asked, finding a solution to the turban issue was prioritized by a large group of 43%, 
while the second largest group of 17.6% saw the İmam Hatip issue as the biggest problem. However, we must also state 
that a large group of 22.9% chose not to give an answer to this question – only very few questions in our survey were left 
unanswered by a such a large group of respondents. When we observe that the response rates to two other questions 
about people of Kurdish and Alevi origin are also low compared to overall response rates, we are forced to think that 
many people, concerned about possible unfavorable consequences, might have deliberately refrained from answering 
this question.
The point that has to be emphasized here is that when the turban issue – which appears to be less important when 
compared to economic issues – is examined with other, similar identity issues, a significant part of the public deems 
it an important problem that requires a solution; then and only then is it highlighted. It is noteworthy that the turban 
issue, when discussed in terms of identity issues, becomes subject to more attention in comparison to Kurdish or Alevi 
issues of identity. This finding can be interpreted as an indicator of the fact that the turban issue can be more easily and 
extensively discussed within society, especially considering it is in the interest of a larger group in society and it is more 
visible in the political agenda. Thus, it must be emphasized that the headscarf issue is structurally different from other 
identity issues, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Relating to this question, respondents were also asked whether they thought that graduates of İmam Hatip high schools 
should be allowed to enter university departments of their choosing upon obtaining the required score at the university 
entrance exam, and whether this had drawbacks. 82.1% stated that “they should”, while 15.4% said that allowing them 
to enter some departments was unfavorable. As can be seen, when solely considering the identity issue, the public is 
relatively more sensitive to the turban issue and İmam Hatip high schools.
Another significant finding about covering we have reached through our research is that, contrary to general impressions, 
the percentage of women who cover has dropped compared to 1999. For example, 25% of the respondents who were 
asked whether there has been an increase in the number of covered women in the last decade said that was a significant 
increase, while 39.1% said that this number slightly increased. In other words, 64% of the people of  Turkey is of the 
opinion that the number of women who cover has risen. 21.8% said that there was no increase, while the percentage of 
respondents who had no idea or who did not answer this question was 14.1%. Our research has not verified these views, 
which we believe are based on impressions. On the contrary, the percentage of women who stated that they do notcover 
when going out was 27.3% in 1999, while this rate is 36.5% in our 2006 survey. When compared to the 1999 study, in 2006, 
the percentage of women who wear a headscover/headscarf/yemeni dropped from 53.4% to 48.8%, the rate of women 
who wear a çarşaf dropped from 3.4% to 1.1%, and the percentage of women who wear a turban dropped from 15.7% to 
11.4%.
If we compare the study we conducted in 1999 to our current study, we can make more observations in addition to 
the finding that the number of women who cover in Turkey has decreased. When the figures in the related table are 
examined, by and large we see that the rate of women who do not cover when going out has increased, both in rural and 
urban regions, when a comparison is made with the situation in 1999.
The number of women who wear a headcover/headscarf/yemeni has increased in rural areas, and decreased in cities. 
The number of women who wear a turban or a çarşaf has decreased both in rural and urban regions. The most important 
change observed regarding settlement units is that the percentage of uncovered women has risen from 33.4% to 46% 
with an increase of 12.6% in cities. The 8.4% decrease in the rate of women in cities who wear a headscarf/headcover/
yemeni, from 49% to 40.6%, is the next noteworthy change. Evaluating these figures, we can suggest that as the rate of 
urbanization in Turkey picks up, there will be fewer women who cover.
When we separate women who do not cover into age groups, we see that the most significant change that has occurred 
since 1999 is the rise in the 25-39 age group: from 28% to 41.5%, an increase of 13.5%. What follows is a 10.2% increase 
in the rate of people in the 18-24 age group who state that they do not cover, from 40.5% to 50.7%. The most significant 
change within the category of people who use a headscarf/headcover/yemeni is observed for the age group 25-39; with 
a decrease of 10.4%, from 53.3% to 42.9%. Women in the 18-24 age group who say that they wear a “turban” follow with 
a decrease of 9.3%, from 20.6% to 11.3%.
On the other hand, the most significant decrease in the number of women who wear a turban was observed  in the 
younger age group of 18-24 and not in the group 25-39, which was the case above. While 20.6% of women who belong 
to this group said that they wore a turban in 1999, this rate has dropped to 11.3%, a decrease of 9.3%. In our 2006 study, 
we have not come across anybody who said that they wore a çarşaf in 1999 in either of these groups. In other words, 
women in the 18-39 age group almost never wear a çarşaf. This observation, without doubt, does not mean that no one 
in that age group wears a çarşaf; it only indicates that such people do not add up to a percentage that can be represented 
statistically in the general population.
These changes can be explained by two reasons. Compared to women in the 18-24 age group, women in the 25-39 age 
group perhaps feel less pressured to cover by their families; and since these older women are probably married, their 
spouses, who are perhaps younger than the head of the family, do not raise an objection when they do not cover.  Single 
men were asked during our research whether they would want their future wives to cover; 56% said they would not, 
while 44% stated that they would.  69.6% of the single men in the latter group would like their future wives to wear a 
headscarf/headcover/yemeni, while 30.9% prefer the turban.
The fact that the highest decrease amongst women who wear a turban is observed in the age group of 18-24 has made 
us think that the women in this group may have chosen to uncover in order to pursue their higher education. A finding 
that could support this view is the answer given to a question directed to everyone included in the sample. When people 
were asked if they had a covered daughter at university age, and if so, whether they would approve of her uncovering in 
order to attend university, 64.9% said that they would. 
Finally, another observation that can be made is that the number of covered women decreases in direct relation to 
increase in income. While no change is observed between 1999 and 2006 in the rate of uncovered women in the lower 
income group, this rate has risen in the medium-level income group by 10%, from 27.2% to 37.2% and it has risen more 
notably in the higher-level income group; by 17%, from 54.2% to 71.2%. Similarly, while the rate of women who wear 
a headcover/headscarf/yemeni in the lower income group has risen from 65.1% in 1999 to 69.4% in 2006, this rate in 
the medium-level income group has dropped from 54.7% to 49.1%. The most significant decrease is seen in the higher 
income group by 13.2% - from 33.8% in 1999 to 20.6% in 2006. The number of people who wear a turban has decreased in 
all income groups, with the most substantial decrease of 6% in the higher income group, from 10.8% to 4.8%.
We can only explain the reasons related to such a decrease in the rate of women who cover through speculation. It could 
be that urbanization enables women to more actively participate in social life, allowing them to become relatively more 
independent individuals who can take part in society without covering. The fact that the education of young girls has 
become part of the public agenda through the work of various campaigns that were launched in recent years could have 
also been indirectly effective. As a result of the ban on covered students after the “February 28” period, which prevented 
them from entering universities, some students may have preferred to pursue their education instead of insisting on 
remaining covered. The polarization and “dispute” over the headscarf issue during the same period may have eased 
when AKP came in to power. However, all of these explanations are only plausible hypotheses.
Our study includes some findings that could support such views. For example, the percentage of respondents who think 
that religious people are under pressure was 42.4% in 1999, while it has dropped to 17% in 2006. Likewise, in 1999, 63.8% 
of those who were asked whether religious people in Turkey were able to freely exercise Islam’s required practices said 
“no”, while 30.9% held the opposite opinion.  In a study that was conducted just before the 2002 elections, the rate of 
people who had said “yes” remained unchanged, while the rate of people who answered “no” had significantly decreased; 
furthermore, fewer people preferred not to answer this question.2 However, the rate of people who answered the same 
question by saying “yes” has risen to 81.9% in our current study, while the rate of those of the opposite opinion has 
dropped to 14.3%.  Another question requesting respondents to compare the period of the AKP government with that of 
the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government before 2002, showed that the rate of respondents who think that the attitude 
of society towards religious people has changed is 49%, with 60% of those thinking that this change is for the better.
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We can conclude from these questions that in May 2006, when we conducted our research, religious people felt generally 
more at ease in society and that the tension in 1999 has remarkably lessened. However, as we have also stated above, 
we cannot say whether the results would come out differently if we conducted the same study again today – in a political 
atmosphere which in the last few months appears to have become tenser once more over the issue of secularism. 
We must stress that the aforementioned tension is essentially a reflection of the struggle amongst the elite. When a 
comparison with the situation in 1999 is made, it is not possible to say that the general social atmosphere throughout 
the country is more tense in 2006. But without doubt, the attitude of leaders has a significant role on changes in the 
attitude of the public. Even though a rising tension throughout society does not exist, the messages and signals given by 
the elite may cause groups of people to form various opinions. What we were able to find here is the average inclinations 
of the people of Turkey. Thus, the study reflects the concerns and views of the elite only in equal ratio to the extent these 
views are spread amongst society.
A third finding in our research about the issue of covering is that, contrary to the views of the “secularist” sector that 
claim that the turban is a political symbol and of some “Islamist” or liberal sectors who claim that this is an issue of 
identity, a great majority of women who wear a headscarf  have stated that they cover because Islam commands it. 
When asked why they cover, 71.5% of covered women say that they do so because Islam commands it, and a group 
of 7.6% say that they have to cover because everyone around them does. The rate of women who say that they cover 
because doing so is an integral part of their identity, and that they would feel “naked” in society if they did not do so, is 
only 3.9%. The rate of women who consider covering as a requisite of being an honorable woman is very low, at 3.4%.3
Neither the people of Turkey nor covered women associate the headscarf with honor, although this connection is 
occasionally made by the Islamic sector. When men were asked why their wives or fiancees cover, 59.3% answered by 
saying “because Islam commands it”, while 7.8% said that it is “because everyone else around is covered”. Only 1.5% of 
these men said that their wives or fiancees consider covering because it is a sign of being an honorable woman. Similarly, 
when men who want their wives or fiancees to be covered were asked why, 51.6% said “because Islam commands it”, 
7.8% said “because of our circle of friends and acquaintances” and 4% said “because of honor”.
As can also be observed by looking at these percentages, it is obvious that the public does not associate the covering of 
women with honor. In a study that was conducted in July 2003 that also took up the issue of women through a sample 
representing the Turkish population, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Binnaz Toprak concluded that “honor” is not considered an 
issue regarding the participation of women in education or business life; and that neither uneducated and/or unemployed 
women, nor the majority of the people of Turkey, have interpreted not participating in education or business life as “the 
requisite of being a honorable woman”.4 In this context, it is quite pleasing that the majority of the public does not 
associate the participation in education or business life with the lack of honor for a woman wearing a headscarf.
The fourth finding of our study with regard to the issue of the covering of women is that the views that are proposed as 
the general conviction of society and that claim women cover because of family pressure have not been verified. Only 
0.9% of covered women have said that they cover because their husbands or fiancees want them to, and the rate of 
women who cover because of their family – and not their husband or fiancee – is only 0.2%. Very few men amongst the 
ones whose wives or fiancees are covered or who want their future wives or fiancees to cover mentioned pressure by 
family as a reason.
However, although it looks as if the decision to be covered does not originate from family pressure, women who cover 
think that their family and/or circle of friends and acquaintances would pressure them if they decided to uncover. When 
covered women were asked, assuming they uncovered, whether they would be forced to cover again by their family or 
someone from their immediate environment, 45.5% said that they would face objections, whereas 54.5% did not. 89.7% 
of women who said that they would face objections believe that these would originate from their family.  
The fact that a total of only 1.1% of covered women have said that they cover because of their spouses, fiancees or 
family, but that 46% think that people would object to them if they uncovered, is utterly paradoxical. This is, indeed, a 
very difficult finding to interpret. One interpretation could be that the women who say that they cover “because Islam 
commands it” are not telling the truth and that they cover because their families insist that they do.
As we have stated in the section about methodology, it is very difficult to verify in this kind of study whether the 
respondents are telling the truth. Therefore, the truth may have been concealed in this question. However, if we assume 
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women, Bayramoğlu has shown that no association is made between covering and honor. Ali Bayramoğlu, Çağdaşlık Hurafe Kaldırmaz: Demokratikleşme 
Sürecinde Dindarlar ve Laikler, TESEV Publications, 2006.
4     Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak, 2004.
that the truth has not been told, then we must also think about the possible reasons for such behavior. The only reason 
that comes to mind is that the respondents were, for some reason, hesitant to tell the truth. But if this is a factor, 
then one would also expect them to be hesitant about admitting that they would face objections if they uncovered. On 
the contrary, in that question, almost 46% of covered women have openly said that their families would object if they 
uncovered. This compels us to come up with a different explanation from the “lying” factor.
Another possible explanation could be that the senior members of families impose on young women the idea that Islam 
commands that women cover. In this case, even if women adopt the belief that covering is a command of Islam, this 
idea that is imposed on them by their family as an unquestionable belief could conceal the  pressure or could even 
prevent it from being examined. Without doubt, the conclusion that women cover by free will cannot be extracted from 
explanations such as “command of Islam” or “immediate environment”.  Clearly, a devout Muslim feels obliged to 
adapt to a condition which he or she sees as a “command of Islam”. In the end, this means submitting to an order. 
What is important here is whether this command is accepted after a process of debate, and to what extent it was truly 
internalized after this particular process. In many arenas, people accept and internalize restrictions which are seen as 
commands, laws or moral rules even after they embark on questioning them. However, it is not clear whether this kind of 
an internalization exists in terms of the covering of women. It might also be true that covering is externally imposed on 
individuals against their wills. In this study, we did not ask questions to help us distinguish between these possibilities. 
For example, covered women could be asked how they reached the conclusion that covering is commanded by Islam, 
or through which circles or institutions they have attained information about Islam – without doubt, people can also 
reach the conclusion that they should cover in pursuit of Islam’s requirements through their own discretion. Had these 
questions been asked, and the existence of an authority being accepted without questioning was mentioned, we could 
have had more convincing proof that women cover because of external pressure. We did not ask people we interviewed 
such detailed questions about this subject. This point can be studied and exposed not by a survey, but through in-depth 
interviews. Unfortunately, such questions must be asked by another study that employs different methods.5
At this stage, accepting covered women’s own explanations and interpreting their conflicting answers by considering 
their inner worlds seems more reasonable to us. As we have stated above, a great majority of covered women have stated 
that they cover “because Islam commands it”, and a small minority said that they cover because everyone around them 
covers as well. These two reasons are the two most important factors in the covering of women. We can assume that 
those amongst the family and the close environment of women who cover for these reasons are in a similar position – in 
other words, the families, friends and acquaintances of women who cover because of religious concerns have probably 
adopted the same kind of reasoning. Women who cover because of religious belief may think that if they uncovered their 
heads – in fact, whether they wanted to uncover was not a part of this question – their families would think that they 
are acting against the orders of religion; thus, based upon this assumption, they may have said that their families would 
raise an objection. They may also personally believe that uncovering is acting against the commands of religion; and if 
they actually cover in order to abide by the order of their religion, then uncovering will definitely mean acting against 
Islam’s command. Likewise, when asked “if women in your family or amongst your friends or acquaintances uncovered, 
would you also do the same?”, 94.1% of women wearing a turban answered by saying “no”.
The last observation we can reach through our study is related to the question of whether two totally different groups 
exist in society in regard to the covering of women. When we study the relationships between women who cover their 
heads by wearing a headscarf or by using traditional ways of covering and women who do not cover, we see that these 
two groups do not lead a segregated life. There is no clear-cut separation in the family and friendship relations of 
uncovered women and women who wear a headcover/headscarf/yemeni.  According to what we have been told during 
our survey, women who wear a headscarf or çarşaf and women who cover in the traditional way come together in one-
to-one meetings and with their families. Two separated groups who avoid meeting each other or who abstain from any 
kind of contact do not, in practice, exist. The striking conclusion we reach here is that although the views and religious 
practices of covered and uncovered women are different from each other, they are not segregated in social life.
3.2. Approaches to the Issue of Identity
We have stated above that contrary to the discussions amongst Turkish intellectuals, the public does not deem the 
“turban” issue important when compared to economical and social issues; and that it gains importance only when it is 
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5     In addition to Ali Bayramoğlu’s study mentioned in Footnote 3, the first extensive study based on in-depth interviews with covered women was conducted 
by Nilüfer Gole and presented in her book titled “Modern Mahrem [The Forbidden Modern]”, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1991). The latest study on this issue 
is the book titled Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005) written 
by Yeşim Arat as a result of her interviews conducted with people in the Women Committees of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). None of the findings in any 
of the three studies do not verify the assertion that covered women covered themselves because they consider covering as being involved in a political 
movement.
defined as an identity issue. However, it is also importnat to note that a certain sensitivity concerning the covering of 
women exists in this context.
Whether this sensitivity reflects a general democratic reaction concerning the rights of each sector of society is 
disputable. The fact that a society which consists of a Sunni Muslim majority is sensitive about the issue of the turban 
and İmam Hatip high schools, but that does not resort to the same democratic norms when it comes to minority ethnic or 
religious groups, is indeed hard to explain by liberal values. This situation could indicate that the majority of the people 
of Turkey adopts a “sectarian” approach to democracy rather than adopting democratic norms fully. In other words, 
the rights of people who belong to “us” are defended, whereas the same sensitivity concerning the rights of “others” is 
not shown.
As we have mentioned above, concerning our question related to identity, 11.4% supported education in Kurdish for 
citizens of Kurdish origin and only 5.3% supported the financial contribution of the state to Alevi Cem houses. 43% gave 
support to lifting the ban on covered students for university entrance, and 17.6% supported measures that would make it 
easier for graduates of İmam Hatip high schools to enter university. In addition to these two questions related to citizens 
of Kurdish or Alevi origin, our survey also brings out this “sectarian” approach through other questions pertaining to 
the issue of identity. For example, when questioning the types of criteria used during voting, the option of a party “that 
considers protecting the Alevi identity and the rights of Alevi people” was the least preferred amongst ten different 
options, while a party “that shows an effort to protect the Kurdish identity” was the second least preferred.
Similarly, the rate of people who support the reinstatement of properties previously owned by non-Muslim foundations 
and later sequestered by the state was 28.1%, while the rate of people of the opposite opinion comprised a high rate of 
47.1%. In another question that asked respondents to answer by using a scale where “0” meant “I do not agree at all”, 
and “10” meant “I totally agree” on a scale of 1-10, only 3.9% agreed to the re-opening of the seminary in Heybeliada for 
the education of Christian Orthodox clergymen and this issue placed last on the list. In another question, respondents 
were asked which religious group should govern Jerusalem, taking into consideration that the city is considered sacred 
by Muslims, Christians and Jews.  66.8% chose Muslims, while only 29.4% chose the option that favored an international 
administration consisting of representatives of all three religions.6 This is another indicator of the “sectarian” approach 
we have previously mentioned.
A similar question was asked using a list of people from 12 different countries, ranging from Japan to Brazil., including 
our close neighbors.  Respondents were asked whether they consider these nations as “friends” or “enemies” and 
where they would place them on a scale of 1 to 10 (with “0” meaning “definitely an enemy” and “10” meaning “definitely 
a friend”). This resulted in only the people of three Muslim countries (Palestinians, Saudi Arabians and Iranians) being 
voted higher than a 5 on the list, with scale points of 5.3, 5.1 and 5.1 respectively, while other nations were given points 
under 5, with the lowest being Armenians with a level of 2.3.
In social and private life, approaches towards “others” seem to be more complicated. For example, similar to our study 
in 1999, the rate of people who are against their daughters or sons marrying someone from another religion is again 
very high, at around 67-70% in our current study. Although not as high, the number of people who say that they would 
oppose an inter-sectarian marriage form approximately half of the public. The striking point here is that while the rate 
of opposition against the marriage of a daughter or a son with a non-Muslim has dropped by 3% to 5% when compared 
to the situation in 1999, the rate of opposition against an inter-sectarian marriage has increased by 10%. On the other 
hand, except for the approach towards homosexuals, the rate of people who have said that they do not object to being 
neighbors with Jewish, Armenian, Kurdish or Greek people, people who belong to another Muslim sect, or who do not 
believe in any religion, is higher than the rate of people who raise an objection regarding each category. However, the 
percentage of people who raised an objection concerning marriage with a non-Muslim is around 40% – a figure that 
cannot be underestimated. The rate of people who stated that they would not raise an objection against any of the 
seven different neighbor categories is 27%, while the rate of people who would not want any of the seven categorized 
neighbors is around 17%.
Respondents were asked with what type of people they would like to work with; 33.7% said that they would prefer their 
fellow countrymen, while 25% said that they would prefer working with “devout Muslims”. The rate of people who stated 
that they would prefer working with individuals who foster the same world view is lower, at 37.9%. However, concerning 
preferences about colleagues, when people were asked which type of people they would especially want to work with 
as a partner if they established a business, the structure of the answers changed; and since business partnership is a 
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risky issue, the great majority of respondents (61.5%) preferred to work with an honest person, 13.3% preferred a person 
with previous business experience, 11% preferred someone with good education and only 9% preferred to work with a 
“devout Muslim”.
Without doubt, the “us syndrome” is a matter of concern in terms of Turkish democracy. In social life, individuals may 
have closer relationships with “others”, although they define two different groups as “we” and “others”. However, the 
formation of a modern democratic culture requires being sensitive towards the rights of “others”. Even though it is not 
easy to make a generalization about this issue without conducting a more detailed study, the above-mentioned data 
are unfortunately not promising enough for us to think that Turkey has become sensitive about these issues as yet.
As we have previously mentioned, 22.8% of the respondents did not answer the questions pertaining to the problems 
of Kurdish and Alevi citizens – perhaps because they are somewhat concerned about revealing their views on such 
sensitive issues, even though we mentioned that the names of the respondents are not written in the survey booklets. 
This situation can be considered as a problem often met during research all over the world. In fact, ordinary citizens may 
not have their own opinions about certain issues that can be defined as “sensitive”. When we take into consideration 
that the education level of ordinary Turkish citizens is lower than 8th grade, it might be difficult for many people to 
develop a personal opinion related to “sensitive” issues on which official views are heard more and more in public; 
similarly, even if an individual has his personal opinion, he might be reluctant to express it to an interviewer questioning 
him. Regarding such an attitude as normal, we are pleased that people have expressed their views on many different 
subjects despite such concerns. The real problem here is to what extent these views were stated in order to have us hear 
the official viewpoint, what part of the official viewpoint was genuinely internalized and how much the answers reflected 
the real opinions of individuals. Answering such questions is truly difficult within the scope of this type of study.
We would like to stress that these findings indicate another problem related to democracy in Turkey. The fact that people 
have a hard time answering questions about sensitive issues in such surveys may be linked to the presence of articles 
and actual circumstances in the Turkish jurisprudence system and legal practices that prevent the free expression of 
thought or to the social bias against minority groups. As a matter of fact, asking direct questions in any survey in order 
to determine the percentage of Kurdish or Alevi citizens is not helpful, and these percentages are determined through 
indirect questions. However, the answers received may give the impression that the size of these groups in society is 
smaller than their real percentage. For example, when we directed the question “Are you an Alevi?” during our survey, 
6.1% said that they were Alevi; on the other hand, the rate of people who said that they had a picture of the “Twelve 
Imams” was 6.6%, the rate of people who said that they had a picture of Ali was 7.4%, the rate of people who considered 
Ali or Hacı Bektaş Veli the most important religious personages according to their beliefs (in a list that also included 
Ebubekir, Ömer and Osman) was 14.3%. The rate of people who directly said that they were not Sunni Muslim but Alevi, 
or who said that they have the picture of the Twelve Imams or Imam Ali in their home, was 11.4%. When we consider 
that the rate of people who directly stated that they were Alevi was 6.1% in our 2006 study, when this rate was only 3.9% 
in our 1999 study, we can say that today people declare their identities with a little more ease.
Two questions were indirectly asked within the survey to determine Kurdish ethnic origin. The first one was an open-
ended question that inquired in which language the respondents communicated with their parents in their childhood, 
while the other, a close-ended question, inquired whether they knew different languages or dialects well enough to 
speak them in daily life. The rate of people who indicated Kurdish or Zazaki as the language spoken with parents was 
13.2%. When asked whether they know Kurdish, Zazaki or Kirmanc, the rate of people who said that they speak these 
languages is 15.6%. We must emphasize that these percentages have significantly risen in recent years.
3.3. “Islamist-Secularist” Polarization
As we stated in the introduction of our study, the secularist approach and practices of the Turkish Republic has caused 
disputes since it was first established, and even gave way to uprisings during its first years. After the transition to the 
multi-party regime, sectors that wanted Islam to be more visible in public life pushed this motive to be a part of the 
public agenda by means of political parties. Since the initial years of the Republic, and even since the Reform Period of 
the Ottoman Empire, Turkish society has faced a separation of two wings that are defined as “Islamist” and “Secularist”. 
This cleavage left its imprint on the last few decades and became the focal point of public debate after the Islamist 
sector began to gain power around the “Milli Görüş [National Outlook]” movement, which started in the 1970s.
In the study we conducted in 1999, we tried to comprehend whether this cleavage, which was widely discussed amongst 
the elite, the print and broadcast media members, during that period, also existed within society. The answers given 
to many questions in our survey did not point to such a cleavage in regards to a significant majority of society – the 
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majority of the people seemed tolerant regarding different lifestyles they came across in the course of daily life. For 
example, it did not matter to them if women in the districts where they lived or in restaurants they visited covered or 
wore mini-skirts. Similarly, a great majority of  people said that there could be good people amongst people from a 
different religion or people who did not have any religious belief; that if someone believes in God or a prophet, he could 
still be considered a Muslim even if he did not perform the ritual prayer (namaz), did not fast, consumed alcohol or in the 
case of a woman did not cover; that they did not approve of political parties that base their policy on religion; that they 
did not want the secular jurisprudence system to change; and that they did not favor the mixing of religion and state.
We decided not to analyze most of the aforementioned questions once again in our current study. We do not think 
that Turkish people have become less tolerant concerning these issues in the seven years that have passed since our 
previous study. In this study, instead of such questions, we used other modes of inquiry that could provide us with some 
hints in terms of the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. If we have to generalize the answers we have received, we can say 
that approximately one-third of the public is sensitive about secularism, and that two-thirds have not displayed any 
sign of such sensitivity. After being told that the terms “Islamists” and “Secularists” were often used in Turkey and 
that “0” means “secular” and “10” means “Islamist” on a scale of 0-10, 20.3% of respondents defined themselves as 
“secular”, 48.5% as “Islamist” and 23.4% placed themselves in the center of these two extremes. However, as shown 
by the answers given to some of our questions, the wing that we can describe as “secular” consists of almost 30% of the 
people, which enables us to distinguish between the “secularists” and “Islamists”.
For example, the question which analyzed whether secularism is under threat in Turkey was answered positively by 
22.6%, while 72.6% said that no such threat exists. When we asked people if they agreed with the claim that religious 
fundamentalism, which aims to establish an Islamic society and state in Turkey, has been on the rise in the last 10-15 
years, 32.6% said that they agreed, whereas 61.3% did not. When the people who agreed with this viewpoint were asked 
what they based their opinion on, 34.6% of the 32.6% pointed out the increase in the number of covered women. When 
asked whether they would feel disturbed if elementary school teachers or judges were allowed to wear a turban, 29.2% 
and 28.2% respectively answered that they would, while the rates of people who were of the opposite opinion were 
70.4% and 71.5% respectively. The rate of people who considered the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet 
Mohammed in a Danish newspaper as an inevitable consequence of democracy and freedom of thought was 15.1%, while 
73% stated that such publications should be prevented. As will be explained below, the answers given to each question 
are closely related with how religious people think they are and with their self-placement on the “Islamist-Secularist” 
scale.
In the study we conducted in 1999, we asked people whether they supported the existence of religion-based political 
parties in the Turkish political system. At that time, 60.6% said that such parties should not exist in the Turkish political 
system, while 24.6% thought that they should. In our current study, the same question yielded a decrease of 7% in the 
rate of people who thought such parties should not be a part of the Turkish political system (53.6%), while the rate of 
people supporting the opposite viewpoint was 41.4%, with an increase of 16.8%. Although this finding appears at first 
to be a matter of concern for people who think that secularism is under threat, this question does not aim to analyze 
what is understood by the concept of “religion-based politics”. Similarly, the rate of people who defined themselves as 
“primarily Muslim”, when directed a question as to how they define themselves, was 35.7% in 1999, which has risen to 
44.6% in 2006. The rate of people who defined themselves as “very religious” was 6% in 1999, while it is 12.8% in our 
2006 study. However, such views do not necessarily mean that the number of people who want a religious state has 
increased.
In fact, through examining another question we can see that such a conclusion cannot be drawn. 21% of the respondents 
gave an affirmative answer to a question we asked in 1999, inquiring whether they would want a Shari’ah state to be 
established in Turkey. This percentage, which was rather high, decreased almost by half in all of the questions asking 
whether they thought Shari’ah laws should replace the Turkish Civil Code, after we provided a comparative explanation 
of both Shari’ah laws and the Civil Code. In some questions (for instance, concerning the implementation of Shari’ah 
laws about adultery) the rate dropped to 1%. We did not include questions that compared these two jurisprudence 
systems into our current study. However, in our direct question with which we inquired whether respondents favored 
the establishment of a Shari’ah state, the rate of positive response of 21% in our 1999 study dropped to 8.9% in 2006. It 
should not be forgotten that at the time we conducted our study in 1999, the answer given to this question asked directly 
in all research conducted was around 20%.
Another favorable conclusion that can be drawn from our study is that a majority of the people included in both groups 
do not think that the opposing group pressures them. As we have stated above, most of the public is not of the opinion 
that the secularist sector pressures religious people. People who defend the countering viewpoint are only represented 
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by 17%. Moreover, only 8.1% of respondents said that religious circles pressure secular people. Likewise, the rate of 
people who think that secularists are unable to live free from the pressure of religious circles is only 11.3%.
A great majority of both covered and uncovered women stated that they do not feel pressured to either uncover or cover 
by strangers. 89.4% of women who wear a headscarf said that they were not disturbed by strangers because they cover. 
Another question directed to the same group of women, asking if anyone in their immediate environment or from their 
family was forcing them to uncover, yielded a percentage of 93% saying that no one pressured them. On the other hand, 
90.1% of uncovered women stated that they did not feel pressured by anyone to cover. The rate of covered women who 
said that they were disturbed by strangers because they are covered was 3.7%, while the rate of uncovered women who 
said that they felt pressured to cover came out at 9.9%. Despite this slight difference between the two groups, in general 
we can say that a significant majority of women in both groups is not under social pressure.
When families who had at least one daughter who does not cover were asked how they would react if their daughter 
decided to cover one day, 15.2% said that they would feel upset and try to convince her to uncover, 28.2% said that 
although they would feel sad they would respect her free decision, and 54.3% said that they would feel pleased and 
support her. However, the total rate of people who said that they would be upset was 43.4%. As mentioned above, the 
same question was directed to covered women, resulting in 46% saying that their families would force them to cover 
again if they uncovered, while 54% said that no one would raise an objection against their decision.
One of the issues often expressed with regard to the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage was that the military played an 
important role in safeguarding secularism, and that the threats cast against the secular state would become stronger 
if the military factor did not exist. Whether this idea corresponds to real facts is the subject of another discussion. 
For example, although the “February 28th” period was considered a “post-modern coup” by certain groups, when we 
look at the process that led to “February 28th”, we believe that the fall of the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) from power 
was also closely related to the reaction of a significant portion of the public against the policies of the party. In other 
words, the reaction of voters, as well as democratic processes, was as effective on the advent of “February 28th” as 
the military factor. Thus, 53.7% of the public has stated that secularism can be safeguarded and maintained in Turkey 
without the support of the military. However, 58.6% of the public finds it normal that military forces can occasionally 
express their views against elected governments concerning certain subjects. Since what these subjects were was not 
asked, people who approved of the military expressing its views concerning security issues that is of direct concern, 
might have given an affirmative answer to this question. Even so, when interpreted together with this question, it is not 
possible to draw the conclusion that a relation between the military’s expression of its opinions and the protection of 
secularism is established. In other words, even if the military states its opinion or not, the majority of the people believe 
that secularism can be protected without the military’s support. On the other hand, when we listed ten different sectors 
and asked to what extent these social groups supported the reforms for eliminating the infringment of human rights, 
expanding the rights of citizens and enabling constitutional institutions to work better and be closer to the public, the 
rate of people who said that the military supported such reforms was significantly high, at 54.5%. The rate of people 
who think that the military is against these reforms was only 20.9%.
Similarly, another interesting finding we have reached in this context is related to the presidential elections that have 
recently become the symbol of the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage in Turkey. In a question that examined the required 
characteristics of the president, the rate of people who think that the president must be a “devout Muslim” was 74.3%, 
while the rate of people who considered “protecting secularism” important was slightly higher at 75.2%. However, 85.9% 
deemed “being an example to modern Turkey through his lifestyle” important. 50.8% thought that if the president is “a 
man and if he is married his wife must be uncovered”. In the open-ended question which asked who respondents would 
support as candidate for the presidential elections in 2007, no names stood out, with the most supported candidate 
at only 14.9%. However, the total rate of people who did not answer this question or who did not mention a name was 
52.9%.
3.4. Opinions Concerning AKP and the AKP Government
The diagnosis that a very serious process of change is in place when compared to the previous DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition 
government is considerably noteworthy in terms of the evaluations made about the AKP government. People who think 
that this change is for the better comprise a larger group than people who think it is for the worse. However, it is not 
possible to say that AKP’s performance in governance has been found satisfactory in all areas. The party’s policies 
concerning Kurdish and Alevi identity, particularly, are thought to be far from satisfactory. The party is also criticized 
concerning its policy in reducing the rate of unemployment. Similarly, the performance of AKP with regard to issues such 
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as the headscarf issue and the problems İmam Hatip graduates face, which are deemed important by the party’s voters, 
is found to be rather inadequate.  The general evaluation of AKP displays a two-sided picture. The more conservative 
group of rural voters who see themselves closer to the religious and Islamist sector and who have a relatively lower 
socio-economic status have a more positive approach, whereas the opposing group of urban voters, who ideologically 
see themselves closer to the leftist and secular sector and who have a relatively higher socio-economic status, generally 
assess AKP negatively. However, we can say that AKP has a better position in these evaluations when compared to RP’s 
position in the 1999 study. Still, as a result of this evaluation, which reflects the general dual structure of society, we can 
say that AKP stands out as a government that receives positive feedback from a certain social segment while it becomes 
the target of another that opposes its policies.
3.5. Issue of “Islam and Terrorism”
One of the most frequently discussed issues worldwide since September 11 is whether there is a link between Islam and 
terrorism. The suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks by Muslim terrorists, that first began during the Palestinian 
conflict and then took place in different parts of the world as well as in Turkey, have gradually caused Western societies 
to establish a link between Islam and terrorism, and the September 11 attack has intensified this prejudice. Without 
doubt, terrorist attacks are not methods employed solely by Muslims, and many people belonging to other religions 
have participated in such terrorist attacks in various countries all over the world. However, it is an obvious fact that many 
of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in the last decade were either administered and/or carried out by Muslim 
organizations. As a result, “Islamophobia” has begun to emerge in the West, and although responsible politicians and 
intellectuals stress that Islam does not condone such terrorist acts and that the actions of terrorists cannot be attributed 
to all Muslims, it is a fact that prejudice against Muslims continuously gains strength in Western societies.
In this study, we have tried to examine this issue and to find out the viewpoint of the people of Turkey, consisting 
mostly of Muslims, concerning terrorism. One of the five questions we asked about this subject inquired whether 
suicide bombings could be deemed acceptable if the country was occupied. 65.5% answered this question by saying that 
suicide bombings are unacceptable even if the country was occupied. The rate of people who thought such attacks were 
acceptable was only 20.2%. When a more concrete example was given and people were asked whether they approved of 
the suicide bombings by the resistance fighters in Iraq, 72.8% said that they did not approve, while the ones who gave 
approval made up a small group of 17.5%. The percentage of people who did not approve of such bombings increased if 
such attacks were directed against civilians. The rate of people who would approve of suicide bombings against civilians 
in the case of an occupation was 8%, while the great majority of people, 84.4%, said that they do not find such actions 
acceptable. When the question was more concretized and people were asked whether they approved of the Palestinian 
suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, 82.8% said that they did not while only 8.3% said that they did. Finally, when 
people were asked whether such attacks were acceptable under Islamic principles, 81.4% said that they were not, while 
only 8.1% said that they were. The rate of people who chose to answer these five questions by saying “I have no idea” or 
who did not give an answer at all ranged between 10% and 15%, which is significant. This attitude could be a reflection 
of their worry about openly voicing their support to an action that is a crime, or could be a sign that they have not really 
pondered upon this issue before.
The picture that appears with relation to these conclusions shows that the majority of people do not associate Islam with 
terrorism, that the people of Turkey do not support terrorist activities even in extreme situations such as the occupation 
of the country, and that they are strongly against such attacks especially if they are directed towards civilians.
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4.1. Demographic Characteristics of the Research Sample
When we look at Table 4.1, which gives information about the distribution of some of the basic indicators in our sample, 
we see that the rate of female respondents in our sample is higher by approximately 2%.1 When these figures are 
evaluated, the fact that no quota has been used in selecting our sample must be kept in mind. All demographical values 
have been obtained through applying the random selection method, except for designing the urban and rural interviews 
in accordance with the actual values of the voting population. The weight that we used to correct certain regional rural-
urban deviations that emerged during the interviews has caused minor changes in sizes calculated without weight 
in some of the other demographical indicators. When we compared the results of the 2006 research with that of the 
one conducted in 1999, we observed that the sample displayed a differentiation by at most 3-4 percentage points. For 
example, a lower percentage of our 2006 samples are married (74.5% in 1999, and 70.4% in 2006). The size of an average 
household is smaller (4.6% in 1999, and 4.2% in 2006). The rate of literate people is higher by almost 1 percent (91.1% in 
1999, and 92.2% in 2006). In the 2006 research, the percentage of voters in the urban population is 65%, a reflection of 
the immigration to urban areas (63.3% in 1999). We should also bear in mind that an important number of these changes 
are the natural consequences of a transformation period of seven years.
Table 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Rate of female population (%) 51.8
Rate of married population (%) 70.4
Size of average household (person) 4.2
Rate of population under the age of 30 (%) 33.9
Average age (year) 38.8
Rate of literate people (%) 92.2
Rate of urban population (%) 65.1
The rate of the population under the age of 30, shown in Table 4.1, is almost at the same level with that of the 1999 study. 
However, when the details in Table 4.2 are taken into consideration, it can be seen that the sample of the 2006 research 
is slightly older in comparison to the 1999 study. The population at age 39 and under was 56.9% in 2006, while this figure 
was 59.7% in 1999. This decrease in the percentage of the younger population has caused an increase, even if slightly, 
in the percentage of the population at 40 and over. It must be emphasized that this increase is partially caused by the 
natural aging of the Turkish population, as well as the effect of family planning.
4. Main Demographic Characteristics of the Sample, 
the Problematic of Identity and Political Leanings
1    As we have stated above, the results we present here have been reported by maintaining the rural-urban percentage based on TUIK’s nomenclature of units 
for territorial statistics. We could have also used a coefficient to set the female-male ratio in each territory in addition to presenting the observed rates on 
the basis of territories. However, we were not able to determine a ratio of female-male voters that displays a difference, even if a slight one. When we used 
a coefficient to determine the female-male ratio in the general population of voters in the country, we were not able to reach meaningful differentiations. 
Therefore, a coefficient was calculated to determine the standard territorial rural-urban ratio, and we have observed that this type of an applied correction 
did not cause substantial differentiations when compared to the results obtained without the application of a coefficient with regard to various questions.
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Table 4.2 Age Groups
(%)
18-24 18.7
25-39 38.2
40-54 26.0
55-69 13.0
70 + 3.6
N/A 0.6
Total 100
4.1.1. Education 
When we look at the education level of the people in our sample, we see that we have a more educated sample in 
comparison to 1999. For instance, the number of people who said that they are not literate is less in comparison to the 
1999 study (8.8% in 1999, and 6.9% in 2006). While the percentage of people who said that they graduated from middle 
school has remained the same, after the enactment of the law for eight-years of compulsory education, the percentage 
of high school graduates is found to be 24.4% in the 2006 sample (in 1999, this rate was 21.7%). The percentage of people 
who graduated from a university or had higher education has slightly increased (8.4% in 1999, and 9.2% in 2006).
Table 4.3 Education (%)
Illiterate 6.9
Literate 4.9
Primary school 42.3
Middle school 11.5
Technical high-school 4.5
Anatolian high-school 0.8
Super high-school 0.7
İmam Hatip high-school 0.5
Other normal high-schools 17.8
University and higher education 9.2
No opinion/no answer 0.9
Total 100
4.1.2. Ethnic Origin 
We asked two questions to determine the size of the Kurdish population. The first question was an open-ended one that 
inquired about the communication language of respondents with their parents during their childhood. The second was 
a close-ended question that asked whether they knew different languages or dialects well enough to talk to others in 
day-to-day conversation. Table 4.4 summarizes the answers given to those two questions. As a small group stated in 
the open-ended answers that they spoke in more than one language with their parents, the total of all answers exceeds 
100%. In this question, the percentage of people who said that they spoke Kurdish or Zazaki is 12.6%. 
In the close-ended question, the percentage of people who said that they spoke Kurdish, Zazaki or Kirmanc is higher 
than the percentage of people who said that they communicated with their parents through these languages or dialects 
(15.6 %). One of the causes of this situation might be that people who can only speak a few sentences in another 
language represented themselves as speaking these languages and dialects. When compared to people who stated 
that they had spoken with their parents in these languages as a child, some people said that they spoke to their parents 
in these languages and dialects in the past, while others said that they were able to speak these languages and dialects 
now although they could not in their childhood – in a way that implies that they have acquired these skills afterwards. 
The percentage of the second group – in other words, the group that said that they learned these languages after they 
grew up (3.5%) – is significantly higher than the group who said that they knew these languages as a child but have now 
forgotten them (0.6%) (Table 4.5). Of the people who stated that they used to speak to their parents in these languages 
and dialects, people who said that they no longer have these skills formed a small group of 4.4%.
Table 4.4 shows the group of people who speak Kurdish determined by combining the answers to these two questions. 
As can be seen, the total percentage of people who say that they used to speak these languages and dialects, or that 
they speak them now, is 16.1%.
Table 4.4 Kurdish Ethnic Origin
Which language or languages did you speak as a child with your mother or father in daily life?
Rate according to all answers (%)
Rate according to the number of people 
who responded /%)
Turkish 85.9 91.1
Kurdish 11.5 12.1
Zaza language (Zazaki) 1.0 1.1
Other 0.7 0.7
Laz language (Lazuri) 0.5 0.6
Arabic 0.4 0.4
100 106
Is your (Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki) good enough to speak it with others in daily life?
Yes, it is 15.6
No, it is not 81.8
N/A 2.6
100
Speaks Kurdish today or used to speak Kurdish with their parents during childhood years
Does not speak Kurdish, did not speak Kurdish 
in the past either
83.9
Speaks or used to speak Kurdish 16.1
100
Table 4.5 Changing use of the Kurdish language in the course of time
 People who used to speak Kurdish-Zazaki with their parents during their childhood
Did not speak (%)
Used to speak Kurdish-Zazaki 
with his/her parents (%) Total (%)
Now Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki
Yes, I know 3.5 12.1 15.6
No, I do not know 81.3 0.6 81.8
N/A 2.6 0.0 2.6
Total 87.4 12.6 100
Did not speak (%)
Used to speak Kurdish-Zazaki 
with his/her parents (%) Total (%)
Now Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki
Yes, I know 22.2 77.8 100
No, I do not know 99.3 0.7 100
N/A 100.0 0.0 100
Total 87.4 12.6 100
Did not speak (%)
Used to speak Kurdish-Zazaki 
with his/her parents (%) Total (%)
Now Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki
Yes, I know 4.0 95.6 15.5
No, I do not know 93.0 4.4 81.8
N/A 3.0 0.0 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
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4.1.3. Ownership and Income
In our country, where the declaration of ownership is met with suspicion especially because people are worried about 
the possible legal consequences of declaring their property, indirect questions in addition to direct questions can be 
helpful in determining the income distribution of the respondents. However, the important task to accomplish in this 
type of study is to determine the socio-economic status of the interviewed people in a comparative way. One of the 
questions we have asked to this end aimed to determine what these people owned, in other words, their accumulated 
property. Table 4.6, shown below, gives the ownership rates of ten different properties. These rates are based on the 
information provided directly by the respondents. However, when a sample of this size and a property list of this variety 
are compared to each other, they are expected to clearly represent the relative status of people.
The percentage of distribution that emerges when we create a total ownership index ranging from 0 to 10, by assuming 
that each item on our list has the same value, is shown in Table 4.7. People who stated that they owned 30% or less of 
these items form approximately 37% of the total sample. People who stated that they own half or less than half of these 
items form approximately 71% of the entire group. People who stated that they own 80% or more of these items form 
approximately 7% of the total sample.
Table 4.6 Ownership
Owns
(%)
Does not own 
(%)
No answer
(%)
Total
(%)
House 29.8 67.4 2.8 100
Automobile 69.7 30.0 0.3 100
Home telephone 28.1 71.4 0.5 100
Dishwasher 71.3 28.5 0.2 100
Automatic washing machine 13.4 86.3 0.3 100
Computer 79.0 20.7 0.3 100
Plasma/LCD television 89.2 10.2 0.5 100
Summer house 93.7 5.7 0.6 100
Cell phone 23.9 74.9 1.2 100
Credit card 68.9 30.6 0.5 100
When a cluster analysis is made on the total ownership index scores, three groups are obtained. When “high”, “medium” 
and “low” level ownership clusters are formed, the average ownership scores constitute 36.8%, 45.3% and 12.8% of the 
sample, respectively (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7 Ownership Index and Groups
Ownership Index % Ownership Groups %
0 0.4 Low-level prorietorship 36.8
10 3.4 Medium-level prorietorship 45.3
20 12.4 High-level prorietorship 12.8
30 20.6 N/A 5.0
40 20.8
50 13.2
60 11.3
70 6.2
80 3.6
90 2.5
100 0.5
CY 5.0
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People who were interviewed in order to determine the income of the household were asked to provide information 
about the salaries, rent income, pension pay, etc., of all the members of the household by taking into consideration 
the last six months. Clearly, the obtained answers cannot be expected to reflect the facts fully, but still, we are of the 
opinion that these figures can be used as a sufficient measure for comparing the people included in the sample. Table 
4.8 shows the household income levels of these three groups.
Table 4.8 Income Groups %
Under  450 YTL 26.6
Between 450-1000 YTL 47.2
Over 1000 YTL 19.0
N/A 7.2
Total 100
4.1.4. Positions on the Left-right Ideological Platform
A finding we had emphasized in the study we conducted in 1999 was that Turkish voters were shifting to the right of the 
center on the ideological platform. Although this shift towards the right has lost speed, it still continues, and according 
to the obtained results, the right side of the center seems to be more than twice the size of the left side of the center. 
We have formed a group of three, since we will use the positions on the left-right axis as a descriptive variable, and have 
summarized the results in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9 Left-right Groups (Placing on the 0-10 scale)                                                     %
Left (0-4) 15.7
Center (5) 30.0
Right (6-10) 37.2
N/A 17.1
Total 100
4.1.5. Alevi Origin
The Alevi-Sunni cleavage in Turkey is very important in order to comprehend different reflections of religiosity and the 
influence of political Islam on the public. In the study we conducted in 1999, we had tried to discuss this matter only 
with regard to primary identity and religious sects and the details of this inquiry are presented below. However, we had 
attained percentages which were not satisfactory. Clearly, it is unusual for Alevi citizens in Turkey to openly talk about 
their identity in public. Therefore, different methods of questioning have been developed and used within the scope of 
various studies, and the results of these efforts have been published in detail.2 We have employed a similar method here 
in order to detemine whether the interviewed people were Alevi or not.
To this end, people were asked if they professed faith in a religion, and the people who responded by saying that they 
were Muslim were asked whether they were “Sunni Muslim”. People who stated that they were not Sunni Muslims were 
directly asked whether they were Alevi or not. (Table 4.10). 6.1% of the 9.2% of respondents, who said that they were not 
Sunni Muslims, stated that they are Alevis.
All of the people interviewed were also asked if they had any picture of the 12 Imams or Imam Ali in their homes, through 
two different questions. 7.4% of the respondents stated that they have a picture of Imam Ali, and 6.6% stated thay 
have a picture of the 12 Imams in their home. The people who responded to all three of the questions by saying that 
they are Alevi or that they have a picture of Imam Ali or the 12 Imams in their home were assumed to be of Alevi origin, 
and consequently, a simple index has been formed. According to this criterium, 11.4% of our sample consists of Alevi 
citizens.
40
2   Çarkoğlu, A. 2005. “Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage”, Turkish Studies special issue, Religion and 
Politics in Turkey, Vol. 6 No. 2, June; A. Çarkoğlu ve E. Kalaycıoğlu, 2006.
People were directed two questions that inquired how religious they were and where they placed themselves on the 
“Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. As we will use their answers as descriptive variables in some of the analyses below, we 
would like to provide a detailed presentation here.
Table 4.10 Alevi Origin
No, I do not profess faith in 
any religion %
Yes, I am Muslim
%
Do you profess faith in a religion? 1.6 98.4 100
To the ones who say “Yes, I am Muslim”
Yes, I am a Sunni Muslim
 (%)
No, I am not  Sunni Muslim
 (%)
N/A
(%)
System
(%)
Are you a Sunni Muslim? 87.4 9.2 1.8 1.6 100
To the ones who say “no, I am not a Sunni 
Muslim”
Yes, I am an Alevi
(%)
No, I am not an Alevi
(%)
N/A
(%)
System
(%)
Then, are you an Alevi? 6.1 1.9 1.3 90.8 100
Do you have in your home a picture of any of the religious personages or sites I will mention now?
Yes, there is
(%)
No, there is not
(%)
N/A
(%)
System
(%)
12 İmams 6.6 90.1 1.8 1.6 100
Imam Ali 7.4 88.7 2.3 1.6 100
Respondents who say that he/she is not a Sunni Muslim and that he/she is an Alevi, or those who say that the picture of the 12 Imams or 
Imam Ali is in their home
Not Alevi 88.6
Alevi 11.4
100
The detailed presentations on a scale of 1-10, related to the questions we have asked in 2006 in accordance with the form 
used in the 1999 study, are summarized in Table 4.11. When the evaluations of people on the level of their own religiosity 
are examined, it can be said that throughout the country, people see themselves as more religious in comparison to 
1999. When we exclude the ones who said “I am not religious at all” or “I am not very religious”, a group of 86% was 
obtained in 1999, while this number was 93.2% in 2006. People consider themselves more religious when compared to 
1999. 
When we interpret the results by also taking into consideration two other questions we have not asked earlier, we see 
that people perceive their mothers to be more religious than them, while they consider their father only as religious 
as themselves. As an indication of whether women have a privileged role in transferring religiosity from generation to 
generation, this finding must be underscored.
Table 4.11 Religiosity of people according to their self-evaluation
Respondent 1999
(%)
Respondent 2006
(%)
Respondent ‘s Mother 
2006
(%)
Respondent’s Father 
2006
(%)
I am not religious at al (0) 2.7 0.9 0.3 0.8
I am not very religious (1-3) 9.4 3.6 1.3 2.3
I can be considered religious (4-6) 55.0 33.9 23.8 25.4
I am very religious (7-9) 25.0 46.5 46.3 43.0
I am extremely religious (10) 6.0 12.8 25.5 24.4
No idea/No answer 1.7 2.3 2.7 4.1
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Figure 4.1 below shows how people position themselves in the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. Obviously, it is not clear 
what is being understood from the expressions “Islamist” or “Secularist”. However, if we assume that people who have 
not understood what these two expressions mean at all, or people who have preferred to conceal their real position, 
have not answered this question, it is rather noteworthy that this group is not very large. In other words, regardless 
of what these two expressions mean to people, most of them seem to have placed themselves towards the “Islamist” 
side of this scale. This is clear from the figures, as people who see themselves closer to the “Secularist” end total 20.3%, 
whereas the people who see themselves closer to the “Islamist” end of the scale add up to 48.5%, which is more than 
double the percentage of the other group. In the analyses from this point on, the term “Islamists” will be used to refer 
to the group of 48.5%, “center” to the group of 23.4% which ranks as a 5 on the 0-10 scale and “Secularists” to the group 
of 20.3%, making up the 0-4 range on the scale.
Table 4.12 displays the positions on the 0-10 scale based on the subgroups in the answers given to these three questions. 
For example, while respondents place themselves at 6.9 in terms of their religiosity; they place their mothers at 7.7 and 
place their fathers at 7.5 on this scale. On the other hand, the average position on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale is at 
5.7, which is closer to the “Islamist” end on the scale. The most significant finding here is that people who speak in 
Kurdish with their parents are closer to the “Islamist” end on the scale when they evaluate the level of religiosity of both 
themselves and their parents in comparison to the average findings throughout the country. In other words, we can 
say that evaluations of Kurdish origin and religiosity are synonymous to the “Islamist” end on the scale. On the other 
hand, being of Alevi origin means proximity to the “Secularist” end, displaying a relatively less strong religiosity. Rural 
settlement areas, low income and inadequate education correlate to the “Islamist” end and a higher level of religiosity. 
Similarly, voters for AKP are closer to the “Islamist-religious” end within the Turkey average, while voters for CHP are, 
in contrast, closer to the “Secularist” and relatively less religious end.
4.2. Turkish Voters and Ethnic Religious Identity
The comparative and detailed presentation of the question on primary identity, which was also asked within the scope 
of our study in 1999, is given in Figure 4.2. As can be observed in this figure, the relative weight of identity options in 
the sample has not changed in the last seven years. People who define themselves primarily as Muslim constitute the 
majority group in 2006, as was the case in 1999. However, while this option is followed by the option of “a citizen of 
the Turkish Republic” in 1999, in 2006, the gap between the two options seems to have grown to the advantage of the 
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Figure 4.1 We often hear about “Islamists” and “Secularists” in Turkey. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale?
definition of Muslim identity. While Muslim identity was chosen as an option by 35.7% of the respondents in 1999, this 
rate has increased to 44.6% in 2006. The option that can be described as ethnic-based Turkish identity was favored by 
approximately 20% of the voters, which is followed by Kurdish and Alevi identities that are preferred by a much smaller 
group. As we have emphasized before, Turkish voters who consider themselves religious also prefer the Muslim identity 
when it comes to selecting a definition of identity.
Table 4.12 Religiosity and the Islamist-Secularist cleavage according to individuals’ self-evaluation
  Religiosity
Secularist-
Islamist
(%)
Respondent
(%)
Respondent’s  
Mother (%)
Respondent’s  
Father
(%)
Gender
Female 5.9 7.1 7.7 7.5
Male 5.6 6.8 7.7 7.5
Settlement type
Rural 6.4 7.4 8.1 8.0
Urban 5.4 6.6 7.5 7.3
Ethnic origin 
Did not speak Kurdish/Zazaki with his/her parents 5.6 6.8 7.5 7.4
Used to speak Kurdish/Zazaki with his/her parents 6.9 7.7 8.8   8.5
Age groups
18-24 5.5 6.5 7.7 7.4
25-39 5.6 6.7 7.7 7.4
40-54 6.0 7.1 7.7 7.7
55-69 5.9 7.5 7.8 7.8
70 + 5.7 7.6 8.0 8.0
Income groups
Under 450 YTL 7.0 7.6 8.2 8.1
Between 450 –1000 YTL 5.7 6.8 7.5 7.4
Over 1000 YTL 4.4 6.2 7.3 7.0
Party preferences
AKP 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.0
ANAP-DYP-GP 5.1 6.3 7.2 7.0
MHP-BBP 5.4 6.7 7.5 7.2
CHP 2.8 5.7 6.8 6.5
DEHAP 5.7 7.1 8.6 7.8
Other 3.9 6.0 7.8 7.2
Undecided 5.1 6.7 7.5 7.3
Left-right groups
Leftist 3.6 5.9 7.2 6.7
Center 5.5 6.8 7.6 7.5
Rightist 6.9 7.5 8.0 7.9
Alevi origin
Not an Alevi 5.9 7.1 7.8 7.6
Alevi 4.3 5.6 7.0 6.7
Education
Illiterate 7.0 8.0 8.2 8.0
Literate without a diploma 6.7 7.7 8.3 8.1
Primary/ middle school graduate 6.3 7.2 7.9 7.7
High school graduate 4.6 6.1 7.2 7.0
University+ graduate 3.9 6.1 7.2 7.0
Turkey average 5.7 6.9 7.7 7.5
* Although DEHAP is outlawed, a small number of voters still see it as an option amongst political parties. In this study, we will refer to this rate as DEHAP/DTP.
When primary preferences are considered in terms of the subgroups of the sample, we come across interesting patterns. 
For instance, women seem to prefer the Muslim identity much more than men. While the preference of the Muslim 
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identity by women is at 51%, this rate is only at 37.7% for men. Women, seem to be more religious in societies where they 
have more limited opportunity to participate in social life and where they are less educated than men. Likewise, studies 
that were conducted in the 1960s and 70s, when the difference in the status of women and men was greater, indicate 
that religiosity plays an important role on the voting behavior of women.
In the same way, the Muslim identity was selected in rural areas by 51.2% of the respondents, while the preference 
of people in urban areas indicated a rate of 41%. 57.4% of the people who stated that they used to speak in Kurdish 
with their parents as a child have chosen the Muslim identity as their primary identity, while people who did not speak 
Kurdish add up to 42.7%. Older age displays a similar preference pattern, and as income level increases, being a citizen 
of the Turkish Republic or being Turkish seems to be given preference as an option.
When we look at party preferences, we can detect a serious cleavage between the voters of AKP and CHP, similar to 
the cleavages observed in Turkish politics. For example, 46.1% of CHP voters define themselves primarily as “citizens 
of the Turkish Republic”, while this rate drops to 23.1% amongst the voters of AKP. On the other hand, AKP voters who 
define themselves primarily as “Muslim” form a group of 60%, which is quite high in comparison to the preferences of 
the voters for all other parties, while only 20.9% of CHP voters have chosen this option. Neither CHP nor AKP voters 
define themselves primarily as Kurdish. People who define themselves primarily as Alevi are largely amongst the voters 
of DEHAP/DTP (11.1%). The people in this group who prefer CHP are represented by only 2.7%, while none are voters for 
AKP. As can be expected, 57% of the people who define themselves primarily as Kurdish vote for DEHAP/DTP.
Ethnic Turkish identity, surprisingly, comes after the Muslim and citizenship identities among the voters of MHP-BBP. 
On the other hand, the preferences for all three identity definitions have almost equal weight amongst the voters for 
ANAP-DYP-GP, and no respondents in this group have indicated another definition.
The relationship between the socio-economic status of voters and their identity definitions also presents interesting 
results. For example, the higher the education level, the higher the percentage of people who define themselves primarily 
as citizens of the Turkish Republic and, the lower the percentage of people who define themselves primarily as Muslim. 
People who define themselves primarily as citizens of the Turkish Republic mainly belong to the groups who consider 
themselves as “secular” and “not very religious” and who have higher education and a high level of ownership. Those 
who consider themselves primarily as Muslim mostly belong to households with a monthly income of less than 450 YTL 
and they usually live in rural areas,  are women, and are illiterate. At the same time, the percentage of respondents who 
primarily define themselves as Muslim rises in parallel to the increase in age, and the highest rate is seen in the 70+ age 
group.
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Figure 4.2 When asked, would you primarily describe yourself as Turkish, Muslim, a citizen of the Turkish 
Republic, Kurdish, or Alevi?
On the other hand, when we look at people who define their identity mainly as Kurdish, we can say that there are more 
men than women in this group. There is no such difference in this group in terms of the rural-urban split; however, when 
the “Secularist-Islamist” cleavage and religiosity are taken into consideration, we can say that when we draw nearer to 
the “Islamists” end in the first and “religious” end in the latter, Kurdish identity begins to stand out. When the education 
level of the people in this group is examined, we observe that people who emphasize the Kurdish identity more strongly 
are people who are literate and who do not have a diploma. At the same time, as the ideological preference of the people 
in this group leans towards the right, and when their income and age increase, the percentage of people who underscore 
the Kurdish identity drops.
In contrast, Alevi identity is more strongly emphasized as income level increases, and is less emphasized closer to the 
“Islamist” and religious end. Similar to the people in the first group, the ones in this group are mostly men; and again, 
similar to the first group, the rate of people who underscore their Alevi identity decreases as they get older and as their 
ideological pereference leans towards the right.
Table 4.13 When asked, would you primarily describe yourself as Turkish, Muslim, a citizen of the Turkish 
Republic, Kurdish, or Alevi?-I
I describe 
myself 
primarily 
as Turkish
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
Muslim
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
a citizen of 
the Turkish 
Republic
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
Kurdish
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
an Alevi
(%)
Other, I 
describe 
myself in 
another way
(%)
No idea/
No 
answer
(%)
Gender
Female 17.9 51.0 26.6 1.5 0.5 1.6 1.1 100
Male 21.1 37.7 33.4 4.1 1.8 1.0 0.9 100
Settlement 
type
Rural 17.8 51.2 25.9 2.9 0.7 0.2 1.4 100
Urban 20.3 41.0 32.0 2.6 1.3 2.0 0.8 100
Ethnic 
descent
Did not speak 
Kurdish/Zazaki with 
his/her parents
21.7 42.7 32.1 0.3 0.9 1.4 1.0 100
Used to speak 
Kurdish/Zazaki with 
his/her parents
3.7 57.4 14.8 19.8 2.7 0.6 1.1 100
Age groups
18-24 17.6 38.6 32.7 5.1 2.6 1.9 1.5 100
25-39 19.0 44.4 30.6 3.3 0.6 1.3 0.7 100
40-54 21.3 46.4 26.8 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.1 100
55-69 19.7 46.9 31.8 0.5  0.6 0.6 100
70 + 21.7 49.4 27.1    1.8 100
Income 
groups
Under 450 YTL 13.4 56.0 24.8 3.7 0.6 0.3 1.3 100
Between 450 –1000 
YTL 19.1 44.8 31.5 2.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 100
Over 1000 YTL 28.5 31.0 32.2 2.8 2.2 2.7 0.8 100
Party 
preferences
AKP 14.6 60.0 23.1 0.9   1.4 100
ANAP-DYP-GP 34.8 32.9 32.3     100
MHP-BBP 28.9 35.6 35.5     100
CHP 27.7 20.9 46.1  2.7 1.9 0.7 100
DEHAP 4.8 20.4 4.4 57.0 11.1 2.2  100
Other 8.1 31.6 34.7 10.8 3.7 8.3 2.7 100
Undecided 20.2 43.5 31.1  0.8 4.4  100
If we summarize these results, we can talk about two different alignments concerning Muslim, Kurdish and Alevi 
identities. In the first group, we can point out the distinction of the people who emphasize their Muslim identity in 
contrast to the commonalities found among those who emphasize their Kurdish or Alevi identities; whereas in the second 
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group, we can point out the distinction of people who emphasize their Alevi identity in contrast to the commonalities 
found among those who emphasize their Muslim or Kurdish identity. When this type of a distinction is made, the group 
of individuals who define themselves primarily as Kurdish or Alevi consist of young people and men, while people who 
define themselves primarily as Muslim consist of old people and women. Conversely, the people who define themselves 
primarily as Muslim or Kurdish consist of more religious people with lower income and less education; whereas the 
group that defines itself primarily as Alevi consists of people with higher income and who are not very religious. It is also 
observable that level of education does not play a significant role on the formation of the Alevi identity.
Table 4.13 When asked, would you primarily describe yourself as Turkish, Muslim, a citizen of the Turkish Republic, 
Kurdish, or Alevi? -II
 
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
Turkish
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
Muslim
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
a citizen of 
the Turkish 
Republic
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily as 
Kurdish
(%)
I describe 
myself 
primarily 
as an Alevi
(%)
Other, I 
describe 
myself in 
another way
(%)
No idea/
No 
answer
(%)
Left-right 
groups
Leftist 27.1 19.7 35.6 8.8 5.2 3.6  100
Center 19.5 43.3 32.4 2.4 0.5 1.1 0.9 100
Rightist 15.3 58.2 23.4 1.7   1.5 100
Alevi 
origin
Not an Alevi 19.3 46.1 29.7 2.4 0.3 1.3 0.9 100
Alevi 19.9 32.5 31.6 5.4 7.5 1.2 1.9 100
Islamist-
Secular 
groups
Secular 27.2 17.8 44.1 1.3 4.4 3.9 1.4 100
Center 21.6 33.3 39.3 3.2  1.4 1.2 100
Islamist 15.0 60.7 19.5 3.5 0.3 0.2 0.9 100
Religiosity 
groups
Not religious 26.6 8.3 52.8 2.1 3.3 5.8 1.1 100
Center 24.2 28.9 39.0 2.7 3.2 0.8 1.2 100
Religious 18.1 52.5 25.0 2.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 100
Ownership
Medium-level 
ownership 19.7 43.1 32.5 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.8 100
Low-level ownership 16.0 52.6 23.4 5.2 0.8 0.7 1.3 100
High-level ownership 27.8 24.9 42.3 1.0 1.7 1.7 0.6 100
Education
Illiterate 9.1 76.8 8.0 5.1   1.0 100
Literate without a 
diploma 11.6 64.7 13.8 8.3  1.5  100
Primary/ middle 
school graduate 18.7 49.1 28.2     1.6 1.1 0.3 1.0 100
High school graduate 23.5 29.0 37.7 4.3 1.9 3.0 0.6 100
University+ graduate 25.1 24.0 44.3  0.8 4.1 1.6 100
Total 19.4 44.6 29.9 2.7 1.1 1.3 1.0 100
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5.1. Turkey’s Agenda
The question “In your opinion, what is Turkey’s most important problem?” has often been asked in similar surveys in 
order to determine the issues that shape the public agenda.1 We have used the same question in our study, and the 
answers are summarized in Table 5.1. For the purposes of the survey, it is of significant importance that this question 
was posed in an open-ended format. In other words, different answer options were not predetermined and respondents 
were left free to answer however they wanted to. After that, they were asked what the second most important issue 
was, again by an open-ended question. All answers were recorded exactly as they were stated, and were included in 
our data file.  During the analysis stage, we decided under what headings all these answers could be categorized, and 
consequently reached the breakdown in Table 5.1. Clearly, not everyone can provide two answers for this question. 
Therefore, we also indicated what percentage of the total number of answers was made up by answer categories that 
we predetermined, considering them independent from the frequency of responses for each category. 
Unemployment and its related issues came first. People who see unemployment as Turkey’s biggest problem comprise 
the largest group (73%), and this figure is the equivalent of 38% of all answers given. The high cost of living - inflation/
terror/national security – which were very close in percentage – and education followed unemployment as other 
problems Turkey faces. These three problems were considered important by groups of 23%, 21% and 20% respectively. 
In general, problems not related to economic instability or economic crisis were mentioned by less than 20% of the 
respondents.
Issues put forth relating to the headscarf came from only 7% of the people interviewed, and accounted for only 3.7% of 
the answers given. The answers given to the same question asked during a study conducted by Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 
shortly before the 2002 elections revealed that less than 1% of the public considered the headscarf as an important issue 
at the time. In short, in May 2006, three-and-a-half years after the formation of the AKP government, the rate of people 
who consider this issue important multiplied by 3.5. However, stating that the public deems this issue important is not 
possible. When not reminded, the respondents did not point out the “turban” or the headscarf as a significant problem 
on the public agenda. Clearly, the approach of the public towards this issue does not overlap with that of the elites, 
politicians or bureaucrats in the country, or with the agenda of the media.
In another question, we employed a different technique. We listed the five broad categories of problems Turkey faces that 
we predetermined ourselves before the interviews and we asked respondents which one of them should be prioritized 
in forming a solution. The problems we stated were unemployment; the Southeastern/Kurdish issue; the inability of 
students wearing headscarves to attend university; educational issues; and health issues. In this question, we aimed 
to observe to what extent the two significant problems, namely ethnic and religious identity issues are brought to the 
foreground in comparison to economic or educational/health problems.
5. Religious, Social and Political Relations 
in Turkey from the Viewpoint of the Study
1  We did not try to determine the role of the headscarf issue in the public agenda in the study we conducted in 1999. However, the headscarf issue was 
not put forth as one of the most signficant problems of the country in similar research conducted during the same period (see Adaman, F., A. Çarkoğlu 
and B. Şenatalar, 2001. Hanehalkı Gözünden Türkiye’de Yolsuzluğun Nedenleri ve Önlenmesine İlişkin Öneriler, TESEV Publications). However, the questions 
asked during these studies were close ended questions, and the issues related to the headscarf were classified under the “others” column if respondents 
mentioned them.  A group significant in size did not include the headscarf in the “others” category. However, the same open-ended question model we 
use here had been used in research that was conducted before the 2002 elections, and the headscarf  issue had been identified by less than 1% of the 
respondents as one of the problems on the public agenda that needed to be solved urgently. For this study, see Çarkoğlu, A. and E. Kalaycıoğlu, 2006. 
Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society, I.B.Tauris. Similar conclusions were also present in the Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak 
study from 2004.
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Table 5.1. What do you think Turkey’s most significant problem is? What is the second most important one?
Percentage in
 overall answers
Referral rate amongst 
respondents*
Unemployment 38.2 73.4
Inflation/High cost of living 12.1 23.2
Terrorism/National security 11.1 21.2
Education 10.2 19.7
Economic instability/economic crisis 6.5 12.5
Headscarf/turban issue 3.7 7.2
Health/Social security 3.4 6.5
Crime/Snatch-and-run thefts 3.1 5.9
Southeastern/Kurdish issue 2.7 5.2
Bribery/unlawfulness 1.8 3.4
Political uncertainty/instability 1.0 1.9
Democracy 0.8 1.6
Lack of an opposition, lack of an alternative to the government 0.6 1.2
Human rights 0.5 1.0
Agricultural problems 0.5 0.9
Religion 0.4 0.8
Foreign politics 0.3 0.6
Other 3.0 5.8
Total 100 192.0
* The total sum is not 100% since the respondents were allowed to give either one or two answers. 
Unemployment comprised a figure of 70.3%, while the other problems mentioned remained relatively insignificant 
(see Table 5.2). The ethnicity-based Southeastern/Kurdish issue was mentioned by a group of 12.1%, which was almost 
twice as big as the group of 5.7% who mentioned the problem encountered by students who wear headscarves. Another 
interesting observation was that the headscarf problem ranked fourth on the list of the most important five problems. 
Health issues came last.
Table 5.2 Which problem do you think must be solved first?
Unemployment 70.3
Southeastern/Kurdish issue 12.1
Problem of not being able to attend university for students who wear headscarf/turban 5.7
Educational issues 7.9
Health issues 2.7
None of them 0.5
No answer 0.9
Total 100
In a third question, we left out issues such as the economy, education and health and questioned what policies the 
government should implement before all else concerning four problems related to identity (Table 5.3). The policies 
presented for respondents’ evaluation were; giving Kurdish people the opportunity to learn their mother tongue in state 
schools; allowing students who wear headscarves to attend universities; enabling the graduates of İmam Hatip high 
schools to be assessed through the same grading system applied for graduates of normal high schools in the university 
entrance exam; and having the state give financial assistance to Cem houses. Students wearing headscarves and the 
problems of İmam Hatip graduates, issues emphasized by the Sunni majority, were prioritized in the answers. Another 
notable result here was the size of the group, at 11-12%, that preferred the Kurdish identity issue above all else. However, 
a notably large group of 22.8% chose not to answer this question.
The headscarf issue, which was deemed less important than economic problems in the answers given to the 
aforementioned questions, was prioritized by an important proportion of the public as an issue that has to be resolved 
when it was listed with similar identity issues. An evaluation that is made on three levels, similar to what we have done 
here, displays the presence of a hierarchy of problems, which indicates that comparing the current problems on the 
public agenda is quite difficult. In a country like Turkey, where Sunni citizens who are not of Kurdish origin comprise the 
majority, it is not surprising that topics concerning Kurdish and Alevi citizens are not emphasized by the general public. 
It must be remembered that none of these problems stand out as the most urgent issues when economic problems are 
considered.
Table 5.3 Which of the following policies should the government implement first?
Allowing students who wear a headscarf/turban to attend universities 43.0
Enabling graduates of İmam Hatip high schools to be assessed through the same grading system applied to graduates 
of normal high schools in the university entrance exam 17.6
Giving Kurdish people the opportunity to learn their mother tongue in state schools, if they wish 11.4
State financial assistance to Cem houses 5.3
No answer 22.8
Total 100
After categorizing current public issues under two headings, ‘economic’ and ‘identity’ problems, we can begin discussing 
our findings concerning social tolerance, which we have questioned through a variety of methods in our research.
5.2. Social Tolerance
Without doubt, social tolerance is closely related to social harmony and peace in the country. Intolerance can be linked to 
numerous issues, such as the lack of trust amongst people in social life, the functioning of democracy, and the dynamism 
of economic life. In this study, we tried to ask questions about different subjects related to social intolerance through 
various methods. First, we used a question that has been asked in many similar studies, and inquired about what kind 
of neighbors people wish to have. However, in these questions, we excluded the kind of neighbors who would naturally 
bring to mind the possibility of having to face legal problems. Since ‘problem’ is almost included in the definition of 
neighbors who are “criminals”, “excessive drinkers”, “mentally unbalanced people” or “drug users”, it is clear that 
interviewed people cannot be described as intolerant when they do not prefer to live with such neighbors.
Our aim in this study was to find out whether the people of Turkey would like to have members of minority groups as 
their neighbors, and a few very interesting patterns were revealed through the results summarized in Figure 5.1. The 
most unwanted neighbors were gay couples. This finding, which has also come out in various other studies, is perhaps 
not surprising. However, although respondents were not specifically reminded of special conditions or problems that 
could be associated with this type of neighbor, it is thought provoking that two-thirds of ordinary citizens – who may not 
even realize that their neighbors are gay – stated that they would oppose having a gay couple as neighbors.  Likewise, 
the fact that one out of four citizens stated that they would object to having neighbors from a different Islamic sect, 
even if they did not know which sect such neighbors belonged to, paints a pessimistic picture.
Clearly, we face a typical example of bigotry. When we consider that the answers do not reflect the personal experiences 
of respondents, and that almost all evaluations are based on assumptions, these conclusions provoke even more 
thought. The possibility of an ordinary citizen having Greek, Jewish or Armenian families as neighbors in Turkey is quite 
low. The generation we talked to (the average age of our sample is approximately 39) has almost no opportunity to 
establish neighborly relationships with the aforementioned minority groups. Thus, the prejudice reflected here is, in 
one way or another, a “learned” view.  In addition, we must also emphasize that a group of about 28% opposed having 
a Kurdish family as neighbors.
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In all of these evaluations, we obtained a total opposition – or, in a way, intolerance – score by giving one point to 
the neighbor whom a respondent defined as “unwanted”. After that, we calculated how many points out of seven a 
respondent totaled, which was the highest score that would come out if a respondent said that he or she would “not 
want” any of the categories as neighbors.  We then converted this score to a percentage. From this point onwards, we 
will present this type of an index in order to provide a comparison. The distribution of these intolerance indices points at 
a bi-polar distribution (Figure 5.2). However, although the rate of people who said that they would not object to having 
any type of neighbor is not very high, at 27%, this finding is still hope inspiring since these people comprise the largest 
group.  The rate of those who objected to all listed options is 17 %.
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Figure 5.1 Would you object if any of the following people became your neighbor?
Figure 5.2 Intolerance Index
A more detailed analysis supports this optimistic observation. The tolerance points of respondents were separated 
into three different groups through a grouping analysis. As can be seen in Table 5.4, the group that can be described 
as having a “high level of intolerance”, receiving 6.1 points on a scale of 0-7, is only the second-biggest group. The 
biggest group is the “low level of intolerance” group, forming approximately 45% of the sample, which received 0.4 on 
a scale of 0-7. In other words, according to our intolerance index – which has been formed by the personal statements 
of individual respondents – one-third of the voting population, a large figure, appears to be “highly intolerant”, while a 
little less than half of the voting population seems to be considerably tolerant.
Table 5.4 Tolerance Groups
Average Tolerance Degree (Between 0-7 ) %
High level of intolerance 6.1 36.9
Medium 2.7 16.6
Low level of intolerance 0.4 45.1
NA 1.4
Total 100
When we consider the relationship between tolerance groups and fundamental demographic and geographical variables, 
we come across interesting patterns (see Table 5.5). There are no significant differences in tolerance indicators for women 
and men. While the intolerance level in rural areas is higher in comparison to that of the general average in the country, 
it appears to be lower in urban settlement areas. The intolerance level of relatively older people and people with lower 
income levels is higher than the country average. This relation between income level and intolerance is also observed 
for ownership and education clusters. The higher the income level or ownership and education level, the higher the 
tolerance level. To summarize, citizens who live in rural areas and who are relatively older are less tolerant than people 
who live in urban areas and who are relatively younger. People who are young, urban with relatively higher income and 
education seem to be more tolerant than people who have the opposite characteristics.
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Table 5.5 Fundamental Variables and Tolerance Groups-1
Intolerance High Medium Low NA Total
Gender
Female 38.0 16.2 44.1 1.6 100
Male 35.7 17.0 46.2 1.1 100
Rural-Urban
Rural 48.6 15.1 34.0 2.3 100
Urban 30.7 17.4 51.1 0.9 100
Age groups
Age 18-24 31.1 25.0 43.2 0.7 100
Age 25-39 32.2 15.8 51.1 0.9 100
Age 40-54 43.5 13.6 41.3 1.7 100
Age 55-69 45.9 12.6 39.1 2.4 100
Age 70 + 31.8 19.9 46.5 1.8 100
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 47.0 16.7 34.9 1.3 100
Between 450-1000 YTL 36.7 17.9 44.3 1.2 100
Over 1000 YTL 22.2 14.6 62.5 0.7 100
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 42.5 18.4 37.9 1.2 100
Medium-level ownership 35.7 16.6 46.3 1.3 100
High-level ownership 25.7 13.7 59.0 1.6 100
Education level
Illiterate 50.9 13.0 32.5 3.6 100
Literate without a diploma 40.2 17.1 41.4 1.3 100
Primary school graduate 42.7 17.1 39.0 1.3 100
High school graduate 26.3 17.5 54.8 1.5 100
University+ graduate 20.3 14.1 65.6 0.1 100
Ethnic identity (Speaks Kurdish, 
Zazaki with parents...)
Did not speak 37.7 16.4 44.4 1.5 100
Used to speak 31.7 18.1 50.2  100
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 38.2 16.5 43.9 1.3 100
Alevi 26.9 17.0 54.5 1.6 100
Provincial clusters
Coastal cities 43.1 19.8 33.3 3.7 100
Central Aegean and some of the Black Sea 38.9 23.1 36.1 1.9 100
Metropolitan cities 34.4 15.0 49.9 0.6 100
Eastern, Southeastern cities 30.3 18.5 51.2  100
Central Anatolia and the western cities of Eastern 
Anatolia 44.2 14.8 38.4 2.6 100
Turkey average 36.9 16.6 45.1 1.4 100
When we consider ethnic and sectarian identities, we come across an interesting finding, which shows that those who 
stated that they spoke Kurdish with their parents appear to be more tolerant than the rest of the population. We can 
reach the same finding for the Alevi minority. Consequently, the tolerance indicator is higher in metropolitan cities and 
in cities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey.
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Table 5.5 Fundamental Variables and Tolerance Groups -2
Intolerance High Medium Low NA Total
Party preferences
AKP 43.9 18.9 35.8 1.3 100
ANAP-DYP-GP 43.6 4.7 50.1 1.5 100
MHP-BBP 45.3 23.7 28.4 2.6 100
CHP 20.9 10.7 68.4  100
DEHAP/DTP 11.5 12.8 75.8  100
Other 10.6 39.6 49.8  100
Undecided 23.8 21.5 52.8 2.0 100
Left-right groups
Leftist 18.2 12.8 68.6 0.4 100
Center 37.2 16.8 44.3 1.7 100
Rightist 46.5 17.6 34.8 1.0 100
Islamist/Secularist 
groups
Secular 17.5 16.3 65.6 0.6 100
Center 38.7 15.8 44.4 1.1 100
Islamist 45.4 17.7 35.6 1.3 100
Religiosity groups
Not religious 25.2 9.0 65.7  100
Center 26.9 16.5 54.5 2.2 100
Religious 41.0 17.7 40.1 1.3 100
Women ... No, I do not cover 20.9 15.3 62.7 1.1 100
Do you cover when 
going outside?
Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 50.2 17.3 30.5 2.0 100
Yes, I wear a turban 41.3 14.8 41.7 2.2 100
Yes, I wear a çarşaf 50.1 12.8 37.0  100
No idea/No answer 39.6 11.6 48.7  100
Men ... Not covered and he would not want her to cover 21.5 15.0 63.2 0.4 100
His wish 
concerning 
headcover/turban
He would like her to cover; she covers or used to cover 42.1 17.1 40.2 0.6 100
He would want her to wear a çarşaf; she wears or used to wear one 63.9  26.1 10.0 100
He would want his wife to cover/she covers but he is not sure how he 
would prefer her to do so 37.6 20.8 39.6 2.1 100
He would want her to wear a turban; she wears or used to wear one 46.2 20.6 29.6 3.7 100
No answer 31.0 17.9 51.1  100
Total Turkey average 36.9 16.6 45.1 1.4 100
Voters of AKP (Justice and Development Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party)-BBP (Big Union Party) are less 
tolerant than the country average, and voters in the center-left appear to be more tolerant than the country average. A 
similar pattern emerges in the clusters formed according to the way people position themselves on the Left-right scale. 
While the left is more tolerant, the rightist voters appear to be more intolerant. On the Secularist-Islamist scale, the 
secular segment displays a “high level of tolerance”, whereas the tolerance level of the Islamist segment is lower than 
the country average. Similarly, people who stated that they were religious are less tolerant than the country average, 
while people who stated that they were not religious appear to be more tolerant. In summary, those who vote for 
parties in the center-right, who define themselves as “Islamist” or who are in the right of the political spectrum, as 
well as people who are more religious, display a lower level of tolerance. However, voters for parties in the center-left 
and people who place themselves in the left of the political spectrum, as well as people who are less religious, are more 
tolerant.
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Table 5.6 Do you think that the repeated publication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammad by a Danish 
newspaper, despite strong opposition from the Islamic world, is an inevitable consequence of democracy and 
the freedom of thought?
Yes, such publications are an 
inevitable result of democracy 
and the freedom of thought
Such 
publications 
must be 
prevented NA
Education level
Illiterate 8.8 74.3 16.9
Literate without a diploma 5.5 86.2 8.3
Primary school graduate 13.8 74.4 11.8
High school graduate 20.1 67.6 12.3
University+ graduate 20.4 72.7 6.8
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 10.4 74.3 15.3
Between 450-1000 YTL 14.5 74.4 11.2
Over 1000 YTL 24.3 66.9 8.8
Party preferences
AKP 7.5 82.2 10.3
ANAP-DYP-GP 14.2 78.3 7.5
MHP-BBP 16.8 75.3 7.9
CHP 30.1 60.2 9.7
DEHAP/DTP 6.5 82.7 10.8
Other 11.8 81.1 7.1
Undecided 11.8 73.0 15.2
Left-right groups
Leftist 27.2 64.0 8.8
Center 19.2 63.7 17.1
Rightist 7.8 82.4 9.8
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 14.1 74.6 11.3
Alevi 23.3 60.8 15.9
Islamist/Secularist 
groups
Secular 22.4 66.3 11.3
Center 24.5 61.1 14.4
Islamist 7.9 81.6 10.4
Religiosity groups
Not religious 36.1 52.5 11.4
Center 22.0 59.0 19.0
Religious 10.7 79.2 10.2
Do you cover when 
going outside?
No, I do not cover 21.1 64.5 14.4
Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 11.8 73.0 15.2
Yes, I wear a turban 5.8 72.7 21.6
Yes, I wear a çarşaf  87.6 12.4
No idea/No answer 31.3 62.9 5.8
His wish concerning 
headscarf/turban
She does not cover/he would not want her to cover 26.0 68.5 5.5
He would like her to cover; she covers or used to cover 11.6 81.3 7.2
He would want her to wear a carsaf; she wears or used to 
wear one  100.0  
He would want his wife to cover/she covers but he is not 
sure how he would want her to do so 13.9 75.0 11.1
He would want her to wear a turban; she wears or used to 
wear one 7.1 82.5 10.3
No answer 14.9 68.6 16.6
Provincial clusters
Coastal cities 9.9 78.6 11.5
Central Aegean and some of Black Sea 3.9 91.3 4.8
Metropolitan cities 22.3 66.2 11.6
Eastern, Southeastern cities 1.0 95.8 3.1
Central Anatolia and the western cities of Eastern Anatolia 3.7 73.6 22.7
Turkey average 15.1 73.0 11.8
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Women who do not cover appear to be more tolerant than the country average, whereas women who cover seem to be 
less tolerant. The interesting thing is that when compared to women who wear a çarşaf or who cover with a headcover/
headscarf/yemeni, the women who said that they wore a turban turned out to be more tolerant. A similar picture 
emerged concerning men whose views were asked about the covering of their wives. Men who did not want their wives 
to cover made up the most tolerant group. Men who preferred their wives to cover responded to our questions similarly 
to covered women.  We observed that the wish or demand to cover does not increase tolerance. In short, women who 
do not cover and men who do not want their wives to cover are more tolerant, whereas women who cover and men who 
want their wives to cover appear to be less tolerant. However, amongst women who cover, women who cover with the 
turban are more tolerant compared to women who cover with other methods.
In this context, an evaluation was made with regard to the cartoons in a Danish newspaper depicting the Prophet 
Mohammad. As can be seen in Table 5.6 above, a group of only 15% supported the proposition “such publications are 
an inevitable result of the freedom of thought and expression”, while 73% stated that such publications should be 
prevented. The cross-tabular analyses show in which of the sub-groups the tolerant approach evaluating the cartoon 
crisis is more prevalent. Amongst people who have high school or university education, this approach is taken by a group 
of 20%. Similarly, 24% of the respondents in the higher-level income group perceived the cartoons as a manifestation 
of the freedom of expression. This viewpoint is expressed more often amongst people who do not deem themselves 
religious, who are ideologically on the left, who are of Alevi origin, who do not cover, who do not want their wives to 
cover, or who live in a big city.
5.3. Democratic Values
In order to assess democratic values, which are closely related to social tolerance, we asked the respondents their 
opinions on a given set of statements. We asked them to what extent they agreed with our propositions by specifying a 
position on a scale of 0-10, with 0 meaning “I do not agree at all” and 10 meaning “I totally agree”. Figure 5.3 summarizes 
the answers, where the interval 0-4 means “I do not agree”, 5 means “I am undecided”, and 6-10 means “I agree”.
When examined individually, a tendency to agree with statements that could be considered as reflective of democratic 
values can be observed, however statements implying that these values are not internalized are also frequently supported. 
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Figure 5.3 Democratic Values
For instance, a person who deems democratic values important is expected to object to the statement, “Turkey’s 
problems can be solved not by elected governments but by a military regime”. Approximately 55% our respondents 
objected, whereas 27% agreed with it. However, in a statement that involves an intolerant approach towards views that 
are against the views of the majority – a statement that implies an intolerant approach towards minorities – the view 
contradicting democratic values was supported. The picture that appears in our study through this and similar answers 
shows that in Turkey, an approach to democracy overbalanced by the majority exists, as opposed to an approach based 
on protecting the rights of minorities. A similar example can be observed concerning publications that are against the 
interests of the country. In this case, the rate of people who felt sympathy for the view that advocated preventing 
publications that are against the interests of the country was high, at 36%.
We created an index for democratic values, similar to what we did above for intolerance. First we inversely coded the 1st 
and 3rd statements in Figure 5.3 and evaluated the agreement level concerning all statements so that it correlated with 
behavior appropriate to democratic values. Then we summed up all nine indices, divided the sum by 90 (which was the 
highest possible value), multiplied it by hundred and showed what percentage of the total statements included anwers 
that reflected democratic values. Figure 5.4 displays our indices for democratic values and intolerance. A negative 
correlation of 22% was observed between these two indices, which were calculated through two similar methods. 
The group that did not object to any type of neighbor and that displayed a high level of tolerance accounted for 45%, 
while there was almost no individual who did not agree with views reflecting democratic values or placed at zero level 
concerning democratic values. As can be expected, the higher the tolerance level gets, the more evaluations in favor of 
democratic values are made. 
As seen in Figure 5.3, liberal views are supported by a significant majority regarding other issues related to democratic 
values. Civil liberties such as freedom of expression, right to use the mother tongue, freedom of belief and demonstration/
marching were advocated; torture was reviled; and democracy was defined as the best regime. The rate of people who 
adopted all of these views was never lower than 62% and was sometimes above 75%, almost reaching 80% concerning 
some issues.
5.4. Inter-faith Relations and Tolerance
In our 1999 study, we had questioned hypothetically how respondents would react to the marriage of their children to 
someone from another religion or Islamic sect. The results obtained in 2006 are shown in comparison in Table 5.6 below. 
In 1999, a non-Muslim daughter-in-law was associated with relatively more problems than a non-Muslim son-in-law. 
In 2006, the same pattern was observed; however, in both cases the opposition decreased by 4-5 points. Conversely, 
opposition against marriage with “a Muslim belonging to another Islamic sect” increased by 10 points
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Figure 5.4 Democratic Values and Intolerance
Table 5.7 Opposition Against Children Who Marry A Non-Muslim Or A Muslim From A Different Sect
1999 2006
I do not agree
I cannot 
decide I agree I do not agree
I cannot 
decide I agree
I would oppose my daughter marrying 
a non-Muslim 18.3 5.2 75.5 22.1 7.2 69.8
I would oppose my son marrying a 
non-Muslim 22.2 6.1 70.7 25.1 7.5 66.6
I would oppose my daughter or my son 
marrying a Muslim from another sect 46.1 10.2 41.7 37.6 11.1 50.5
The answers given to this question, which can be seen as a sign of the general approach to intersectarian rapport 
and coexistence, indicate rather destroyed and weak relationships between different sects; thus, they are thought-
provoking. Which segments of society support the cleavage between sects? When we look at the social base of this 
question, the picture presented in Table 5.7 emerges. The answer “I would oppose my daughter or my son marrying 
a Muslim from another sect” is given an above-average number of times by relatively older people with a lower socio-
economic status, who live in rural areas and who are less educated.
Table 5.8 I Would Not Allow My Daughter Or Son To Marry Someone From A Different Sect – Independent 
Variables – 1
Does not agree Undecided Agrees NA
Gender
Female 35.8 11.1 51.9 1.2
Male 39.5 11.1 48.9 0.5
Rural-Urban
Rural 28.4 10.7 60.6 0.4
Urban 42.5 11.4 45.1 1.1
Education level
Illiterate 24.7 12.7 60.8 1.7
Literate without a diploma 26.0 8.4 64.2 1.4
Primary school graduate 30.7 11.4 57.4 0.5
High school graduate 51.4 11.2 36.2 1.2
University+ graduate 57.4 9.1 32.6 0.8
Age groups
Age 18-24 49.4 10.4 39.1 1.1
Age 25-39 40.0 11.0 48.0 0.9
Age 40-54 31.4 12.1 56.0 0.5
Age 55-69 24.4 10.7 63.9 1.0
Age  70 + 39.9 8.9 51.2  
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 32.3 9.9 56.6 1.1
Medium-level ownership 37.4 12.3 49.6 0.6
High-level ownership 50.5 10.6 38.3 0.6
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 29.3 7.1 63.2 0.4
Between 450-1000 YTL 36.0 14.3 49.0 0.6
Over 1000 YTL 53.3 9.8 35.8 1.2
Turkey average 37.6 11.1 50.5 0.8
The observations for people of Kurdish and/or Alevi origin are not differentiated significantly when compared to the 
country average. When considered in terms of party preferences, an approach against intersectarian marriages greater 
than the Turkey average is observed among parties in the center-right (i.e. AKP, MHP, BBP). This inclination is above 
the country average for groups who ideologically position themselves in the center and the right and who do not feel any 
sympathy towards secularism, and who define themselves as religious.
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Although the status of Jerusalem has limited place in Turkey’s current agenda, we included a question on the evaluation 
of this issue, as it is still a sensitive subject for Muslim communities.2 We asked respondents to state their opinion on 
what the governance structure of Jerusalem should be by taking into consideration the complex nature of the city as it 
is deemed holy for all three monotheistic religions.  Despite the emphasis on this unique condition, almost two-thirds of 
the respondents supported the argument that the city had to be governed solely by Muslims. When we study the people 
who adopt this view, we can see that the same pattern that emerged in the previous analyses was repeated in this study 
as well (the details of this cross-tabular analysis are not presented here). In comparison to the country average, people 
who supported this view were mostly above 55 years of age, with a relatively lower socio-economic status and a low 
level of education, who lived in rural areas, who ideologically placed to the right, who felt closer to the Islamist sector, 
and who stated that they considered themselves religious. When voting behavior is taken into consideration, we can 
say that this view is supported with a percentage above the country average only amongst people who stated that they 
would vote for AKP.
Table 5.8 I Would Not Allow My Daughter Or Son To Marry Someone From A Different Sect – Independent 
Variables – 2
Does not agree Undecided Agrees NA
Ethnic identity (Used to speak 
Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)
Did not speak 37.0 11.5 50.6 0.9
Used to speak 41.5 8.5 49.5 0.6
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 36.8 11.1 51.3 0.7
Alevi 43.1 11.2 43.8 1.9
Party preferences
AKP 30.1 10.5 58.9 0.5
ANAP-DYP-GP 41.1 14.2 44.8  
MHP-BBP 33.4 12.3 54.3  
CHP 59.4 8.5 30.8 1.3
DEHAP/DTP 57.7 15.0 27.3  
Other 56.6 8.1 35.3  
Undecided 43.4 12.8 41.9 1.9
Left-right groups
Leftist 61.3 10.0 28.7  
Center 28.3 12.2 57.9 1.6
Rightist 33.9 11.4 54.1 0.6
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 61.1 10.0 27.9 1.0
Center 29.4 13.6 56.1 1.0
Islamist 32.7 10.9 55.9 0.5
Religiosity groups
Not religious 63.9 7.5 28.7  
Center 41.3 15.2 41.6 2.0
Religious 32.8 10.8 55.8 0.6
37.6 11.1 50.5 0.8
Table 5.9 Jerusalem is a sacred city for Muslims, Christians and Jews. Which of the following do you think should 
govern the city?
Christians Jews Muslims
International – including representatives of different 
religious communities NI/NA
0.3 0.8 66.8 29.4 2.7
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2  We extend our thanks to 7th Grade student Can Çarkoğlu for this question.
5.5. Compulsory Religious Education
Religious education and İmam Hatip high schools are significant topics with regard to the religion-politics relationship in 
Turkey. The basic breakdown of the different questions we asked about this subject is presented in Table 5.9. The table 
indicates that a significant majority, 82% of people at voting age, supported compulsory religious education in public 
schools.  In this section, respondents were also asked about their opinions on religions other than Islam being taught 
in religion classes. 60% approved of teaching about other religions. Almost 86% thought that worship practices should 
also be included in the curriculum. When people were asked whether they supported the idea of teaching about Alevism 
in religious education classes along with Sunnism, 62% supported it, while 34% objected to the idea.
Most people who were against compulsory religious education lived in urban settlement areas, were ideologically 
inclined to the left, were amongst the voters of CHP and DEHAP/DTP, and had a relatively higher socio-economic status. 
35% of the group with Alevi origin, 41% of the respondents who ideologically placed themselves on the left, and 52% 
of the people who felt closer to the “I am not religious” option were against compulsory religious education in public 
schools.
The characteristics of the group who advocated the teaching of only Islam within compulsory religious education (38%) 
displayed a similar pattern to those that have emerged in the previous analyses (the details of this cross-tabular analysis 
have not been presented here.) The people who supported this view were more prevalent among those who lived in rural 
areas, who were over 40, who had a relatively lower socio-economic status, who were less educated, who ideologically 
placed on the right, who felt closer to the Islamist sector, and who considered themselves religious in comparison to the 
Turkey average. Amongst people who said that they used to speak Kurdish with their parents in childhood, this rate was 
about 45%. Regarding voters for political parties, the percentage of people who supported solely Islam being taught 
in compulsory religious classes was higher than the country average only amongst respondents who stated that they 
would vote for AKP (42%). A similar picture was observed in all other questions. When we evaluated the social role of 
religion by taking these results into consideration, we observed that the group who defined themselves as Sunni Muslim 
and religious, who lived in rural areas, who were less educated, who defined themselves as “rightist” on the right-left 
spectrum, and who represented segments with a lower socio-economic status clashed with a minority group who had 
a relatively better socio-economic status, who were better educated and who lived in urban areas, and also included 
individuals of Alevi identity.
Clearly, the theory of evolution is a contentious subject within the scope of the educational system. Setting out from 
the assumption that ordinary citizens who were interviewed would not know what the ‘theory of evolution’ meant, 
we formed a question that included an explanation of the theory. After that, we asked the respondents whether the 
theory of evolution or the view that “God created humans” sounded more convincing.  It is important to note here 
that approximately 54% of our sample consisted of people who have elementary school level or lower education, and 
about 45% had received middle school level or higher education. However, the rate of people who found the theory of 
evolution more convincing was only 11%.  Furthermore, a group of 41.5% stated that teaching only Creationism in high 
school science classes would be sufficient. When this question is analyzed in terms of various independent variables, 
it can be seen that people who supported Creationism instead of the theory of evolution were from rural areas, had 
relatively lower education and a lower socio-economic status, ideologically placed on the right, and defined themselves 
as religious, as was the case concerning many other questions. Regarding voting for political parties, the percentage of 
people who supported Creationism was higher than the country average only amongst people who voted for AKP and 
DEHAP/DTP. In short, we can say that a dominant Sunni Muslim conservative group of voters prefers a restrictive and 
conservative educational policy, in contrast to a minority group that also includes Alevis. Within the framework of these 
results it can be clearly seen that society has the potential for polarization concerning this issue and similar ones.
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Table 5.10 Evaluation of religion classes at school and İmam Hatip high schools
Do you think that compulsory religious 
education should be given in public schools?
Yes, it should.
82.1
No, it should not.
15.4
NA
2.5
Are you in favor of teaching about religions 
other than Islam?
Yes, I think students must be 
informed about religions other 
than Islam.
59.6
No, students must not be 
taught about religions other 
than Islam.
37.8
NA
2.6
Do you think that worship practices such 
as ritual ablution and namaz should also be 
taught as part of the general teaching of Islam?
Yes, it should. No, it should not. NA
85.5 11.1 3.5
Should information be given about Alevism in 
addition to Sunni Islam?
Yes, it should. No, it should not. NA
61.5 33.9 4.6
I will describe the two different theories about 
the creation of human beings. Which one do 
you think is more convincing?
According to evolution theory, 
living species evolved in order  
to adapt to their environment.
Human beings were created 
by Allah. NA
10.7 87.4 1.9
Do you think the theory of evolution should 
be taught in science classes starting from high 
school, or do you think discussing Creationism 
is enough? Or do you think both theories 
should be taught at the same time?
The theory of evolution should 
be taught in schools starting 
from high school level.
11.3
Discussing Creationism is 
enough.
41.5
Both approaches to 
creation should be 
taught at the same 
time.
43.0
NA
4.2
Do you think that graduates of İmam Hatip high 
schools should have the opportunity to enter 
faculties of their own choice after taking the 
university entrance exam?
Graduates of İmam Hatip high 
schools should be able to enter 
the faculty of their choice.
82.4
Allowing the graduates of 
İmam Hatip high schools 
to enter some faculties has 
drawbacks.
14.5
NA
3.1
In relation to this question, we also asked people whether graduates of İmam Hatip high schools should be allowed 
to enter the schools or departments of universities of their choice – provided that they received enough points in the 
university entrance exam – and whether they thought allowing them to enter certain schools or departments had any 
drawbacks. 82.4% believed that they should be allowed into schools of their choice, while 14.5% stated that allowing 
them this opportunity had drawbacks. People who believed that allowing İmam Hatip graduates to enter certain schools 
or departments had drawbacks were asked which specific departments they had in mind. (Table 5.10). Approximately 
34% of this group did not give an answer, while 23% said that İmam Hatip graduates should not have the opportunity 
to go to any university. People who believed that restrictions existed for specific schools or departments primarily 
highlighted the faculties of law and political science deparments. This was followed by faculties of education and 
military schools. Evidently, the possibility of İmam Hatip graduates receiving higher education in fields such as natural 
sciences, mathematics, medicine or engineering was not considered as a situation that involved specific drawbacks. 
However, the objection to İmam Hatip graduates entering faculties of law, political science departments, and faculties 
of education, as well as military schools, which would enable them to have occupations that provide more power over 
the social and political future of the country, is an indicator of the sensitivity of at least a section of this group towards 
the issue of secularism.
Table 5.11 You have said that the entry of graduates of İmam Hatip High Schools to certain faculties has 
drawbacks. Which faculties are those?
Military Schools 3.5
Law Schools 19.8
Schools of Political Science 7.4
Schools of Education 4.7
They should not be able to enter any faculty. 22.9
Other 7.5
No answer 34.3
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5.6. Business, Wealth and Religion
In this section, we will try to study the relationship between the business world, entrepreneurship and religious views. 
How Islamic thought and practice are conjoined with economic activities is amongst subjects that have not yet been 
studied in detail. It is, however, publicly known that along with the Milli Görüş movement, a new entrepreneur group of 
more religious businessmen who faithfully follow traditions and who are described as “Muslim entrepreneurs” or the 
“Anatolian Tigers” has emerged; and that this movement is organized by the agency of the Association of Individual 
Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD) and the Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (SİAD). In this 
context, setting out from a recent study conducted by the European Stability Initiative in Kayseri3, the thesis of “Islamic 
Calvinists” has become a subject of public discussion in Turkey.  Claims were exerted about the recent emergence of 
a new kind of businessman profile – especially in Central Anatolian cities – who supports the development of the city 
as well as educational institutions in the city, who leads a morally upright life and who adopts conservative values. 
However, research on this group is considerably limited.4
The study we conducted is not sufficient to provide detailed information about this group. It is obvious that this 
information cannot be obtained through public opinion polls. However, we tried here to see how the public views this 
issue. For example, if an ordinary citizen established a business, and if we assume that he or she did not have sufficient 
experience or money for this business, with what type of a partner would he or she want to collaborate? (Table 5.12) 
Out of the options we presented for an evaluation here, the option “an honest person” was by far the most preferred 
(61.5%). This was followed by “an experienced person” (13%) and “an educated person” (11%), while the option “a devout 
Muslim” was only chosen by a group of 9%.
When asked with what type of people they wanted to work with in their business life, priority was given to people “with 
a similar world view” (37.9%), and then to fellow countrymen from the same region (33.7%).  Devout Muslims were 
preferred by one out of every four respondents, making it the third most preferred choice. What attracted our attention 
here was that all three options could, in fact, be stating almost the same thing. People wish to collaborate in business 
with like-minded individuals and appear to have expressed this wish in different ways. It is not surprising for people 
from the same region to adopt a similar worldview.
However, preferring a devout Muslim will be possible only if the respondent gives the same degree of importance to the 
religion factor. When we study the cross-tabular analyses, we see that our hypothesis is supported.   It is so that, those 
who considered themselves closer to the Islamist sector concerning the “Islamist-Secularist” conflict and who defined 
themselves as religious, had a higher preference rate for a “devout Muslim” colleague. In the first question, 9% of all 
people preferred a devout Muslim, while it was around 12% when these groups were concerned. Yet the rate for people 
who displayed a low level of religiosity and who saw themselves closer to the secularist end was around 1%. Clearly, 
while being a devout Muslim becomes an attraction for one group, it is deemed unimportant by another. In the second 
question, the preference of a devout Muslim – with a country average of 25% - was 38% in the Islamist group and 31% 
in the religious group.  On the other hand, only 4% of the secular sector preferred the option of a “devout Muslim”, 
while the rate of preference for the group who did not consider themselves religious was only around 12%. What needs 
to be emphasized here is that, although religious fraternity may suggest being like-minded, it does not act as a primary 
social binder in the business community. Quite the contrary, it can be stated that it has created a significant cleavage 
between people who consider themselves religious and close to the Islamist sector and people who do not. One of the 
conclusions that can be drawn here is that a bi-polar structure exists in the business sector.
We asked our respondents to state their views on wealth. Once again, a bi-polar structure similar to the previous 
findings was observed in the answers given to the question: “Do you think that wealth, in other words, having a house, 
a summer house, a car and possessing more money than the amount that would allow for a comfortable life, is the result 
of one’s own work and efforts or is it a God-given blessing?” The group who deemed wealth as the consequence of one’s 
own work and effort (56.5%) was notably larger than the group who thought wealth was a blessing (36.4). In these two 
groups, a cleavage is clearly observed between the representatives of the “periphery” consisting of religious, rural, 
less-educated individuals with a lower socio-economic status and the opposing group which represents more educated, 
urban, less religious individuals in the “center” with a higher socio-economic status.
When a simple question such as “What should one do to become wealthy?” was asked, being a devout Muslim was 
clearly not one of the underscored options. Although a structure that can be defined as a bi-polar center-periphery 
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3  See Islamic Calvinists, Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia, European Stability Initiative, September 2005.
4  For such a study see: Ayşe Buğra, Siyasal İslam ve Ekonomik Örgütlenmesi, 1999.
reflection is observed within the scope of religiosity and Islamism, we can say that creating wealth through business 
did not correlate with “being devout” in terms of Islam or fulfilling the requirements of Islam. Thus, only about 7.6% 
thought that being a devout Muslim was a prerequisite for becoming wealthy. More respondents supported reason-
based approaches. For example, people who thought one’s social environment was very important for becoming 
wealthy formed half of the sample. When this group was asked what kind of a social environment had a positive effect 
on accumulating wealth, having close connections with the government and close relations with wealthy business 
circles was preferred much more than interacting with devout circles.
Table 5.12 Business, Wealth and Religion
If you established a business, assuming 
that you do not have enough experience 
or money to do so, with what type of 
partner would you prefer to work with 
before all others?
An honest 
person
An educated 
person
Someone 
who has 
business 
experience
Someone who 
has strong 
financial 
resources
A devout 
Muslim Other NI/NA
61.5 11.0 13.3 2.7 9.0 0.6 1.9
With whom would you like to work with? 
With my fellow 
countrymen
With devout 
Muslims
With 
people who 
have the 
same world 
view
Other NI/NA
33.7 25.0 37.9 0.5 2.8
Do you think that wealth is the result of 
one’s own work and efforts, or a blessing?
Wealth is 
primarily the 
result of one’s 
own work and 
efforts
Wealth is 
primarily a 
blessing by 
Allah
Both Other NI/NA
56.5 36.4 0.9 0.9 5.3
What is required before all else to become 
wealthy?
Being diligent Being an entrepreneur
Having 
a good 
education
Being a 
devout 
Muslim
Stealing/
Theft/Fraud
Being 
honest NI/NA
63.1 18.9 7.0 7.6 0.5 0.2 2.8
Do you think that one’s immediate 
environment is important in rising to 
wealth?
Yes, I do No, I do not NA
50.3 48.1 1.6
What kind of people should this 
environment consist of?
People who 
have close 
connections with 
the government
Influential 
business 
people
People who 
are devout 
Muslims
NI/NA
17.6 25.7 5.6 1.4
5.7. Headscarf, Yemeni, Turban, and Çarşaf
Since the establishment of the AKP government, women and their covering have become issues that frequently engage 
the public agenda.  In our first study conducted in 1999, we had tried to determine the percentage of women who cover. 
In our current study, we employed the same questioning framework to find out whether any changes had occurred in 
the percentage of covering women during the seven years that have passed. In addition, we took care to study this 
issue more in depth. The results of our study indicate that the picture that emerges is different than general public 
perceptions.  As we have emphasized before, contrary to the assertions of both the “secularist” and “Islamist” sectors, 
the headscarf issue does not currently have a place in Turkey’s public agenda. The public does not consider the headscarf 
issue as more important than economic problems and national security issues. 
In order to prevent terminological discrepancies during the inquiries related to this issue, the statement below was first 
read to all those who were interviewed in our study conducted in 1999 as well as in the current one:
“Those women in our country who choose to cover, either because of their religious beliefs or traditions, do so in three 
different ways.. One of these methods is the ÇARŞAF, which covers the entire body from head to toe except for the eyes. 
62
Another is the HEADCOVER, which comes in different forms such as yemenis, headscarves and similar covers that are used to 
cover only the head, leaving some hair visible. The third one is the TURBAN, which leaves the face bare but covers all the head 
including the neck and the shoulders with no hair seen. 
By providing this explanation, we aimed to eliminate any confusion that could arise in the interviewing process when 
we asked questions that included the terms headcover, yemeni, turban or çarşaf.  This explanatory text was read to both 
women and men since similar questions were asked to both groups.
Table 5.13 Do women cover outside the home; if yes, how do they cover?
Do you cover when going outside?
No, I do not
Yes, I wear 
a headscarf/
headcover/yemeni 
Yes, I wear 
a turban
Yes, I wear 
a çarşaf NI/NA Total
1999
Rural 12.4 64.6 17.1 5.9  100
Urban 33.4 49.0 14.9 2.3 0.3 100
2006
Rural 15.1 67.2 12.0 2.2 3.5 100
Urban 46.0 40.6 11.1 0.6 1.7 100
1999
Age 18-24 40.5 36.1 20.6 2.3 0.5 100
Age 25-39 28.0 53.3 15.6 2.9 0.2 100
Age 40-54 22.9 61.1 12.5 3.2 0.3 100
Age 55-69 14.1 65.5 13.7 6.7  100
Age 70 + 17.4 69.0 8.3 5.3  100
2006
Age 18-24 50.7 34.0 11.3  4.0 100
Age 25-39 41.5 42.9 13.1  2.5 100
Age 40-54 28.3 58.5 9.1 3.1 1.1 100
Age 55-69 13.7 70.0 12.3 2.6 1.4 100
Age 70 + 12.7 80.6 6.7   100
1999
Low-level ownership 10.5 65.1 19.0 5.4  100
Medium-level ownership 27.2 54.7 14.9 3.2 0.1 100
High-level ownership 54.2 33.8 10.8 0.4 0.7 100
2006
Less than 450 YTL 10.5 69.4 14.6 2.5 3.0 100
Between 450-1000 YTL 37.2 49.1 11.1 0.6 2.1 100
Over 1000 YTL 71.2 20.6 4.8 0.8 2.5 100
Turkey average  1999 27.3 53.4 15.7 3.4 0.3 100
Turkey average 2006 36.5 48.8 11.4 1.1 2.2 100
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Table 5.14 Do you think the number of women who cover has increased in the last 10 years?
Yes, there 
has been a 
substantial 
increase
Yes, it slightly 
increased
No, there 
has been no 
increase NA
Gender
Female 26.5 38.9 18.9 15.8
Male 23.5 39.3 24.9 12.4
Rural-Urban
Rural 24.2 34.5 26.6 14.7
Urban 25.5 41.5 19.2 13.8
Ethnic identity (Used to speak 
Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)
Did not speak 26.8 37.4 21.9 13.9
Used to speak 12.9 50.5 20.7 15.9
Age groups
Age 18-24 22.1 40.9 22.1 14.9
Age 25-39 26.4 36.8 22.1 14.7
Age 40-54 24.4 41.4 21.7 12.4
Age 55-69 27.9 38.8 17.8 15.5
Age 70 + 21.9 37.0 34.3 6.8
Income Groups
Less than 450 YTL 22.1 37.2 22.8 17.9
Between 450-1000 YTL 24.4 39.8 23.5 12.3
Over 1000 YTL 31.3 39.5 17.7 11.5
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 21.7 40.4 22.6 15.3
Medium-level ownership 25.6 37.2 22.9 14.3
High-level ownership 31.4 43.7 14.5 10.4
Education level
Illiterate 18.5 41.4 15.6 24.5
Literate without a diploma 16.9 35.8 28.3 18.9
Primary school graduate 26.2 38.0 23.2 12.6
High school graduate 25.7 40.5 20.5 13.3
University+ graduate 26.9 41.1 17.3 14.7
Party preferences
AKP 22.0 41.5 19.4 17.1
ANAP-DYP-GP 23.4 37.1 29.7 9.8
MHP-BBP 20.0 29.2 39.5 11.3
CHP 44.3 34.2 14.8 6.7
DEHAP/DTP 22.7 54.8 14.0 8.5
Other 28.7 44.2 21.4 5.6
Undecided 16.9 40.0 27.3 15.7
Left-right groups
Leftist 37.9 41.3 12.9 7.9
Center 26.5 35.1 24.5 13.8
Rightist 18.1 41.9 23.0 17.0
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 23.7 38.2 23.8 14.3
Alevi 35.4 45.7 6.0 12.9
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 34.6 38.5 17.8 9.1
Center 27.6 36.8 23.1 12.5
Islamist 20.6 40.6 23.0 15.8
Religiosity groups
Not religious 37.0 32.7 18.8 11.5
Center 33.1 36.7 13.8 16.4
Religious 21.4 40.6 24.3 13.7
Turkey average 25.0 39.1 21.8 14.1
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We directed the question “Do you cover when going outside? If yes, do you wear a çarşaf, turban, headcover, headscarf, or 
yemeni?” to women only. The answers given to this question in 1999 and 2006 are presented in Table 5.13, comparatively 
for both general distributions in the country and the major subgroups.
The most striking finding in this table is that, contrary to general belief, the rate of covered women in 2006 decreased 
in comparison to the rate in 1999. In order to discover the general impressions on this subject, we asked respondents 
during our research whether “the number of covering women has increased in the last ten years”. 25% said that there 
was a substantial increase, while 39.2% said that there was a slight increase (Table 5.13). In other words, 64% of the 
public was of the opinion that the number of covering women had increased. The rate of people who said that there was 
no increase was 21.8%, while 14.1% did not answer this question. When we analyze these evaluations through cross-
tabular analyses, we can say that men, people living in rural areas, people over 70, people who are literate but who 
do not have a diploma, voters from the right wing except for those of AKP, people who are undecided, and people who 
define themselves as religious believe that there had been no increase in the number of covering women in the last ten 
years, representing a percentage over the country average. On the other hand, people who said that “there has been a 
substantial increase” and who represented a rate above the country average are mainly those between 55 and 69, who 
have a high level income and ownership, who vote for parties other than AKP, who ideologically place on the left and 
the center, who are of Alevi origin, who feel closer to the secularist end and who place in the middle on the “Secularist-
Islamist” scale. In other words, the representatives of the “periphery” who are conservative, religious and who have 
a lower socio-economic status, and the secular representatives of the “center” who are relatively more educated, and 
have a higher socio-economic status, seem to hold opposing positions in their evaluation concerning the increase in the 
number of covering women.
However, our study did not verify these views based on impressions. On the contrary, the rate of women who said in 
1999 that they did not cover when going outside was 27.3%, whereas this rate rose to 36.5% in the study we conducted in 
2006. The rate of women wearing a headscarf/headcover/yemeni, which was 53.4% in 1999, decreased to 48.8% in 2006. 
The rate of women who wore a çarşaf was 3.4% in 1999, but it decreased to 1.1% in 2006. Likewise, the rate of women 
wearing a turban dropped from 15.7% in 1999 to 11.4% in 2006.
When the two studies are compared through cross-tabular analyses, it is possible to  frame a more detailed analysis 
based on the findings rather than solely asserting the fact that the number of covering women in Turkey has decreased. 
We can observe that the rate of women who go outside without covering has increased since 1999 in both rural and 
urban areas. The rate of women who wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni when going outside has increased in rural 
areas but decreased in cities. The rate of women who wear a turban or çarşaf has decreased both in rural and urban 
areas. The most important change observed with regards to types of settlement is the increase in the number of women 
in urban areas who do not cover, from 33.4% to 46%. Another significant change is the decrease in the rate of women 
in cities who wear a headcover/headscarf/yemeni from 49.0% to 40.6%. Taking these figures into consideration, we can 
assert that the faster the rate of urbanization in Turkey, the fewer the women who cover.
When we group uncovered women in accordance with age groups, the most significant change that we can observe is 
the increase in the rate for the 25-39 age group since 1999, from 28.0% to 41.5%. This is followed by a rise in the 18-24 
age group to 41.5%, an increase of 10.2%. Similarly, the biggest change in the group of women who wear a headscarf/
headcover/yemeni is the decrease in the 25-39 age group from 53.3% to 42.9%, a drop of 10.4%. This is followed by the 
18-24 age group, with a decrease of 9.3% to 11.3%. However, the most significant decrease in the group of women who 
wear a turban is not seen in the 25-39 group but the younger, 18-24, age group. In 2006, in neither of these two groups, 
did we come across the small minority of people who had said in 1999 that they wore a çarşaf. In other words, women in 
the 18-39 age group almost never wear a çarşaf.
As seen in Table 5.13, parallel to the increase in income, the number of women who cover decreases.  When studies 
conducted in 1999 and 2006 were compared, no change was observed in the rate of women from the lower-income group 
who did not cover when going outside, this rate increased from 27.2% to 37.2% in the medium-income group, and from 
54.2% to 71.2% in the higher-income group. The percentage of women wearing a headscarf/headcover/yemeni in the 
lower-income group was 65.1% in 1999, but rose to 69.4% in 2006. In the medium-level income group, this level dropped 
from 54.7% to 49.1%, whereas the greatest decrease occurred in the higher-income group with a decrease from 33.8% 
in 1999 to 20.6% in 2006 – a drop of 13.2%. On the other hand, in all income groups a decrease was observed in the rate 
of women who wore a turban, with the most significant change in the higher-income groups – a drop of 6% from 10.8% 
to 4.8%. In short, the number of women wearing a turban in the higher-income group has decreased in the last seven 
years.
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Table 5.15 If you have or had a daughter who wears a turban, would you approve of her removing it in order to 
attend university?  
Yes, I would No, I would not NI/NA
Gender
Female 65.5 24.8 9.7
Male 64.8 24.3 10.9
Rural-Urban
Rural 58.4 31.5 10.0
Urban 68.8 20.8 10.4
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki 
with parents...)
Did not speak 67.1 22.9 10.0
Used to speak 51.7 36.0 12.4
Age groups
Age 18-24 69.9 22.2 7.9
Age 25-39 64.1 24.3 11.6
Age 40-54 65.3 25.2 9.5
Age 55-69 62.6 27.0 10.5
Age 70 + 64.8 23.5 11.7
Education
Illiterate 45.6 44.2 10.2
Literate without a diploma 47.5 41.4 11.2
Primary school graduate 63.0 27.0 10.0
High school graduate 74.6 14.5 10.9
University+ graduate 77.6 11.6 10.9
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 53.3 36.7 10.0
Between 450-1000 YTL 66.7 22.7 10.6
Over 1000 YTL 77.4 13.4 9.2
Propriotership groups
Low-level ownership 67.0 21.9 11.1
Medium-level ownership 58.1 33.0 8.8
High-level ownership 79.1 12.2 8.6
Party preferences
AKP 55.1 34.1 10.8
ANAP-DYP-GP 86.4 13.6  
MHP-BBP 73.7 18.2 8.1
CHP 82.8 9.7 7.4
DEHAP/DTP 70.1 8.5 21.4
Other 73.4 18.5 8.2
Undecided 70.6 22.6 6.9
Left-right groups
Leftist 79.3 13.0 7.8
Center 70.0 19.7 10.3
Rightist 55.1 34.8 10.1
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 65.0 24.6 10.4
Alevi 66.5 23.9 9.7
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 81.5 9.1 9.4
Center 68.7 20.4 11.0
Islamist 57.3 32.8 9.9
Religiosity groups
Not religious 81.3 7.1 11.6
Center 76.3 14.0 9.7
Religious 60.4 29.0 10.6
Turkey average 65.2 24.5 10.3
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65.2% gave an affirmative answer when we asked whether they would approve of their covered daughter uncovering 
in order to attend university, whereas only 24.5% answered by saying that they would not approve. If, in a way, the 
answers given to this question indicate to what extent the headscarf ban in universities was accepted or adopted, 
studying the type of pattern that is exposed when these answers are subjected to cross-tabular analyses through the 
use of independent variables will be a worthwhile practice. The related cross-tabular analysis is presented in Table 5.15. 
The groups who ranked above country average with their rate of inapproval for their daughters to uncover in order to 
pursue their university education included those who lived in rural areas, who were in the 55-69 age group, who had a 
lower level of education, income and ownership, who ideologically placed to the right, who felt closer to the Islamist 
sector, and who defined themselves as religious. Among the voters of political parties, only the voters for AKP belonged 
to this group.
In short, it was observed that the AKP voters – conservative people with a lower socio-economic status – have not 
adopted the ban on headscarves in principle. Certainly, sending their covered daughters to university might be an idea 
that is difficult to imagine for this sector of society. Therefore, since our question was based on an assumption, these 
people might have more easily said that they would not give their approval. Evidently, the people in this group did not 
approve of their daughters uncovering even if this would leave them bereft of education. It is clear that these parents 
are opposed to their daughters uncovering, even if this means that they would be bereft of an education.  This level of 
opposition points to a high level of sensitivity among these groups concerning the issue of covering.  
Another question asked women why they choose to cover. We tried to investigate this issue by asking a simple, 
close-ended question: “What are the primary reasons for you to cover?” Table 5.16 shows the answers we received 
to this question, grouped according to women who cover, men whose wives or fiancées cover and women who do 
not cover. An important finding these tables represent is that, contrary to the views of the “secularist” sector who 
claim that the “turban” is a political symbol, and some sections of the “Islamist” or liberal sectors who claim that the 
“turban/headscarf” is related to the issue of identity, most women who cover said that they cover because covering is 
“commanded by Islam”. When asked why they cover, 71.5% of covered women said that they cover because it is Islam’s 
command, and 7.6% said that they had to cover because all women around them also cover. The only group in which this 
option was selected by less than 7% was the one that consisted of women who did not cover or men whose wives did not 
cover. The rate of people who said that covering was an integral part of their identity was very low, at 3.9%. Similarly, 
the rate of people who saw covering as the requisite of being an honorable woman is only 3.4%.  Being part of a political 
movement was a reason that was almost never mentioned by covered women, although 8.7% of uncovered women and 
men whose wives did not cover opted for this answer.  
Table 5.16 Why do they cover? – 1
Women who cover Married or widowed/divorced men whose wives or fiancées cover
Because everyone else around me covers, I must also cover 7.6 Because everyone else around us covers 7.8
Because I see the headcover as a requisite of being an 
honorable woman 3.4
Because I see the headcover as a requisite of being an 
honorable woman 1.5
Because Islam commands that women cover 71.5 Because I consider covering as a command of Islam 59.3
I did not use to cover when I was young, but now I cover 
because I am old 1.7 Because I think that older women should cover 0.7
For me, this is being a part of a political movement 0.4
Because my husband/fiancée wants me to cover 0.9
Because my family (mother, father, siblings – except for 
husband/fiancée) wanted me to cover 0.2 Because our family wants it 2.4
I cover not because my family wants me to cover but so that I 
can go around in public more comfortably 1.2 So that she can go around in public more comfortably 0.6
Because covering is an integral part of my identity 3.9 Because covering is an integral part of women’s identity 1.6
For traditional reasons 1.9
Other 1.1
NI/NA 8.2 NI/NA 24.1
Total 100 100
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When men whose wives, fiancées or ex-wives cover were asked why their wives or fiancées do so, 59.3% said “because 
Islam commands it”, while 7.8% said “because everyone else around us covers.” Only 1.5% of these men stated that 
their wives or fiancées covered because they considered covering as a requisite of being an honorable woman. Similarly, 
when single men who wanted their prospective wives or fiancées to cover were asked to state the reason, 51.6% said 
“because Islam commands it”, while 7.8% stated “their immediate environment”, and 4% “honor” as a reason.
Table 5.16 Why do they cover? – 2
Women who do not cover and men whose wives or fiancées do not cover Single or married men who want their wives or fiancées to cover
They must also cover because everyone else around them covers 4.2 Because everyone’s wife around me covers 7.8
Because they see the headscarf as a requisite of being an 
honorable woman 5.2
Because I see the headscarf as a requisite of being an 
honorable woman 4.0
Because they consider covering as a command of Islam 43.6 Because I consider covering as a command of Islam 51.6
Even though they do not cover when they are young, they cover 
when they become older 3.5
Because for them, this means being a part of a political 
movement 8.7
Because their families (mother, father, siblings or fiancé and 
husband) want them to cover 4.3 Because our family wants it 1.4
They cover not because their families want them to cover but so 
that they can go around in public more comfortably 1.4 So that she can go around in public more comfortably 2.3
Because covering is an integral part of their identity 2.8 Because covering is an integral part of women’s identity 0.7
Due to traditions 2.8 Due to traditions 1.1
NI/NA 23.4 NI/NA 31.1
Total 100 100
When we study these answers, we see that the rate of covered women who did not answer or were unable to answer 
the question about their reason for covering was approximately 8%, while this rate in the other groups ranged from 
23% to 31%. In other words, we observed that uncovered women and men who support the idea that women should 
not cover experience a difficulty in expressing their thoughts as to why women cover, whereas covered women and men 
who support the idea that women should cover produce answers more easily concerning the reasons for the covering 
of women.
Another interesting pattern that can be seen in Table 5.16 is that the view that women cover because of family pressure 
– another general public impression – was not verified. Only 0.9% of covering women stated that they covered because 
their husbands or fiancées wanted them to cover whereas only 0.2% said that they covered because other members 
of their families wanted them to. Family pressure was stated in very low proportions amongst men whose wives or 
fiancées covered and single men who wanted their fiancées or future wives to cover. Clearly, saying that women cover 
because of family or spousal pressure was not an answer that these respondents, who were family members or spouses 
of the women in question, could easily express. Therefore, the answers given by this group is not surprising. However, 
even if the decision to cover does not appear to have been caused by family pressure, we must emphasize that covered 
women think that if they uncovered, they would be pressured by their families or the people in their close environment. 
When covering women were asked whether someone in their family or close environment would object to their decision, 
if they uncovered and whether they would be compelled to cover again, 45.5% said that people would object to their 
decision while 54.5% claimed the opposite. When we then asked the group who said that people would oppose them, 
as to who specifically would object to their decision to uncover, 89.7% of this group of 45.5% said that “their family” 
would. In other words, almost 40% of covering women believe that even if they uncovered, they would have to cover 
again because of pressure from their family. Although this is a hypothetical situation, covering women obviously feel 
pressured to remain covered. In order to go beyond hypothetical analyses here, the extent to which covering women 
have internalized the act of covering and the question of whether they are happy to be covered must be studied.
Table 5.17 allows us to observe whether or not the reasons for covering are significantly different for women who use 
different methods of doing so. The reason that “Islam commands covering” was given less by the group who wore 
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a headscarf/headcover/yemeni in comparison to both the country average and to the percentage observed for other 
groups who employed other methods of covering. However, the answer “because Islam commands it” was the 
dominant explanation in this group too. Although the fact that other women in their environment also cover was more 
important for this group, only 9% placed emphasis on this reason. The number of women who wore a çarşaf and who 
left the question “do you cover” unanswered was too small to allow meaningful evaluations concerning this group. 
When we studied women wearing a turban, we observed that the answer “because Islam commands it” was given by a 
higher percentage in this group (79% among women wearing a turban, and 73% in the entire country). Thus, the answer 
“because Islam commands it” was clearly more important for the group wearing a turban.
Table 5.17 Which of the following is the main reason you use a headcover?
Everyone 
else 
around 
me 
covers, 
I must 
also 
cover
I see the 
headcover 
as a 
requisite 
of being an 
honorable 
woman
I cover 
because 
Islam 
commands 
that 
women 
cover
I did not 
used to 
cover 
when 
I was 
young, 
but now 
I cover 
because I 
am old
For me, this 
is being a 
part of a 
political 
movement
Because my 
husband/
fiancé 
wants me 
to cover
Because 
my family 
(mother, 
father, 
siblings – 
except for 
husband/
fiancé) 
wanted me 
to cover
I cover not 
because my 
family wants 
me to cover 
but so that 
I can go 
around in 
public more 
comfortably
Because 
covering is 
an integral 
part of my 
identity Other NI
D
o 
yo
u 
co
ve
r w
he
n 
go
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e?
Yes, I wear 
a headscarf/ 
headcover/
yemeni
9.0 3.8 69.4 1.9 0.5 0.8 0.3 1.1 3.0 1.1 9.0
Yes, I wear a 
turban 2.4 1.2 78.8 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.4 7.1 1.2 4.7
Yes, I wear a 
çarşaf* 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NI/NA* 0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 20.0
Turkey 
average 7.5 3.4 71.3 1.7 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.3 3.9 1.1 8.2
* The total number of observations is less than 30.
On the other hand, 94.1% of covered women stated that they would not uncover even if most women in their family 
or close environment uncovered. (Table 5.18). This rate was a little lower among women who used more traditional 
methods to cover such as the headscarf, headcover or yemeni. However, it is clear that for both groups there is no direct 
correlation between the abandonment of covering and the elimination of societal pressure.
Table 5.18 If women around you decided to uncover, what would you do?
If most women in your immediate environment uncovered, would you uncover 
too?
Yes, in that case, I 
would also uncover
No, I would still remain 
covered NI Total
D
o 
yo
u 
co
ve
r w
he
n 
go
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e?
Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 3.6 87.7 8.8 100
Yes, I wear a turban 1.2 94.1 4.7 100
Yes, I wear a çarşaf* 0.0 100.0 0.0 100
NI/NA* 0.0 20.0 80.0 100
3.0 86.9 10.1 100
* The total number of observations is less than 30.
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5.7.1. Experiences of Covered Women
Within the scope of our study, we asked a series of questions in order to shed light on the experiences of covered women 
in the course of daily life and to determine what aspects of public life women who cover and who do not cover lead 
differently. The answers given to the question asking if covered women were made uncomfortable in public places are 
presented in Table 5.19. As can be seen in this table, the rate of women who wear a turban or a headscarf/headcover/
yemeni and who feel uncomfortable in public because of doing so is only 5%. Although this rate is higher amongst women 
who wear a çarşaf, because the number of people in this group who responded to our question was very small, the rate of 
12.5% does not represent all the women included in this category. These results show that the public does not adversely 
react to the covering of women.
Table 5.19 Do you think women who cover are bothered by others for doing so?
Has a stranger ever bothered you for wearing a headscarf?
 Yes No NA Total
D
o 
yo
u 
co
ve
r w
he
n 
go
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e? Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 5.2 86.6 8.2 100
Yes, I wear a turban 5.9 89.4 4.7 100
Yes, I wear a çarşaf* 12.5 87.5 0.0 100
NI/NA* 0.0 20.0 80.0 100
5.3 85.0 9.7 100
* The total number of observations is less than 30.
We used the question below to reveal the life experiences of covered and uncovered women:
“It is often claimed that there are differences between the daily life experiences of covered and uncovered women in society. 
Below are some observations concerning daily life. Can you please compare covered and uncovered women in regard to each 
of these? Here, we are not interested in knowing whether you approve or disapprove of the examples. What we would like to 
know is the most common experiences of covered and uncovered women.”
Perhaps the most striking result summarized in Table 5.20 is that society does not consider covered women as having 
a more advantageous position in any circumstance in comparison to uncovered women. However, another similarly 
striking result is that the opinion expressing that there is no difference between covered and uncovered women is the 
dominant answer. In other words, people who stated that they saw no difference between covered and uncovered 
women in any of the hypothetical questions constitute the majority. More importantly and contrary to expectations, 
the number of people who said that there was no difference between covered or uncovered women with regards to the 
issues of establishing a good marriage and traveling in the city constituted the majority. In short, only a small minority 
stated that the covering of women caused a meaningful differentiation in terms of travelling in public, working life and 
marital relationships.
Table 5.20 Everyday experiences of covered and uncovered women
Covered 
women
Uncovered 
women
No differences 
between the 
two groups of 
women NA Total
They can travel more frequently in the city on their own 4.6 22.6 72.6 0.3 100
They can travel more frequently between cities on their own 4.1 27.4 68.2 0.3 100
They can eat in a restaurant on their own 4.0 30.5 65.1 0.4 100
They have a higher possibility of getting a job with a salary 4.4 37.2 57.9 0.5 100
They have a higher possibility of having a boyfriend before they get married 4.0 36.6 59.1 0.3 100
They can establish a better marriage in a shorter time 11.6 17.3 70.8 0.4 100
They have a higher possibility of choosing the man they will marry 4.4 28.8 65.2 1.5 100
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Are the results achieved through the sampling also valid for covered women? The results in Table 5.21 show that women 
who wear a turban display a meaningful differentiation concerning only a single subject when compared to the answers 
that represent the entire country, and that subject is “choosing one’s spouse”. Women who wear a turban believe, 
with a rate much higher than the country average, that there is a better possibility of covered women choosing the man 
they will marry compared to uncovered women. Other than that, differentiation throughout the country was observed 
between the evaluations of uncovered women and women who wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni instead of the 
turban or çarşaf. Uncovered women stated in higher rates that there was no difference between covered and uncovered 
women concerning traveling within the city, having a boyfriend before getting married or establishing a good marriage 
in a shorter time. Furthermore, the rate of uncovered women who thought that covered women had a lower possibility 
of having a boyfriend before getting married (1.6%) was lower than the country average (4%).
Table 5.21 Everyday Experiences According to the Type of Cover – 1
Do you cover when going outside?
No, I do 
not
Yes, I wear a headscarf/
headcover/yemeni
Yes, I wear a 
turban
Yes, I wear 
a çarşaf NI/NA
They can travel 
more frequently 
in the city on their 
own
Covered women 2.7 6.4 4.6 4.6
Uncovered women 22.2 21.4 22.1 49.9 26.5 22.6
No differences between the 
two groups of women 75.1 71.5 73.3 50.1 73.5 72.6
NA 0.7 0.3
100 100 100 100 100 100
They can travel 
more frequently 
between cities on 
their own
Covered women 2.2 6.3 3.3 4.1
Uncovered women 28.6 26.2 28.0 49.9 24.6 27.4
No differences between the 
two groups of women 69.2 66.6 68.6 50.1 75.4 68.2
NA 0.9 0.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
They can eat in a 
restaurant on their 
own
Covered women 3.5 4.9 3.4 4.0
Uncovered women 30.0 30.0 31.4 62.5 44.6 30.5
No differences between the 
two groups of women 66.6 64.5 65.2 37.5 55.4 65.1
NA 0.7 0.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
They have a higher 
possibility of 
getting a job with 
a salary
Covered women 3.1 5.8 3.4 4.4
Uncovered women 36.7 35.6 34.0 62.7 31.2 37.2
No differences between the 
two groups of women 59.8 58.0 62.6 37.3 68.8 57.9
NA 0.4 0.6 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
The rate of women who wore a headscarf and who said that uncovered women had a higher possibility of having a 
boyfriend before getting married when compared to covered women (%39.2) was higher than the country average 
(36.6%) and the rate of uncovered women (31.2%). With regard to establishing a good marriage in a shorter time, women 
who wore a headscarf thought that covered women (15.3%) had a greater advantage in comparison to uncovered women 
(12.5%).
In summary, women who wore a turban did not perceive themselves as different from the general public in any way and 
said that there were no differences between covered and uncovered women in terms of daily life experiences. On the 
other hand, uncovered women and women who wore a headscarf/headcover/yemeni believed that covered women had 
different experiences, especially concerning choosing one’s spouse and establishing a marriage. The rate of uncovered 
women who stated that they did not note any difference between the two groups of women was higher, whereas women 
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who wore the traditional headscarf said that covered women could have boyfriends but that they could neither choose 
their husband more freely nor achieve more success in establishing a good marriage.
Table 5.21 Everyday Experiences According to the Type of Cover – 2
Do you cover when going outside?
No, I do not
Yes, I wear a headscarf/
headcover/yemeni
Yes, I wear a 
turban
Yes, I wear 
a çarşaf NI/NA
They have a higher 
possibility of having 
a boyfriend before 
they get married
Covered women 1.6 5.9 3.4 4.0
Uncovered women 31.2 39.2 36.3 62.5 46.4 36.6
No differences between the 
two groups of women 67.1 54.4 60.4 37.5 53.6 59.1
NA 0.4 0.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
They can establish 
a better marriage in 
a shorter time
Covered women 6.4 15.3 13.0 37.8 11.6
Uncovered women 19.6 12.5 16.6 24.7 18.9 17.3
No differences between the 
two groups of women 74.0 71.8 70.5 37.5 81.1 70.8
NA 0.0 0.4 0.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
They have a higher 
possibility of 
choosing the man 
they will marry
Covered women 3.2 5.4 7.1 4.4
Uncovered women 30.2 26.2 23.7 49.9 18.9 28.8
No differences between the 
two groups of women 66.0 65.3 69.2 50.1 81.1 65.2
NA 0.6 3.1 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
5.7.2. Marriage and the Covering of Women
We asked a few additional questions concerning marriage and the selection of one’s spouse. The findings that are 
presented in Table 5.22 indicate that a modern practice, which involves young people meeting and getting to know 
each other before getting married was notably supported. The people we interviewed said that this was practiced in 
their own social environment, and that they would support it even more concerning the marriage of their own children. 
The rate of people who said that it was easier for young people around them to meet on their own and get married was 
70%, while the rate of people who supported the same idea concerning their own children was 72%. However, the rate 
of people who stated that marriages arranged between families were easier to establish in the social environment they 
lived in and who also said that they were in favor of supporting such arranged marriages for their own children was 
around 20%. Although it is difficult to predict the extent to which these views are reflected in real actions, it is even 
harder to assume that such clearly-expressed thoughts do not correspond to reality.
Table 5.22 What type of marriage?
When you consider the young men and women around you at the 
age of marriage, do you think that it would be easier for them to 
marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or to 
establish an arranged marriage with someone their families picked?
It would be easier for them to 
marry someone whom they 
meet and get to know on their 
own
70.0
It would be easier for them to 
establish an arranged marriage 
with someone their family picked
22.1
NA
7.9
If you have or if you had any daughters or sons at the age of marriage, 
would you find it more appropriate if they married someone whom 
they meet and get to know on their own or if they established an 
arranged marriage with someone their family picked?
I think it is more appropriate 
for them to marry someone 
whom they meet and get to 
know on their own
72.2
I think it is more appropriate for 
them to establish a marriage 
arranged between families
21.3
6.5
What about the young men around you who are at the age of 
marriage? Do you think that they prefer to marry women who cover or 
women who do not cover?
They prefer women who do 
not cover
32.8
They prefer women who cover
33.2
NA
34.0
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Table 5.23 What type of marriage – Cross-tabular analysis – 1
 
When you consider the young men 
and women around you at the age of 
marriage, do you think that it would be 
easier for them to marry someone whom 
they meet and get to know on their own 
or to establish an arranged marriage with 
someone their families picked?
If you have or if you had any daughters or sons 
at the age of marriage, would you find it more 
appropriate if they married someone whom 
they meet and get to know on their own or if 
they established an arranged marriage with 
someone their family picked?
It would be 
easier for 
them to marry 
someone whom 
they meet and 
get to know on 
their own
It would be 
easier for them 
to establish 
an arranged 
marriage with 
someone their 
family picked NA
I think it is more 
appropriate for 
them to marry 
someone whom 
they meet and get 
to know on their 
own
I think it is more 
appropriate for 
them to establish 
a marriage 
arranged between 
families NA
Gender
Female 69.4 21.2 9.4 71.0 20.8 8.3
Male 70.7 23.1 6.2 73.6 21.9 4.5
Rural-Urban
Rural 65.4 28.3 6.3 68.5 26.9 4.6
Urban 72.5 18.8 8.8 74.2 18.3 7.5
Ethnic identity (Used 
to speak Kurdish, 
Zazaki with parents...)
Did not speak 70.7 21.5 7.9 73.2 20.6 6.2
Used to speak 65.7 26.2 8.2 65.3 26.5 8.2
Age groups
Age 18-24 75.8 16.2 8.0 77.7 15.4 6.9
Age 25-39 72.6 19.6 7.8 74.2 18.7 7.1
Age 40-54 66.2 25.4 8.4 68.9 25.2 5.9
Age 55-69 63.0 30.8 6.2 66.8 28.1 5.1
Age 70 + 70.3 24.6 5.1 70.3 26.1 3.5
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 61.0 28.5 10.4 62.8 28.4 8.8
Between 450-1000 YTL 70.0 23.2 6.8 71.9 22.0 6.1
Over 1000 YTL 81.3 11.5 7.2 83.9 11.1 4.9
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 70.6 21.5 7.9 71.8 21.6 6.6
Medium-level ownership 66.4 24.5 9.1 69.2 22.9 7.9
High-level ownership 82.3 13.8 3.9 86.4 11.2 2.4
Education
Illiterate 53.7 35.8 10.5 56.2 33.4 10.5
Literate without a diploma 62.1 34.9 3.1 66.8 30.1 3.0
Primary school graduate 66.6 24.8 8.6 69.0 24.4 6.5
High school graduate 79.3 12.8 7.9 81.3 12.7 6.0
University+ graduate 82.9 12.5 4.6 82.1 11.0 6.9
Party preferences
AKP 61.9 31.4 6.6 63.4 30.9 5.6
ANAP-DYP-GP 75.6 21.1 3.3 75.8 20.9 3.3
MHP-BBP 63.2 24.0 12.8 72.4 20.5 7.1
CHP 86.4 10.0 3.6 89.8 6.5 3.7
DEHAP/DTP 84.0 9.6 6.3 79.7 11.9 8.4
Other 89.9 10.1  89.9 10.1  
Undecided 78.1 12.3 9.5 81.5 11.2 7.3
Left-right groups
Leftist 86.7 8.6 4.7 87.6 9.5 2.8
Center 73.6 14.8 11.6 77.2 12.8 10.0
Rightist 57.6 35.1 7.3 59.6 34.3 6.1
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 69.0 23.0 8.0 71.0 22.6 6.4
Alevi 77.9 14.6 7.5 81.5 11.6 6.9
Islamist/Secularist 
groups
Secular 89.6 4.9 5.5 92.8 3.1 4.1
Center 75.0 16.3 8.7 76.9 15.7 7.3
Islamist 59.4 32.6 8.0 61.2 32.2 6.6
Religiosity groups
Not religious 83.6 8.8 7.6 89.6 5.0 5.3
Center 80.6 10.7 8.7 82.2 9.4 8.3
Religious 65.8 26.4 7.9 67.8 26.0 6.2
Turkey average 70.0 22.1 7.9 72.2 21.3 6.5
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When we study the cross-tabular analyses, we see that people who live in rural areas support a marriage arranged by 
families for their own children at a rate higher than the country average (Table 5.23). However, no matter how high 
these rates are in rural areas, they are always under 30%.  People who stated that they were of Kurdish ethnic origin had 
preferences similar to those of people in rural areas. Amongst this group, the rate of people who said that marriages 
arranged between families were easier to establish and that they found such marriages more appropriate for their own 
children was higher than the country average. A generation gap was observed concerning this subject as well, as people 
over the age of 55 supported the idea of arranged marriages more strongly. People belonging to this generation stated 
that arranged marriages were very common in their own environment where they lived.  When the level of education, 
income and ownership increases, the level of support for arranged marriages decreases.  When political preferences are 
studied, it is observed that the support for arranged marriages is only above country average for voters of AKP.  People 
who ideologically placed on the right, who felt closer to the Islamist end on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale and who 
defined themselves as religious practiced arranged marriages more often in comparison to the country average.
More striking results appear in these cross-tabular analyses when the practice of covering is taken into consideration. 
Only 6.9% of  uncovered women stated that marriages arranged by families were common in the environment where 
they lived in and 6.3% said that they would approve of such marriages for their own children.  The rate of uncovered 
women who supported individuals meeting each other on their own and marrying was 87%, whereas among women 
who said they wore a turban, this rate dropped to almost 68%. Interestingly, 61% of the women who said they wore a 
turban stated that marriages established freely between individuals was an easier practice to follow in the environment 
where they lived, while 68% of these women said that they would approve of such marriages for their own children.
Table 5.23 What type of marriage – Cross-tabular analysis -2
 
When you consider the young men and 
women around you at the age of marriage, 
do you think that it would be easier for 
them to marry someone whom they 
meet and get to know on their own or 
to establish an arranged marriage with 
someone their families picked?
If you have or if you had any daughters or sons 
at the age of marriage, would you find it more 
appropriate if they married someone whom 
they meet and get to know on their own or if 
they established an arranged marriage with 
someone their family picked?
It would be 
easier for 
them to marry 
someone whom 
they meet and 
get to know on 
their own
It would be 
easier for them 
to establish 
an arranged 
marriage with 
someone their 
family picked NA
I think it is more 
appropriate for 
them to marry 
someone whom 
they meet and get 
to know on their 
own
I think it is more 
appropriate for 
them to establish a 
marriage arranged 
between families NA
(Women)
Do you cover 
when going 
outside?
No, I do not cover 87.3 6.9 5.8 87.8 6.3 5.9
Yes, I wear a headscarf/
headcover/yemeni 58.9 30.4 10.7 60.0 29.9 10.1
Yes, I wear a turban 61.2 22.6 16.2 67.5 24.4 8.1
Yes, I wear a çarşaf 37.3 62.7  37.3 62.7  
NI/NA 54.9 32.3 12.7 61.1 26.8 12.0
(Men) 
What would 
he want?
She is not covered or he would 
not want her to cover 87.0 7.1 5.8 90.3 5.0 4.7
He would want her to cover or 
she covers or used to cover 65.5 28.2 6.3 66.6 28.8 4.6
He would want her to wear a 
çarşaf or she wears or used to 
wear a çarşaf
38.0 62.0  38.0 62.0  
He wants his wife to cover 
but he is not sure about the 
method of covering
53.1 36.5 10.4 61.7 32.4 5.9
He would want her to wear a 
turban or she wears or used to 
wear a turban
61.9 33.4 4.7 66.0 29.4 4.6
No answer 71.2 21.0 7.8 76.9 20.1 3.1
Turkey average 70.0 22.1 7.9 72.2 21.3 6.5
74
Concerning men, those whose wives or fiancées are uncovered and who do not want them to cover, support individuals 
getting married after they meet on their own by a rate of 87-90%, which is considerably higher than the country average 
and similar to the rate for uncovered women. Similar to the views of women who wear a turban, men whose wives 
wear a turban or who want their wives to wear one seem to be less willing for their own children to establish arranged 
marriages compared to what they observe in their own social environment. Marriage, based on free will, is preferred by 
all groups, regardless of the practice of covering.  Concerning the group of women wearing a çarşaf, we are unable to 
make a comment as the number of observations was not sufficient.
5.7.3. Relationships Between Covered and Uncovered Women
We asked each respondent whether they had any close friends and relatives who did not cover or who covered using a 
çarşaf, turban or headscarf/headcover/yemeni, in order to determine if covered and uncovered women as well as their 
families interacted in daily life.
The cross-tabular analyses of this question in relation to covering are presented in Table 5.24. As each respondent was 
able to say that there were both uncovered and covered women who wear a çarşaf, turban or headcover among their 
close friends, each row can have a total over 100. When studying the table it is important to keep this point in mind; as 
an example, a correct interpretation of the data would be “66.9% of women who said they did not cover stated that they 
had uncovered friends.”  When we employ this method, we can say that approximately 28% of uncovered women said 
that they had friends who wore a turban (a rate under the country average, which is 32.7%), whereas almost 66% of 
women who stated that they wore a turban said that they had close friends who did not cover (slightly above the country 
average). Among those who wore a headscarf/headcover/yemeni, the rate of having close friends who did not cover was 
8% less than women who wore a turban.  The rate of women in this group who had friends who wore a turban was higher 
than the rate of women who wore a turban and who were friends with other women who also wore a turban. Concerning 
women who wore a turban, 31% had close friendships with other women who wore a turban, whereas for women who 
wore a headcover, this rate was 36.7%. The noteworthy thing here is that the rate of women who wore a turban and who 
stated that they had close friends who also wore a turban was not the highest. Another striking finding is that the rate 
of women who wore a turban and who stated that they had close friends in the other two groups was higher than the 
rate of other groups who said that they had close friendships with women who wore a turban.
When close friends in the family circle were considered, we observed that both covered and uncovered women primarily 
interacted with families similar to themselves in this particular sense. For example, 80% of women who wore a turban 
stated that as a family they met other families, which had some members who wore a turban; this rate was only 47% 
among women who did not cover. Only 28% of uncovered women stated that as a family they met other families which 
had members who wore a turban, while approximately 77% of this group said that they got together with families whose 
members did not cover. However, it must be emphasized here that a clear-cut point of separation in relations between 
families of uncovered women and women who wear a turban or headscarf/headcover/yemeni does not exist, similar to 
relationships with friends, and that at least some of the people from both groups get together as families. These groups 
do not lead isolated or separated family lives. As far as we could understand from what people told us, these groups 
maintain social contact individually and within family groups. Two separated groups who exclude each other or who do 
not have any social interaction do not exist in practice. Although their social views and religious practices differ, these 
groups still interact.
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Table 5.24 Relationships of Covered and Uncovered Women
Could you please indicate if women who wear a ÇARŞAF, YEMENİ/HEADCOVER or TURBAN or WHO DO NOT COVER exist within the groups 
I will list now?*
                                                                                                    Among close friends
Uncovered Çarşaf Yemeni/Headcover Turban
D
o 
yo
u 
co
ve
r w
he
n 
go
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e?
No, I do not cover 66,9 6,3 62,1 27,9
Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 57,5 7,2 73,1 36,7
Yes, I wear a turban 65,5 2,4 67,9 31,0
Yes, I wear a çarşaf* 83,3 16,7 50,0 16,7
NI/NA** 41,2 5,9 58,8 41,2
61,8 6,4 67,9 32,7
                                                                                                   Among close friends or relatives often met in family gatherings
Uncovered Çarşaf Yemeni/Headcover Turban
D
o 
yo
u 
co
ve
r w
he
n 
go
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e?
Hayır örtmüyorum 76,5 4,0 63,6 28,3
Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 39,4 6,3 91,2 32,8
Yes, I wear a turban 47,1 28,2 68,2 80,0
Yes, I wear a çarşaf* 37,5 87,5 62,5 50,0
NI/NA** 58,8 5,9 76,5 29,4
54,1 8,9 77,7 36,5 100
* More than one answer is possible. ** The total number of observations is less than 30.
5.7.4. Evaluations on the “Turban”
Both in the 1999 study and in this one, we used the same question format when we asked respondents about their 
evaluations of different statements concerning the “turban” (Table 5.25). The most striking finding here was that the 
rate of people who agreed with the proposition “female university students should be allowed to cover if they wish to” 
was 76% in 1999, whereas this rate decreased to 71% in 2006. A similar but more significant decrease was observed in 
the rate of people who agreed with the proposition “female civil servants should be allowed to cover if they wish to”. 
This rate was 74% in 1999 but dropped to 68% in 2006. Although these results indicate that the polarization observed in 
1999, which emerged as a result of the headscarf ban and possible changes in opinions, decreased slightly, an obvious 
majority have not internalized the headscarf ban even after seven years and support the view opposing the ban.
Table 5.25 Evaluations on the turban
Disagrees Undecided Agrees NA
If a woman believes in Allah and the Prophet she is considered a Muslim even if she does not 
cover-2006 12.1 6.7 79.9 1.3
If a woman believes in Allah and the Prophet she is considered a Muslim even if she does not 
cover -1999 8.3 6.9 84.8 1.3
Female civil servants should be allowed to cover if they wish to-2006 22.3 9.1 67.9 0.7
Female civil servants should be allowed to cover if they wish to-1999 17.4 5.8 74.2 2.5
Female university students should be allowed to cover if they wish to-2006 19.4 8.9 71.1 0.6
Female university students should be allowed to cover if they wish to-1999 16.0 5.6 76.1 2.3
A woman wearing a turban should not smoke in public – 2006 39.2 10.4 49.1 1.3
A woman wearing a turban should not wear make up in public – 2006 40.8 11.4  46.5 1.3
Women who cover by wearing a turban, headscarf or other types of covers are more honorable 
than women who do not cover – 2006 65.8 10.2 22.2 1.7
In some other questions, which we did not ask in 1999 but used in 2006, we aimed to collect evaluations concerning 
the public behavior of women wearing a turban and how they were perceived by the public in general. For example, 
people who were against women who wore a turban “smoking in public” or “wearing make-up” made up a significant 
group, with rates of 47% and 49% respectively. However, the rate of people who opposed this view was also high at 
40%. Another interesting finding was that 66% disagreed with the idea that covered women were more honorable than 
ones who did not cover. The group who agreed with this statement with a rate above the country average was made 
up of respondents who lived in rural areas, who had lower levels of education and socio-economic status, who were 
relatively older, who felt closer to the Islamist end, and who defined themselves as religious and ideologically on the 
right - similar to what we observed in preceding questions.
Table 5.26 Women who cover using a turban, headscarf or other types of covers are more honorable than 
women who do not cover
Disagrees Undecided Agrees NA
(Women)
Do you cover when 
going outside?
No, I do not cover 84.2 5.1 10.1 0.6
Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni 57.0 13.2 27.6 2.3
Yes, I wear a turban 51.7 11.5 33.1 3.6
Yes, I wear a çarşaf 25.2 24.7 37.8 12.4
NI/NA 60.8  32.7 6.5
(Men) 
What would he want?
She is not covered or he would not want her to cover 82.2 8.1 9.2 0.5
He would want her to cover or she covers or used to cover 63.5 11.9 23.1 1.6
He would want her to wear a çarşaf or she wears or used to wear a çarşaf 23.1  76.9  
He wants his wife to cover but he is not sure about the method of 
covering 44.4 7.4 48.2  
He would want her to wear a turban or she wears or used to wear a 
turban 46.2 13.1 39.5 1.2
No answer 65.8 10.9 17.7 5.6
Turkey average 65.8 10.2 22.2 1.7
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Table 5.27 If the headscarf ban was lifted, which situation would disturb him/her?
 Elementary school teacher* Judge **
Yes, it 
would
No, it 
would not NA
Yes, it 
would
No, it 
would not NA
Rural-Urban
Rural 27.6 72.1 0.4 25.8 74.0 0.2
Urban 30.1 69.5 0.4 29.5 70.2 0.3
Ethnic identity (Used to 
speak Kurdish, Zazaki with 
parents...)
Did not speak 32.2 67.4 0.4 31.1 68.6 0.3
Used to speak 8.7 90.8 0.5 8.4 91.6  
Age groups
Age 18-24 25.4 74.2 0.4 26.3 73.7  
Age 25-39 27.0 72.2 0.7 26.2 73.2 0.5
Age 40-54 31.2 68.8  29.1 70.6 0.3
Age 55-69 34.6 64.9 0.5 32.7 67.3  
Age 70 + 40.2 59.8  36.5 63.5  
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 23.0 76.3 0.7 21.8 77.6 0.6
Medium-level ownership 29.8 70.1 0.2 29.3 70.5 0.2
High-level ownership 46.6 52.9 0.6 43.3 56.7  
Education
Illiterate 16.8 82.2 1.0 10.7 89.3  
Literate without a diploma 16.5 82.2 1.3 14.8 83.9 1.3
Primary school graduate 27.7 72.0 0.3 25.2 74.6 0.3
High school graduate 33.5 66.2 0.3 35.0 65.0  
University+ graduate 43.0 56.1 0.8 47.8 51.4 0.8
Party preferences
AKP 20.0 79.9 0.2 19.1 80.5 0.3
ANAP-DYP-GP 41.8 58.2  46.0 54.0  
MHP-BBP 29.2 70.8  23.7 76.3  
CHP 58.6 41.4  59.7 40.3  
DEHAP/DTP 10.7 87.1 2.1 11.6 88.4  
Other 40.6 56.8 2.6 48.6 48.8 2.6
Undecided 37.4 61.2 1.4 40.0 60.0  
Left-right groups
Leftist 44.8 54.7 0.4 45.4 54.6  
Center 27.5 71.6 0.9 23.4 76.2 0.4
Rightist 22.0 77.8 0.2 22.9 76.9 0.2
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 28.6 71.0 0.4 27.4 72.3 0.3
Alevi 34.0 65.4 0.6 35.0 65.0  
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 51.1 47.9 1.0 54.3 45.3 0.3
Center 23.4 76.0 0.6 20.7 78.7 0.6
Islamist 23.1 76.9  21.9 78.1  
Religiosity groups
Not religious 43.2 56.8  45.1 54.9  
Center 39.2 59.6 1.2 35.9 63.7 0.4
Religious 24.6 75.1 0.3 23.9 75.8 0.3
Turkey average 29.2 70.4 0.4 28.2 71.5 0.3
* If we assume that female elementary school teachers were allowed to wear a turban, would you be disturbed if a teacher wearing a turban taught your child at 
school? 
** If we assume that female judges were allowed to wear a turban, would you be disturbed if a female judge with a turban presided over your hearing in the court 
room?
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Concerning party preferences, only the rate of voters for AKP who agreed with this statement (%30) is above the country 
average. (The relevant cross-tabular analyses are not presented here.)
The rate of women who cover and men whose wives or fiancées cover or who want their wives or fiancées to cover who 
consider covered women as more honorable in comparison to uncovered women was higher than the country average. 
In other words, those who cover see themselves as more honorable than the ones who do not. However, we must stress 
here that even in these subgroups, the rate of people who consider women who cover to be more honorable than women 
who do not is never higher than 35-40%.
We shall conclude the series of questions on the headscarf ban in public places with two hypothetical evaluations. The 
respondents were asked in two separate questions whether they would feel disturbed if the headscarf ban was lifted 
and if their child’s teacher at elementary school or a female judge in a courtroom wore a turban. Though surprising, 
the results were coherent with the previously obtained results. A group of approximately 70% throughout the country 
stated that such a situation would not disturb them.
We can see through the cross-tabular analyses that the rate of people who stated that they would not be disturbed by 
receiving public service from civil servants who covered was higher among people who lived in rural areas, who indicated 
that they were of Kurdish origin, who had a relatively lower level of income and ownership, who were less educated, who 
ideologically placed on the center and the right, and who felt closer to the religious and Islamist sectors (Table 5.27). The 
most striking result was that the rate of people in the age group 18-24 who stated that they would not be disturbed by 
such a situation was 74% - a rate higher than the country average, which was 70%. Concerning party preferences, voters 
for AKP and DEHAP/DTP who stated that such a situation would not disturb them displayed higher rates than others. 
The rate of Alevis, 34%, who said that they would be disturbed by these situations was above the country average, 
at approximately 29%. Clearly, Alevis would be relatively more disturbed if women wearing turbans worked as civil 
servants. However, the groups who would be disturbed by such a situation displayed the highest rates among people 
who were relatively more educated (43% in the group with university or higher education), who ideologically placed on 
the left (45%) and who considered themselves closer to the secularist end on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale (51%).
The picture that appears in relation to these results shows that if the headscarf ban was lifted, a minority that is too big 
to disregard would feel disturbed even if the majority of the people supported such a decision. Moreover, the fact that 
45% of people with university or higher education stated that they would be disturbed by these conditions is thought-
provoking considering that the people in this group hold important positions in society. It is not possible to predict the 
consequences of such discomfort through this type of a study. However, the fact that a group of almost 30% stated that 
they would be disturbed by the existence of civil servants who wore a turban suggests that finding a solution to this 
problem is not easy.
5.8. Is Religious Fundamentalism A Rising Trend?
In recent months when views suggesting the rise of reactionary Islam were expressed, some insisted that this was 
not true. Clearly, views on this issue will change according to individuals’ interpretations based on their world view, 
observations and knowledge. In this study, we aimed to determine how ordinary citizens consider this issue as of May 
2006. At the time we asked these questions to respondents of our field study, the political statements and counter-
statements that gradually polarized the public and raised the tension in the country in fall 2006 were not yet on the 
public agenda.
When asked the question, “Some people claim that a religious fundamendalist movement which aims to establish a 
radical Islamic society and a state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years; do you agree?”, 33% said that 
they agreed that Islamic religious fundamentalism was on the rise (Table 5.28).
Table 5.28 Some people claim that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims to establish an Islamic 
society and state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years; do you agree?
Yes, I agree No, I do not agree NA
32.6 61.3 6.1
Above, we gave a breakdown of the question that studied whether the number of covering women had increased. 
Naturally, evaluations concerning the increase in the number of covering women are expected to have influenced 
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evaluations about the rise of religious fundamentalism. As seen in Table 5.29 below, almost 33% of the public thought 
that religious fundamentalism was indeed on the rise, and this rate went up to 53% in the group who believed that the 
number of covering women had increased. Furthermore, people who stated that religious fundamentalism was on the 
rise were asked on what they based their view. Their answers indicate that the basis for the view that religious Islamic 
fundemantalism has grown stronger was the perception that the number of covering women had increased. We showed 
earlier that, contrary to this perception, the number of covering women has, in fact, decreased. In spite of this fact, the 
view that religious fundamentalism and reactionary Islam has gained power in the country was enhanced because facts 
and perceptions were not in accord.
Table 5.29 Some people claim that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims to establish an Islamic 
society and state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years; do you agree?
Yes, I agree
No, I do not 
agree NA
Do you think the number of covering 
women has increased in the last 10 years?
Yes, there has been a substantial increase 53.2 41.2 5.6 100
Yes, it slightly increased 30.7 64.6 4.7 100
No, there has been no increase 21.2 75.2 3.7 100
NA 18.5 66.7 14.8 100
Turkey average 32.6 61.3 6.1 100
Other findings obtained by this question format, which allowed respondents to give multiple answers, are also 
interesting. For example, almost 30% of the respondents stated that the fact that “Islamists have become more 
powerful in politics” over the last 10-15 years was the main reason for the recent rise of religious fundamentalism (Table 
5.30). On the other hand, almost 25% gave an affirmative answer to the question “Should political parties that base 
their policies on religion exist in Turkey?” in 1999, while this rose to 41% in 2006 (Table 5.31). When these two questions 
are compared, it can be observed that the number of people who thought that political parties with policies based on 
religion should be a part of the political system increased while another group regarded “the increase in the power of 
Islamists in politics” as proof of the rise of religious fundamentalism.
Table 5.30 What is the main reason that makes you think that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims 
to establish an Islamic society and state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years?
Share among the answers
Share among the 
respondents
The increase in the number of covering women 20.6 34.6
The increase in the number of people who favor the Shari’ah 13.5 22.7
The increase in the power of religious sects 13.9 23.3
The increase in the number of religious publications 8.8 14.8
The increase in the activities of Islamic terror organizations 8.2 13.7
The increase in Islamist views among university students 5.3 8.8
The increase in the activity of Islamist newspapers and television channels 8.9 14.9
The increase in the power of Islamists in politics 17.5 29.4
Other 1.3 2.2
NI/NA 2.0 3.3
100 167.8
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Table 5.31 Do you think political parties that base their policies on religion should be a part of the Turkish 
political party system?
 1999 2006
Yes, they should 24.6 41.4
No, they shouldn’t 60.6 53.6
NA 14.8 5.0
100 100
Similarly, 23% of the people who thought that religious fundamentalism was on the rise in the country claimed that the 
increase in the number of people who wanted a Shari’ah-based regime was the proof of this increase. As was the case 
in the issues of religious fundamentalism and headscarf, whether this view coincides with the truth must be studied 
further. We will be able to monitor the answer to this question in the course of time. The figure above was created by 
putting together the results of the studies conducted by TÜSES between 1995-1998, the studies we conducted in 1999 
and 2002 and our current study. The most important result obtained through this figure is that since our study in 1999 the 
number of people who wanted a Shari’ah-based regime gradually decreased. However, the above-mentioned group of 
23% claimed exactly the opposite. According to this group, more people want a regime based on Shari’ah. Representing 
approximately one out of every four people in the country, this group saw the claim that the number of people who 
wanted a Shari’ah based regime in Turkey had increased as proof of the rise of religious fundamentalism.  Yet the data 
obtained indicate that the support given to a Shari’ah-based regime did not increase but instead decreased. In short, 
the paradoxical situation we observe in this perception, as well as in the opinions that differentiate according to this 
perception, can also be observed in this question (Figure 5.5).
A striking example of this bi-polar perception and the different opinions based on this perception is the view that 
secularism is under threat in Turkey – a view also occasionally stated by top government officials. Almost four months 
before fall 2006, when this issue became part of the public agenda, we shared this view with ordinary citizens at voting 
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Figure 5.5 Would you want a Shari’ah-based religious regime to be established in Turkey?
*  TÜSES Foundation (1995), Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı, Ankara, TÜSES (1996), Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin 
Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri, Ankara, TÜSES (1999), Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni, Ankara.
**  Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2006)
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Table 5.32 Do you think secularism is under threat in Turkey?
Yes, it is No, it is not NA
Gender
Female 20.0 73.3 6.7
Male 24.3 72.8 2.9
Rural-Urban
Rural 19.5 72.9 7.6
Urban 23.5 73.2 3.3
Ethnic identity (Used to 
speak Kurdish, Zazaki with 
parents...)
Used to speak 23.7 72.1 4.2
Did not speak 10.8 80.2 9.1
Age groups
Age 18-24 24.1 72.1 3.8
Age 25-39 23.0 72.5 4.5
Age 40-54 21.5 72.3 6.1
Age 55-69 17.5 79.6 2.9
Age 70 + 24.0 68.9 7.1
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 11.5 77.5 11.0
Between 450-1000 YTL 21.5 75.8 2.7
Over 1000 YTL 38.5 60.5 1.0
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 22.0 73.5 4.5
Medium-level ownership 17.0 76.1 6.9
High-level ownership 35.2 63.3 1.5
Education
Illiterate 10.2 70.1 19.7
Literate without a diploma 13.3 74.4 12.3
Primary school graduate 17.5 78.2 4.3
High school graduate 29.4 68.9 1.7
University+ graduate 43.6 55.6 0.8
Party preferences
AKP 12.0 81.2 6.7
ANAP-DYP-GP 32.2 64.4 3.4
MHP-BBP 20.5 78.2 1.3
CHP 49.1 50.9  
DEHAP/DTP 21.5 69.9 8.6
Other 47.7 52.3  
Undecided 24.5 72.1 3.4
Left-right groups
Leftist 42.5 56.2 1.3
Center 18.9 76.9 4.3
Rightist 14.4 80.8 4.8
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 20.5 74.5 4.9
Alevi 34.1 61.7 4.2
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 50.4 49.0 0.7
Center 17.6 78.5 4.0
Islamist 12.2 81.4 6.4
Religiosity groups
Not religious 35.9 62.0 2.1
Center 31.2 65.5 3.3
Religious 17.1 77.5 5.4
Turkey average 22.1 73.1 4.8
age in our sample by asking the question: “Do you think that secularism is under threat in Turkey?” A group of 22% stated 
that they thought secularism was under threat. A group of almost 5% did not give an answer. When we study the cross-
tabular analyses, we see that people who felt closer to the secularist end in the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage displayed 
a higher rate, around 50%, of thinking that secularism was under threat. Likewise, this rate was 44% for people who had 
university or higher education, 39% and 35% respectively for people who had a higher level of income and ownership, 
36% for people who did not consider themselves religious, and approximately 43% for people who ideologically placed 
themselves on the left. When we take a look at voting patterns, 49% of CHP voters regarded secularism to be under 
threat, while this rate was 32% in the group of voters for ANAP-DYP-GP, but only 12% among the voters for AKP. Clearly, 
whether secularism is under threat or not directly varies according to different political views, and this diversification is 
significantly parallel to the social and cultural cleavage observed.
5.9. Role of the Military in Politics and in Confronting the Threat of 
“Radical Fundamentalism”
We would like to conclude the issue of the threat of radical fundamentalism, rising religious fundamentalism and the 
view that secularism is compromised, as perceived by groups whose breakdown we presented above, by discussing 
the role of the military in politics and the threat of radical fundamentalism as perceived by the public. Many reliable 
field studies conducted in Turkey up to the present day have shown that the military is regarded as the most reliable 
institution in Turkey. In this study, we did not embark upon inquiring about the same issue to obtain the same result. 
Instead, we asked a few different questions in order to understand the view of ordinary citizens concerning what the role 
of the military should be in politics. We presented the results of one of these questions when we previously discussed 
the issue of democratic values. Here, we would like to discuss the same question once again but on a larger scale.
The people we interviewed were asked to evaluate the statements in Table 5.33 below on a scale of 0-10, “0” meaning 
“I do not agree at all” and “10” meaning “I totally agree”. People who did not agree with the first statement but 
who agreed with the second and the third constituted the majority. The fact that the majority did not agree with the 
statement “Not elected governments but a military regime can solve Turkey’s problems” can be interpreted as saying 
that a military regime does not find the support of the public; but on the other hand, the fact that a group of almost 27% 
agreed with this statement can also allow us to infer that democracy has not yet been firmly established in Turkey. A 
group of almost 59% agreed with the statement “It is natural for the military to occasionally voice their opinion against 
an elected government”. It can be said that the people who agreed with this view do not want a military regime but 
that they approve of a special role for the military in the unique context of Turkey.  Finally, almost 54% agreed with the 
statement “Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military”. This view perhaps indicates 
that the majority of the public has enough self-confidence to be able to state that secularism can be protected without 
the support of the military. However, the fact that a significant group of 25% stated that the support of the military was 
crucial points at the sensitivity of the people of Turkey concerning secularism – while also showing that the public does 
not have much trust in the democratic mechanisms in Turkey.
In short, although the majority of the public does not agree with the idea that only a military regime can solve Turkey’s 
problems, it is also clear that the public supports a unique role for the military in the context of Turkish  politics. 
Table 5.33 Role of the military in Turkish politics
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
Turkey’s problems can be solved not by elected governments but by a military regime 54.7 14.3 26.8 4.2
It is natural for the military to occasionally voice their opinion against an elected 
government 18.4 18.8 58.6 4.2
Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military 24.8 17.7 53.7 3.9
Can we identify the groups who supported the unique role of the military in Turkey concerning these sensitive issues 
and those who opposed it?  Cross-tabular analyses enable us to determine which groups included more people who 
stated views against the existence of a civil authority, which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy, and 
people who supported the opposite view (Table 5.34). For example, when we consider the first statement, we observe 
that men, more than women, opposed the view that Turkey’s problems could be solved not by elected governments but 
by a military regime.
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Table 5.34 Role of the military in Turkish politics
Turkey’s problems can be solved 
not by elected governments but by 
a military regime
It is natural for the military to 
occasionally voice their opinion 
against an elected government
Turkish people can safeguard 
secularism without the support of 
the military
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
Gender
Female 50.7 14.5 27.4 7.5 15.5 21.0 56.3 7.3 24.1 18.0 51.2 6.8
Male 58.9 14.2 26.2 0.7 21.6 16.5 61.1 0.8 25.5 17.3 56.3 0.8
Rural-Urban
Rural 51.1 11.0 31.4 6.6 14.4 16.2 61.9 7.5 18.8 16.7 57.1 7.5
Urban 56.6 16.2 24.3 2.9 20.6 20.2 56.8 2.4 28.0 18.2 51.8 2.0
Ethnic 
identity 
(Used 
to speak 
Kurdish, 
Zazaki with 
parents...)
Did not speak 52.3 15.2 28.6 3.8 17.0 18.3 61.2 3.5 26.1 17.8 52.7 3.4
Used to speak 71.0 8.3 14.1 6.7 28.5 22.2 40.5 8.8 15.4 16.9 60.6 7.2
Education
Illiterate 39.1 20.4 20.7 19.9 14.3 17.4 47.5 20.8 12.8 11.6 56.0 19.6
Literate 
without a 
diploma
54.8 20.8 23.5 0.9 16.9 15.1 59.9 8.1 20.7 16.1 55.1 8.1
Primary school 
graduate 53.4 12.3 30.3 4.0 18.2 18.5 59.9 3.4 23.0 18.9 54.7 3.3
High school 
graduate 58.9 15.0 24.6 1.4 18.6 20.7 58.9 1.8 30.8 16.8 51.2 1.2
University+ 
graduate 63.4 16.5 18.0 2.1 25.0 19.9 55.1  30.1 18.9 50.9 0.1
Income 
groups
Less than 450 
YTL 51.0 17.3 25.1 6.6 19.1 23.2 49.6 8.0 20.2 21.6 51.3 6.9
Between 450-
1000 YTL 55.4 13.3 28.8 2.5 19.2 18.2 60.4 2.2 24.7 17.8 55.1 2.4
Over 1000 YTL 62.5 13.7 22.2 1.6 17.1 18.6 62.9 1.4 27.1 14.1 58.0 0.7
Party 
preferences
AKP 50.3 14.7 30.3 4.7 16.8 17.4 60.4 5.4 17.8 17.2 60.3 4.7
ANAP-DYP-GP 48.8 15.9 32.8 2.5 8.9 13.3 75.3 2.5 25.4 13.4 58.7 2.5
MHP-BBP 50.8 14.5 33.3 1.4 17.4 12.8 69.8  30.9 27.0 42.1  
CHP 61.0 11.9 24.1 3.0 15.1 14.3 70.0 0.6 32.8 16.8 49.8 0.6
DEHAP/DTP 74.4 13.1 12.4  47.2 19.6 26.9 6.3 15.3 15.1 65.3 4.3
Other 66.0 16.3 14.6 3.0 21.4 17.7 58.2 2.7 33.8 16.8 49.4  
Undecided 47.6 17.4 29.5 5.5 16.1 22.7 57.0 4.3 34.6 12.0 48.0 5.4
Left-right 
groups
Leftist 67.7 9.9 18.8 3.6 20.3 18.9 59.1 1.7 32.6 12.9 53.7 0.9
Center 54.3 15.6 27.2 3.0 21.8 25.2 49.9 3.1 29.8 22.3 44.3 3.6
Rightist 49.9 15.2 30.3 4.6 17.1 15.9 62.6 4.4 16.9 16.2 62.7 4.2
Alevi 
identity
Not Alevi 54.6 14.4 26.9 4.1 18.7 18.5 58.4 4.3 24.7 17.7 53.6 4.0
Alevi 55.0 13.8 26.2 4.9 16.3 21.2 59.8 2.8 25.0 17.5 54.1 3.4
Islamist/
Secularist 
groups
Secular 66.3 11.0 19.9 2.7 16.6 14.7 67.6 1.0 38.4 13.8 47.2 0.7
Center 60.8 15.3 20.5 3.3 19.7 25.7 50.1 4.5 27.5 26.3 42.6 3.5
Islamist 48.0 15.0 32.7 4.3 18.7 16.5 59.8 5.0 16.2 14.8 63.9 5.1
Religiosity 
groups
Not religious 65.6 12.8 18.5 3.1 19.5 16.7 61.7 2.1 36.3 13.8 46.8 3.1
Center 55.7 15.2 23.7 5.4 18.4 23.0 55.0 3.7 30.0 20.5 46.0 3.5
Religious 52.8 14.6 28.5 4.1 18.1 18.0 59.3 4.6 22.1 17.5 56.2 4.2
Turkey 
average 54.7 14.3 26.8 4.2 18.4 18.8 58.6 4.2 24.8 17.7 53.7 3.9
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The results that emerge when we analyze this statement in more detail are quite interesting. People with Kurdish origin 
opposed a military regime at a rate of 71%, which is almost 18% above the country average. People who are relatively 
more educated (i.e. people with high school or higher education) and who have a higher level of ownership – although 
this is not presented in the related table – were against a military regime with a rate higher than the country average. The 
rate of opposition to a military regime was also above the country average for groups who did not consider themselves 
religious and who felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-Secularist” scale – a result consistent with the other 
results above.
People who ideologically placed on the left and voters for CHP and DEHAP/DTP, as well as relatively smaller parties, 
also displayed their disapproval of a military regime. On the other hand, the voters for AKP and parties in the center 
right opposed a military regime with a rate lower than the country average. This last finding concerning AKP voters was 
rather interesting and also unexpected. We are not sure as to how we should interpret this finding. We could say that 
the voters for AKP were uneasy about this issue and were reluctant to openly express their views. On the other hand, 
the fact that CHP voters were significantly against a military regime is a finding that the CHP administration must study 
carefully.
A similar pattern appears when we study the cross-tabular analyses of the second statement. However, what provokes 
thought here is that the rate of people who did not agree with the statement “It is natural for the military to occasionally 
voice their opinion against an elected government” did not exceed 47% in any of the subgroups, except for the voters for 
DEHAP/DTP. This rate was only 29% for the group of people who stated that they spoke Kurdish with their parents. The 
fact that the opposing view found support of around only 20% in the other subgroups could be regarded as proof that 
the view in favor of the role of the military unique to Turkey is quite prevalent throughout the country.
Finally, we come across a similar picture when we take a look at the cross-tabular analyses concerning the statement 
“Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military”. However, this time, DEHAP/DTP voters 
displayed the highest rate of 65% in agreeing with this statement, which can be seen as an expression of the self-
confidence of the civil will in safeguarding secularism. This rate was 60% among the voters for AKP, but was still above 
the country average (54%). The above-mentioned fact indicating that AKP voters were unable to express their views 
against a military regime as strongly as “leftist” voters did not emerge in this question. The belief that secularism can 
be protected without the support of the military was stronger than the country average among people who defined 
themselves as religious and ideologically to the right, and who felt closer to the Islamist end of the “Islamist-Secularist” 
cleavage. Similar to the results in the previous examples, the rate of people with a higher level of income who said that 
secularism could be protected without the support of the military was higher than the country average.
According to the picture formed from these analyses, the more religious groups in society who voted for AKP and who 
could be defined as the “Islamist sector” stated that secularism could be safeguarded without the support of the 
military. However, even this sector did not adopt a definite position concerning the issue of the military voicing their 
opinions against civil authority. Therefore, a coherent frame for views concerning civil initiative and the absolute power 
of civil authority, which has democratic legitimacy, cannot be created.  Any attempt to do so must take into account the 
fervently supported special role for the military as a unique necessity of the Turkish political context by all segments of 
society.  
5.10. Is Religion-Based Conservatism on the Rise?
In order to examine this issue, we reused some of the statements from 1999 or made some minor alterations to them. 
The results presented in Table 5.35 below indicate that except one, all attitudes formed through religious motives lost 
strength from 1999 to 2006. When the possible reactions of people to events they could face in daily life are predicted 
through interpreting the religious motifs that could be identified in these statements, we can say that the religion-based 
conservative attitude has not become stronger in comparison to the situation in 1999, and that on the contrary, it has 
weakened. However, there are also observations that could indicate the opposite view. For example, the rate of people 
who said in 1999 that there could be good people among the believers of other religions was 89%, whereas it decreased 
to 72% in 2006.  Perhaps we can come up with a more meaningful explanation if we conjoin this result with the results 
concerning the skeptic attitude towards “foreigners”.
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Table 5.35 Attitudes that assess religion-based conservatism
 
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
If I had an apartment to rent out, I would try to ensure that my tenant was a devout 
Muslim – 2006 30.2 17.6 50.9 1.3 100
If I had an apartment to rent out, I would try to ensure that my tenant was a devout 
Muslim – 1999 40.2 5.9 51.9 1.9 100
If I looked for an apartment to rent, I would take care that my neighbors were devout 
Muslims – 2006 32.1 16.8 50.0 1.1 100
If I looked for an apartment to rent, I would take care that my neighbors were devout 
Muslims – 1999 37.1 6.6 54.3 2 100
If I had two grocers in my neighborhood who asked for the same price for their goods, I 
would prefer to shop from the one who is known to be a devout Muslim – 2006 32.6 16.8 49.6 1.0 100
If I had two grocers in my neighborhood who asked for the same price for their goods, I 
would prefer to shop from the one who is known to be a devout Muslim – 1999 39 9.5 49.3 2.2 100
It is important that my friends are devout Muslims – 2006 29.4 19.2 50.5 0.8 100
It is important that my friends are devout Muslims– 1999 30.9 6.4 61.1 1.7 100
In business, devout Muslims are more honest and trustworthy than people who are not 
devout Muslims – 2006 35.2 20.1 42.8 1.9 100
In business, devout Muslims are more honest and trustworthy than people who are not 
devout Muslims – 1999 37.4 10.8 48.8 3 100
I believe that there may be good people among the believers of other religions – 2006 12.4 14.2 72.2 1.2 100
I believe that there may be good people among the believers of other religions – 1999 4.7 3.0 89.2 3.1 100
An ideal Muslim society should be established after the example of the era of the Prophet 
Mohammad – 2006 20.0 21.7 51.4 6.9 100
The most important responsibility of Muslim people is to work to enhance and promote the 
Islamic way of living 24.1 18.5 55.5 1.8 100
For example, almost 59% agreed with the statement “the activities of missionaries who try to promote religions other 
than Islam must be restricted” (Table 5.36). Although not a very large group, almost 56% agreed with the statement 
“the most important responsibility of Muslim people is to work to enhance and promote the Islamic way of living”. On 
the other hand, the rate of people who were against the re-opening of the Clergy School in Heybeliada was about 49%. 
53-55% agreed with conspiracy theories that claim that the world economy is controlled by the Jews and that some 
influential circles who serve the interests of this group also exist in Turkey. This intolerant approach towards “others” 
who are “different” can also be observed in the answers given to our question designed to find out what kind of neighbor 
people want to have.
These serial observations indicate that large groups among the people of Turkey have a sceptical, distant and even hostile 
attitude towards groups they describe as “others” or “foreigners” as opposed to “us”. Another similar observation is 
that a sectarian and excluding approach exists towards non-Muslim citizens, who make up a very small number anyway, 
and towards people who have a different ethnic origin or who belong to another religious sect. Moreover, as stated 
above, this approach causes a lack of sensitivity in advocating the rights of “others”, although in general, democratic 
rights are supported. Such a sectarian, excluding and sceptical attitude occasionally impedes the democratic system in 
the country.
Table 5.36 Skeptical attitudes towards foreigners
 
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
The September 11 attacks against the US can in no way be justified according to 
Islamic belief 22.1 16.1 56.4 5.5 100
The activities of missionaries who work to promote religions other than Islam must be 
restricted 21.3 16.5 58.6 3.6 100
The clergy school in Heybeliada, which is currently closed, should be re-opened so that 
Christian Orthodox clergymen can be educated there 48.9 18.4 26.6 6.1 100
The Jews are in control of the world economy 19.6 17.8 54.8 7.8 100
In Turkey, some influential circles serve the interests of the Jews 17.5 21.3 52.9 8.3 100
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The need to reform Sunni Islam in Turkey has been regularly debated since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 
The rate of agreement with the reformist statements, which is documented in Table 5.37 below is higher than that for 
the options advocating the current situation, except for the issue of approving women to perform the funeral prayer. For 
instance, the rates of those in favor of supporting the Presidency of Religious Affairs through the voluntary contribution 
of the public, the state’s financial support to Cem houses and the implementation of case law in Islam are higher than 
those of opposing views. The support for the re-interpretation of Islam within the modern context was the same as in 
1999 (34.8% in 1999 and 34.6% in 2006), while the rate of people against this view remained the same in both studies 
with 49.8%. This is the only finding that was exactly the same in both of the studies we conducted. On the other hand, 
the rate of support for state subsidies for Cem houses was 69.2% in 1999, but it dropped to 43.5% in 2006. This decrease 
is an example of the cleavage among sects, which we emphasized in different sections of our study.  Allowing women to 
perform the funeral prayer received the support of only 25.0% in 1999, whereas it rose to 35.4% in 2006, and the rate of 
people who were against this practice decreased to 44.6% in 2006 from a rate of 63.9% in 1999.
Table 5.37 Reform in Islam
 Does not agree Undecided Agrees NA
In Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs should not be supported by the state 
but through the voluntary contributions of the public 25.4 21.0 49.3 4.3 100
The state must give financial support to Cem houses in order to fulfill the needs of 
Alevi citizens 31.7 20.6 43.5 4.1 100
Women can perform prayers in mosques together with the community in an area 
assigned to them 20.2 16.8 60.5 2.4 100
Women should be allowed to perform the funeral prayer 44.6 16.6 35.4 3.3 100
Islam needs to be reorganized in line with case law, namely, many of its parts 
must be re-interpreted within the modern context 27.7 19.4 42.6 10.3 100
Islam needs be re-interpreted according to the modern context 49.8 8.8 34.6 6.7 100
5.11. Evaluating Religion and the Performance of the Governing Justice and Development 
Party (AKP)
When AKP (Justice and Development Party) won a majority of the votes in the 2002 elections, it became the fifth 
party with a reference to Islam to come into power since 1946 – the date Turkey implemented the multiparty system. 
Moreover, AKP did not need to establish a coalition but established a government as a single party.  After 1973, the CHP-
MSP coalition was formed, which was followed by the Welfare Party’s (Refah Partisi – RP) participation in coalitions of 
the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe).  Consequently, RP got the highest votes in the 1995 elections and RP and True 
Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi – DYP) established the Refahyol coalition. However, this coalition did not last long and 
came to an end because of the February 28 period. The discourse of the Welfare Party had caused both the elites and 
the public at large to polarize, while the February 28 period deepened this cleavage. In the study we conducted in 1999, 
we examined how the public evaluated the Welfare Party (RP) and its successor, the Virtue Party (FP) in this process, 
and reached significant findings about the progression of political Islam into the political party system in Turkey. For 
example, the voting population did not know Recai Kutan, who was the president of FP at the time, and the people we 
interviewed stated that if FP wanted to succeed in the election, it had to change its leader. The people who stated that 
a change was needed were asked whom they wanted to see as the leader of the party, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
the name that stood out by far in the answers. In the evaluations about RP, 60% of the respondents had been against 
the party’s policies, while a group of 40% had given them some support. In spite of a group of 37% who approved of the 
abolishment of RP, a group of 38% was of the opposite opinion. The support given to RP by respondents who had said 
that they spoke Kurdish had displayed a rate of 47%, which was higher in comparison to all other groups.
After the elections in April 1999, a short-lasting contention for the presidency of FP took place, and consequently, a 
relatively “younger” group from the MSP-RP-FP wing of the Milli Görüş movement broke away and established AKP, 
which came to power after the 2002 elections. We believe that it is important to present a comparative analysis of AKP’s 
historical background and its four and a half year performance together with our evaluations at hand of RP. 
We would like to begin this discussion with the question we asked respondents to find out what factors were prioritized 
when they voted for a party. As can be seen in Figure 5.6 below, among ten propositions, the belief that influenced 
the behavior of voters the most was “believing that the party would fight against bribery and corruption”, with a rate 
of 92.6%. The following most important factors were the conviction that a party would “protect human rights and 
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freedom” (91.5%), that it would “improve the economy” (90.8%) and that it would “pursue a foreign policy that befits our 
national pride and identity” (87.2%). Finally, 84.2% considered “protecting secular republican values” as important for 
a party. These five factors formed the most dominant group of factors in the analysis that was applied to the evaluations 
and accounted for 30.5% of the total variance. We named these factors as the “Issues on which consensus has been 
reached”.
Table 5.38 What factors hold the greatest importance for voting? – Factor Analysis Results
Issues on which consensus 
has been reached Minority rights
Islamic values and the 
EU
Because I believe they will fight against bribery and corruption 0.82 0.07 0.14
Because I believe thay will protect human rights and freedom 0.80 0.10 0.14
Because their foreign policy befits our national pride and identity 0.75 -0.03 0.17
Because they protect secular republican values 0.72 0.05 0.03
Because I have trust that they will improve the economy 0.72 0.00 0.22
Because it is a party that is more predisposed to the protection of the 
identity and rights of Alevi citizens 0.03 0.93 0.02
Because they show an effort to protect the cultural identity of 
Kurdish people 0.06 0.91 0.12
Because they protect Islamic values 0.10 0.05 0.81
Because I approve of the leader of the party 0.14 0.00 0.76
Because they support the process of Turkey’s membership to the EU 0.30 0.21 0.42
Explained total variance (%) 30.5 17.7 15.4
Factor inference method: Principle component analysis, rotation method: varimax, through Kaiser normalization.
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Figure 5.6 What factors affect party selection during elections and to what extent?
  The three factors that formed the second group of most important factors were “upholding Islamic values”, “supporting 
the process of Turkey’s membership to the EU”, and “approving the leader of the party”, which were all rated at a range 
of 71% to 78%. We named this group “Islamic Values and the EU”. The third group consisted of the issue of minority 
rights, which we expressed as “showing an effort to protect the cultural identity of Kurdish people and Alevi citizens”. 
We named this third dimension “Minority Rights”. The subject groups of “Minority Rights” and “Islamic Values and the 
EU” can account for a total variance of 17.7% and 15.4% respectively in factor analysis. The fact that important issues 
related to voting can be divided into three clear-cut dimensions is remarkable.
We used this factor analysis to obtain factor scores, which are in fact the weighted average of the answers each person 
gave for all of the questions. These scores were normalized; in other words, they were created as a series with an 
average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Therefore, when the average for a subgroup approached zero, that subgroup 
tended to bear resemblance to the country average, while the positive averages displayed a weighted average score 
of importance above the country average, and the negative average factor scores corresponded to a weighted average 
score of importance under the country average. 
When we used the cross-tabular analyses to analyze these factor scores and the average values of the subgroups, we 
saw that women and men did not display a differentiated picture concerning the three dimensions (Table 5.39). However, 
we observed that minority rights were considered less important by people who live in rural areas compared to those 
who live in urban areas.  The latter group deemed Islamic values and the EU as less important compared to people who 
live in rural areas.  Respondents who stated that they were of Kurdish origin gave more importance to minority rights, 
Islamic values and the EU than the rest of the sample.
Concerning age groups, only the group of people who were 70 or older considered minority rights as less important, 
and the issue of Islamic values and the EU more important than the country average. When business was taken into 
consideration, a meaningful differentiation related to the “Most Important Factors” was observed. Self-employed 
people, unemployed people and students considered the issues in this group more important, displaying a rate above 
the country average, while paid workers and unpaid family workers considered them less important than the country 
average. Students and paid full-time workers considered minority issues important, while retired people displayed a 
rate under the country average regarding these issues. Workers did not find the issues of Islamic values and the EU 
very important, whereas self-employed people and family workers considered these issues very important, displaying a 
rate above the country average. Students deemed Islamic values and the issue of the EU as less important, with a rate 
under the country average.  Finally, we observed that as education levels increased, the importance given to such issues 
decreased.
When we consider the situation from the viewpoint of party voters, we see that the voters for AKP constituted the only 
group that made up a percentage under the average regarding the issues mentioned in the first group. AKP voters who 
considered these issues less important when compared to the general public displayed higher rates concerning issues 
such as Islamic values and the EU. Concerning minority issues, CHP voters held a similar position with AKP voters 
regarding minority rights and stood close to the general public opinion on the issue.   However, contrary to AKP voters, 
they considered the issues in the first group more important than the general public and the issues of Islamic values 
and the EU less important than the country average.  It is not surprising that the voters for two different parties held 
such converse positions with regard to the issues they deemed as important in terms of selecting the party they vote for. 
DEHAP/DTP voters considered all issues more important than the country average and paid special attention to minority 
issues. Alevis considered minority issues more important and the issues of Islamic values and the EU less important 
than the general public. Concerning the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage and the religiosity of people according to their 
self-evaluation, only people who do not consider themselves religious deem minority rights more important than the 
country average, and no other cleavege exists, which is surprising. People who considered themselves as “religious” 
or as “Islamist” did not appear to regard “Minority Rights” as important. However, that the Islamist sector – which 
provided answers coherent with the cross-tabular analyses according to party preferences – did not consider the “Issues 
on Which Consensus Has Been Reached” important is quite astonishing.
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Table 5.39 Important issues related to voting – Cross-tabular analysis 1
  
Issues on which 
consensus has been 
reached Minority rights
Islamic values and 
the EU
Gender
Female -0.02 0.01 0.01
Male 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Rural-Urban
Rural 0.10 -0.20 0.20
Urban -0.05 0.10 -0.10
Ethnic identity 
(Used to speak 
Kurdish, Zazaki 
with parents...)
Did not speak -0.01 -0.07 -0.05
Used to speak 0.07 0.52 0.36
Age groups
Age 18-24 0.02 0.03 -0.02
Age 25-39 0.03 0.03 0.00
Age 40-54 0.00 -0.03 -0.05
Age 55-69 -0.08 0.01 0.08
Age 70 + -0.01 -0.30 0.24
Working status
Wage-earning/with salary and on full-time basis -0.10 0.17 -0.22
Wage-earning / with salary and on part-time basis -0.21 -0.14 -0.14
Self-employed 0.12 -0.08 0.16
Unpaid family worker -0.48 -0.02 0.30
Retired 0.03 -0.10 0.00
Housewife -0.04 -0.04 0.11
Student 0.20 0.16 -0.28
Looking for a job and wants to works if he/she finds 
one 0.28 -0.06 -0.08
Unemployed; subsists on income such as rental or 
interest income -0.19 -0.06 -0.17
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 0.03 0.02 0.27
Between 450-1000 YTL -0.07 -0.06 -0.04
Over 1000 YTL 0.04 0.11 -0.22
Education
Illiterate 0.00 0.07 0.48
Literate without a diploma 0.03 -0.12 0.36
Primary school graduate -0.05 -0.02 0.08
High school graduate 0.05 0.09 -0.21
University+ graduate 0.15 -0.10 -0.39
Turkey average 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 5.39 Important issues related to voting – Cross-tabular analysis 2
  
Issues on which consensus has 
been reached Minority rights
Islamic values and the 
EU
Party preferences
AKP -0.12 0.01 0.31
ANAP-DYP-GP 0.12 -0.32 0.05
MHP-BBP 0.03 -0.38 0.03
CHP 0.30 0.08 -0.59
DEHAP/DTP 0.15 0.85 0.25
Other 0.15 0.18 -1.00
Undecided -0.10 -0.04 -0.18
Left-right groups
Leftist 0.14 0.20 -0.46
Center 0.13 -0.07 -0.06
Rightist -0.16 0.01 0.30
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 0.01 -0.07 0.05
Alevi -0.07 0.53 -0.38
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 0.29 -0.02 -0.56
Center 0.21 -0.03 -0.08
Islamist -0.22 0.07 0.26
Religiosity groups
Not religious 0.06 0.21 -0.50
Center 0.14 0.03 -0.15
Religious -0.06 -0.04 0.11
Turkey average 0.00 0.00 0.00
In order to measure AKP’s performance in government, we first tried to determine what things had changed in different 
areas when compared to the previous DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government; and studied whether these changes, if 
any, were for the better or for the worse. At least 44% and at most 57% of the respondents stated that certain things 
had changed during the AKP government when a comparison with the previous government was made (Figure 5.7). The 
rate of people who thought that the existing change was for the better was at least 55% and at most 67%. A group of at 
least 20% and at most 30% believed that there had not been any change in any of the mentioned areas. Evidently, the 
AKP government underwent significant changes in comparison to the previous period, and most of these changes were 
for the better. Most importantly, a group of 33% stated that some change had taken place in terms of the economy (57% 
who said that “change had occured”, subtracting 24% who said that “there had been no change” = net 33% who said 
that “change had occured”), and 67% claimed that this change was for the better. The rate of people who said that “a 
noticeable change took place” in the EU process, in internal politics and in relationships with the US was 39%, 33% and 
31% respectively. 
In order find out how satisfactory AKP’s policies were considered to be, we asked respondents to evaluate the party’s 
policies in 16 different areas. As can be seen in Figure 5.8 below, in five of these areas the rate of people who did not 
find the policies satisfactory was higher than that of those who found them satisfactory. Thus, the overall satisfaction 
appears to be negative. Although the public recently developed certain doubts concerning membership of the EU, in 
May 2006 when our study was conducted, AKP’s performance since November 2002 concerning EU membership was 
regarded as generally satisfactory. People who found the party’s performance satisfactory displayed additional net 
points of 31% in comparison to the people who were of the opposite opinion. The rate of people who found AKP’s policies 
satisfactory in terms of improvement in the economy was approximately 25%, while this rate was 22% concerning the 
fight against bribery and corruption and around 24% in terms of bringing solutions to health care issues.
Negative net satisfaction points mean that the number of people who were not satisfied was higher than the ones who 
were satisfied. The first noteworthy indicator here was that the biggest group, of 10%, consisted of people who were 
not satisfied concerning the work done to decrease unemployment. The subsequent areas where the party’s policies 
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were found unsatisfactory were related to the issue of identity. A group of almost 30% found the policies satisfactory in 
meeting the expectations of Kurdish and Alevi citizens, whereas a group that was 4.5% larger did not find the policies 
regarding minority issues satisfactory. The issue of restricting the immunity of members of parliament was next on the 
list with a negative net value of satisfaction.
Another expectation which the AKP government had difficulty meeting was related to resolving the turban and 
headcover issue – another area with a negative net value of satisfaction. When we look at the cross-tabular analyses of 
this question, we can see that the people who did not find the party’s policies satisfactory in solving this issue belonged 
to the group who had a higher socio-economic status and who also had higher education (Table 5.40).  Respondents 
who ideologically placed on the left, who identify themselves as Alevi, who did not consider themselves religious, who 
felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-Secularist” scale deemed AKP’s policies for solving the turban issue 
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Figure 5.7. Has any change taken place during the AKP government? If yes, is it for the better or for the worse?
unsatisfactory, with a rate above the country average. However, the rate of AKP voters who also found the related 
policies unsatisfactory is lower than the country average. We would like to mention here without delving into much 
detail that the percentages of covered women, and men who wanted their wives to cover, who did not find AKP’s policies 
concerning the turban issue satisfactory were below the country average, with 31% and 34% respectively.
93
Figure 5.8. How satisfactory are AKP’s policies?
In short, the performance evaluations of some of the issues that were important for AKP displayed results far from 
being satisfactory.  Especially regarding the issue of decreasing unemployment, the number of people who were 
dissatisfied was higher than those who were satisfied. The expectations of Alevi and Kurdish people from the Turkish 
state also seem to not have been amply met during the AKP government. In addition, it can be clearly seen that the 
AKP government did not pursue satisfactory policies in solving the issues of İmam Hatip schools and people wearing 
a turban – two important expectations stressed when AKP came to power. However, it is quite interesting that the 
dissatisfied group mainly consisted of people who were relatively less religious, who felt closer to the secularist end, 
who placed themselves to the left, and who had a relatively better socio-economic status, instead of people in favor of 
covering, who are relatively more religious, and who expect policies from and also support AKP concerning these issues. 
Perhaps this result shows that the question was interpreted in different ways by different groups. In other words, the 
dissatisfaction of the secular sector with AKP cannot result from the fact that AKP had been unable to lift the ban on 
turbans. We are not able to infer through our study what this sector expects from AKP concerning the turban issue. How 
AKP will succeed in pleasing this sector with regard to the turban issue remains a question that is difficult to answer.
In our study, we also got some general evaluations about certain subjects related to AKP.  In the answers given to 
these questions, summarized in Figure 5.9 below, the evaluations concerning almost all subjects displayed a bi-polar 
structure. For example, while 42% of the respondents did not agree with the statement “AKP aims to reverse the rights 
women were able to acquire with the establishment of the Turkish Republic”, a group of 37% did. A similar difference of 
opinion was also observed in all other evaluations.
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Figure 5.9. Evaluation of AKP 
Table 5.40 Are AKP’s policies in solving the turban (headscarf) issue satisfactory? – Cross-tabular analysis
Not satisfactory Undecided Satisfactory
Gender
Female 38.2 21.3 40.5
Male 43.9 16.3 39.7
Rural-Urban
Rural 38.9 20.0 41.2
Urban 42.1 18.3 39.6
Ethnic identity (Used to speak 
Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)
Did not speak 41.1 19.5 39.3
Used to speak 39.9 14.7 45.5
Age groups
Age 18-24 42.2 19.8 38.0
Age 25-39 42.6 18.0 39.4
Age 40-54 39.8 20.9 39.3
Age 55-69 37.1 18.3 44.6
Age 70 + 37.4 13.8 48.8
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 33.9 22.8 43.3
Between 450-1000 YTL 38.9 17.5 43.6
Over 1000 YTL 53.8 17.6 28.6
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 42.6 17.9 39.5
Medium-level ownership 35.2 21.2 43.5
High-level ownership 49.9 18.0 32.1
Education
Illiterate 25.1 29.7 45.2
Literate without a diploma 35.1 15.6 49.3
Primary school graduate 35.8 20.1 44.2
High school graduate 52.6 15.3 32.1
University+ graduate 55.9 16.8 27.3
Party preferences
AKP 26.2 19.0 54.8
ANAP-DYP-GP 45.3 18.6 36.0
MHP-BBP 50.7 19.9 29.5
CHP 65.5 18.3 16.2
DEHAP 51.9 6.4 41.7
Other 67.2 9.5 23.3
Undecided 58.1 12.5 29.4
Left-right groups
Leftist 55.1 17.1 27.8
Center 37.3 24.9 37.8
Rightist 35.9 15.7 48.3
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 39.9 18.9 41.2
Alevi 49.2 18.9 31.9
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 62.6 17.1 20.3
Center 41.3 24.5 34.2
Islamist 31.2 17.4 51.4
Religiosity groups
Not religious 63.4 19.6 17.0
Center 49.0 22.5 28.5
Religious 36.2 18.3 45.5
Turkey average 41.0 18.9 40.1
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Table 5.41 AKP is a party that is committed to democracy
Does not 
agree Undecided Agrees NA
Gender
Female 24.7 18.3 52.0 5.0
Male 27.2 16.0 55.5 1.2
Rural-Urban
Rural 18.6 14.5 62.1 4.8
Urban 29.9 18.6 49.2 2.3
Ethnic identity (Used to speak 
Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)
Did not speak 26.1 17.2 53.8 2.9
Used to speak 24.8 16.9 52.8 5.5
Age groups
Age 18-24 26.5 21.2 49.3 3.0
Age 25-39 29.4 14.8 53.1 2.7
Age 40-54 23.6 17.3 55.7 3.4
Age 55-69 18.5 20.1 59.0 2.5
Age 70 + 28.0 13.3 53.5 5.2
Income groups
Less than 450 YTL 16.0 18.6 58.5 7.0
Between 450-1000 YTL 23.6 17.2 57.5 1.7
Over 1000 YTL 42.7 16.1 40.8 0.4
Ownership groups
Low-level ownership 20.6 20.1 53.7 5.6
Medium-level ownership 24.9 16.0 56.9 2.2
High-level ownership 45.2 16.6 38.2  
Education
Illiterate 12.2 20.6 54.4 12.8
Literate without a diploma 17.9 19.5 57.1 5.4
Primary school graduate 18.8 17.3 61.0 2.9
High school graduate 40.3 17.0 41.0 1.7
University+ graduate 43.6 15.0 41.4 0.1
Party preferences
AKP 7.5 11.1 78.1 3.3
ANAP-DYP-GP 38.3 10.3 49.8 1.6
MHP-BBP 27.5 22.1 50.5  
CHP 66.1 11.4 21.8 0.6
DEHAP 52.5 28.2 19.3  
Other 58.1 13.2 25.8 2.9
Undecided 33.2 23.0 38.7 5.0
Left-right groups
Leftist 57.3 15.9 26.7 0.0
Center 24.0 26.3 47.0 2.7
Rightist 12.7 13.1 71.3 3.0
Alevi identity
Not Alevi 23.3 18.0 55.5 3.2
Alevi 46.6 10.6 39.4 3.3
Islamist/Secularist groups
Secular 59.1 14.7 25.1 1.1
Center 23.8 27.4 46.3 2.4
Islamist 11.7 13.8 70.7 3.8
Religiosity groups
Not religious 62.0 11.0 22.7 4.3
Center 38.7 21.4 37.2 2.7
Religious 18.0 17.0 61.7 3.2
Turkey average 25.9 17.2 53.7 3.2
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We reach interesting results here when we examine the two questions we had also asked about RP in the study we 
conducted in 1999. For example, the people who disagreed with the statement “AKP is a party that believes in democracy” 
with a rate above the country average consisted of people who lived in urban areas, who had a relatively higher socio-
economic status, who had high school or higher education, who ideologically placed on the left, who felt closer to the 
secularist end in the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage and who identified themselves as Alevi (Table 5.41). AKP voters 
who disagreed with this statement only accounted for 8%, whereas voters for MHP-BBP constituted a rate of 27.5% 
and those of CHP, 66%. Clearly, the evaluations about AKP display a completely incongruous structure between the 
followers of AKP and those of opposing parties, even concerning a question about the commitment of AKP to democracy. 
For example, 18% of those who defined themselves as religious stated that AKP was a party that believed in democracy, 
while 66% of people who did not define themselves as religious supported the opposite view.
However, when the answers given to a similar question that was asked about RP in 1999 are examined, we see that back 
in 1999, those who did not agree with the opinion that RP was a party that was committed to democracy comprised 
a rate of 42%, whereas this rate for AKP in 2006 was 25.9%. In other words, when compared to RP, less polarization 
was observed in the evaluations of AKP. Another indicator of the significant support given to AKP is that in 1999, 43% 
agreed with the statement “RP helps its followers in solving their problems more than other parties do”, whereas the 
same question that was asked about AKP in 2006 yielded an agreement rate of around 54%.  It can be observed that 
people strongly believe that during its service in government as a single party, AKP had helped its followers more than 
RP helped its supporters in the past. If this “help” is interpreted as “favoritism”, we can infer that this act of favoritism 
harboured the fragmentation in the evaluations about AKP.
However, providing opportunities for its followers can also be interpreted positively. Drawing into the system the 
sectors that had been marginalized by the Republic as a result of their sensitivity concerning religion can be seen as a 
contribution to the institutionalization of Turkish democracy. When considered from this perspective, we have some 
data that suggest that religious people have been leading a more comfortable life during the AKP government (Table 
5.42). For example, the rate of those who thought that religious people were under oppression was 42.4% in 1999, but it 
decreased to 17.0% in 2006. Before the 2002 elections, the rate of people who believed that religious people were under 
oppression had decreased slightly, but a significant increase in the rate of people who said that there was no oppression 
had been observed.5 In 2006, the rate of people who argued that oppression existed decreased to a level that equalled 
40% of the rate in 1999.
Similarly, 63.8% gave an affirmative answer to the question asking whether religious people in Turkey were able to freely 
practice their belief – a question we also asked in 1999 – while 30.9% were of the opposite opinion. A study conducted 
before the 2002 elections had displayed a significant decrease in the rate of people who said “no”, although the rate 
of people who said “yes” had remained the same; in addition, there were fewer people who did not provide an answer. 
However, the rate of those who gave the answer “yes” to this question in this study increased to almost 82.0%, while 
the rate of those who answered negatively dropped to 14.3%.
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5  Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2006.
Table 5.42 Freedom of worship and the perceived pressure on religious people
Are people able to freely worship and follow the fundamental Islamic practices?
Yes No    NI/NA
2006 81.9 14.3 3.8
2002 63.3 33.8 2.9
1999 63.8 30.9 5.3
Are religious people under oppression in Turkey?
Yes No    NI/NA
2006 17.0 77.1 5.8
2002 40 55.6 4.4
1999 42.4 50.2 7.4
Examples of oppression: 
2006-May 2002 1999
Turban-Headcover oppression 65.1 67.7 53.7
Obstruction of the freedom to worship 10.9 7.3 2.2
The status of İmam Hatip high schools 2.6 4.6 5
Oppression originating from the military 1.7
Discrimination exists 6.4
Other 6.3
NA 7.1
Total 100
Respondents who believed that religious people were oppressed in Turkey were given the opportunity to come up with 
their own examples, and after that, these answers were assembled into similar categories in each of the three studies. 
After 1999, the turban/headcover ban was stated more often as an example of oppression, and this rate, which was 53.7% 
at that time, had risen to approximately 68% during the election period in 2002. After AKP came to power, this rate did 
not rise but slightly decreased, and remained around 65%. We observed through the examples given by the respondents 
that the opinion that the freedom of worship was restricted had become stronger since 1999. However, as 11% of the group 
of 17% who thought in 2006 that religious people were oppressed used this example, it can be seen that less than 2% 
of the entire sample suggested the restriction of worship as an example of oppression. On the other hand, oppression 
originating from the military was neither found in the answers of the respondents in the study conducted in 1999 nor in the 
current study.  are scorned”, “religious people are called conservative and reactionary”, “religious people are oppressed”, 
“religious people are cast out from society”, “religious people are looked down on” and “religious people are treated as if 
they are terrorists”, which had not been observed before, were observed in the open answers given in the 2006 study.
In short, we have observed that in May 2006, at the time we conducted our study, religious people were more at ease 
in society, and that the tension that had reached its peak as a result of the February 28 period had receded significantly. 
We do not know whether the developments that took place after our study was conducted affected this atmosphere 
adversely, causing augmented tension. However, we must emphasize here that care must be taken to determine to 
what extent this tension has spread among the elite as well as among the general public. Through this study, we were 
only able to detect the views and attitudes adopted by the public in general and those that were shared with us. When 
considered from this point of view, the atmosphere has not become tenser in 2006 compared to 1999.
In another question that asked respondents to compare the period when AKP was in power with the period before the 
2002 elections when the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was in government, almost 50% thought that the way religious 
people are treated in society had changed (Table 5.43). 60% of this group thought that this change was for the better. 
Similarly, the rate of people who believed that a change existed concerning the practice of religious belief was 50%, 
with 62% of this group thinking that this change was for the better. 44% thought that the way religious people were 
treated in public offices underwent a change, and 55% of this group thought that this change was for the better. The 
rate of people who answered all questions by saying that “there has been no change” was only about 26%, whereas the 
98
people who said that things have become worse represented a small group of 29%. However, the perception of change 
was observed not only related to the social status of religious people but also related to that of secular people. The rate 
of people who said that the attitude secular people faced in society had changed was 44%, with 55% thinking that this 
change was for the better. 44% stated that the treatment of secular people in public offices had changed, and 55% of 
this group thought that this change was for the better. In summary, we have ample data to say that both the secular and 
the religious sectors seem to experience a more comfortable atmosphere within society and in public offices. This level 
of comfort and ease has certainly brought along an optimistic perspective to people’s views when evaluating whether 
religious practices and religious freedom is restricted.
Table 5.43 Taking into consideration the following, please compare the period during which AKP was in power 
with the period before the 2002 elections when the DPS-MHP-ANAP coalition government was in power
No change Undecided Has changed For the better For the worse NA
The way people worship 26.0 19.6 50.2 61.7 17.9 20.3
The way religious people are treated in society 26.2 19.1 49.5 59.6 20.0 20.4
The way secular people are treated in society 27.3 22.5 43.6 55.0 22.7 22.3
The way religious people are treated in public offices 26.9 20.1 48.1 59.8 21.3 18.9
The way secular people are treated in public offices 29.9 19.4 43.7 55.0 22.5 22.5
5.12. The Presidential Elections
The presidential elections that will be held in May 2007 have recently engaged the public agenda, and the AKP 
government faces certain objections and criticism concerning this issue. We took up this subject through two simple 
questions. In the first question, we asked people “what characteristics the Turkish President should have in order to 
fulfill his/her duties assigned within the Turkish political system”. In the second question, which was open-ended, we 
asked respondents whom they wanted elected as President. As can be seen in Table 5.44 below, “having insight about 
the public” received the highest rate for the former question, with 88.6%. This was followed by “being knowledgeable 
and experienced about foreign affairs” (86.8%), “setting an example to modern Turkey with his/her lifestyle” (85.9%) 
and “being educated in the field of law” (82.6%). Having a political background, protecting secularism and being a devout 
Muslim were also desired characteristics of the Turkish President, at a rate of approximately 75%. The President’s wife 
being uncovered held less importance than other desired characteristics, assuming that the claims made at the end of 
2006 that the President will not be a woman will hold true (50.8%).
Table 5.44 Characteristics expected of a President
Unimportant Undecided Important NI/NA
Has insight about the public 5.1 4.9 88.6 1.3 100
Is knowledgeable and experienced about foreign affairs 4.7 6.8 86.8 1.7 100
Sets an example to modern Turkey with his/her lifestyle 5.2 7.4 85.9 1.6 100
Is educated in the field of law 7.3 9.0 82.6 1.2 100
Has a political background 10.0 10.9 77.4 1.7 100
Protects secularism 8.0 9.9 75.2 6.8 100
Is a devout Muslim 11.9 13.0 74.3 0.8 100
If male and married, his wife does not cover 30.8 17.3 50.8 1.1 100
When we examined the answer about “protecting secularism” through cross-tabular analyses, the people who 
considered this characteristic important appeared to be those who voted for leftist and center-right parties other than 
AKP, who had a relatively higher socio-economic status, who felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-Secularist” 
scale, who stated that they were not religious, and who belonged to the group of uncovered women, or men who did not 
want their wives to cover. The idea that the President should be the protector of secularism in Turkey can be considered 
widespread in the country. 
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Similarly, the group who deemed it important that the President’s wife should be uncovered consisted of people who 
voted for CHP, who had a relatively higher socio-economic status, who felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-
Secularist” scale, who stated that they were not religious, and who belonged to the group of uncovered women, or 
men who did not want their wives to cover. In short, once again, voters for the party in government and voters for the 
opposition have very different preferences concerning presidential elections.
The most significant result that stood out in the answers given to the open-ended question “Who would you want 
to see as the President?” was that almost 53% of the respondents were unable to give a name. One reason for this 
could be that at the time this study was conducted, the majority of the public had not been acquainted with any of the 
candidates, while another reason could be that a candidate that duly fulfills all the expectations of the public had not 
yet emerged. Another important finding is that the people we interviewed mentioned the names of four important AKP 
leaders. These four people were altogether preferred only by a group of 28.5% and the most opted for person among 
them received 14.6% at most.
These results must be carefully assessed. At the time we conducted this study, the candidates for the presidential 
elections had not yet been declared. Therefore, it is normal that the respondents were unable to specify any names. 
However, it seems unlikely that AKP would have someone from its leading team elected as the president with the support 
of the public. If we bear in mind that a bi-polar structure emerged concerning public opinion in each and every stage of 
our study, reaching public consensus around a name proposed by AKP is obviously very difficult. In conclusion, “having 
insight about the public” and “setting an example to modern Turkey with his/her lifestyle” are the most important 
characteristics expected of the Turkish President. In addition, if a candidate is also knowledgeable and experienced in 
the fields of foreign affairs and law, he or she could receive significant support from the public.
5.13. Suicide Bombings and Terrorism
The process of associating global terrorism with the Islamic movement gained speed after the September 11 attacks. 
In this context, the approach of the people of Turkey towards suicide bombings, terrorism and the Islamic movement 
is closely related to the level of tolerance in the country.  We tried to investigate these relations by using a few, simple 
questions.  Table 5.45 below shows that when asked whether suicide bombings could be considered legitimate when 
used against occupational forces, 20% answered by saying that they could. However, a group of almost 66% stated 
that such bombings were unacceptable even if the country was occupied. Only 8% deemed attacks against civilians 
acceptable in the case of an occupation. Even when the question was concretized and respondents were asked to 
evaluate the attacks by Palestinians against Israeli civilians, there was very little support given to such attacks. In 
summary, suicide bombings against civilians do not have the support of the people of Turkey. When respondents were 
asked if they approved of suicide bombings by Iraqi resistance fighters, without mentioning civilian casualties, the rate 
of approval increased to a level of approximately 18%. However, when respondents were reminded that such attacks 
were organized in the name of Islam and were asked whether they were acceptable according to Islamic principles, 
only a very small group of 8% approved of such attacks. In summary, the people of Turkey slightly approve resistance 
against occupational forces but is largely against any attacks against civilians. Likewise, the people of Turkey are 
strongly against such attacks being legitimized by making a reference to Islam.
Table 5.45 Suicide bombings, terrorism and the Islamic movement
Some people claim that in certain situations, for example if the country is 
occupied by foreign forces, suicide bombings against the occupational forces 
are acceptable. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?
Yes, I agree
20.2
No, I do not agree
65.5
NI/NA
14.3
Would you approve of suicide bombings by resistance forces against civilians in 
the case of an occupation?
Yes, I would
8.0
No, I would not
84.4
NI/NA
7.6
Do you approve of the suicide bombings performed by Palestinians against 
Israeli civilians?
Yes, I approve
8.3
No, I do not approve
82.8
NI/NA
8.9
Do you approve of the suicide bombings by the Iraqi resistance fighters? Yes, I approve17.5
No, I do not approve
72.8
NI/NA
9.7
Most of these attacks are claimed to have been organized in the name of the 
Islamic movement. Do you think that such attacks are acceptable according to 
Islam?
Yes, they are
8.1
No, they are not
81.4
NI/NA
10.5
100
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In this last chapter, we would like to touch upon the general conclusions that can be drawn from our research about 
the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage that has been discussed in Turkey for a long time. Hoping that our results will be 
assessed by the public, we believe that our study will enable the discussions on this subject to be based on reliable 
data and will contribute to the solution of the problems shaped around this issue.
One of the conclusions we  reached in our study is that the people of Turkey are gradually becoming more religious. In 
comparison to our study conducted in 1999, we observed that the percentage of people who stated that they are “very 
religious” and who defined themselves primarily as “Muslim” has increased remarkably in 2006. The rate of people 
who defined themselves as “very religious” was 6% in 1999, a figure which has risen to 13% at the time we conducted 
this study in 2006. Similarly, the rate of people who defined their identity primarily as Muslim was 36% in 1999, while 
in 2006 this rate is 45%, with an increase of almost 10%.
Along with an increasing level of religiosity, the number of people who advocate that parties can lead religion-based 
politics has also increased. This figure, which was 25% in 1999, has risen to 41% in 2006.
Without doubt, reaching a conclusion that the growing religiosity in any society will cause the state to wither away 
from secular principles is not possible. Such a connection between religiosity and secularism does not exist in 
Turkey. The overall picture we see when we consider the conclusions of both our 1999 study and our current study is 
that the majority of the public does not have the perception that secularism is under threat, nor does it support the 
establishment of a theocratic state in Turkey. Perceptions aside, we do not even have any findings indicating that 
the majority of the public would support a theocratic state. On the contrary, the rate of people who support the idea 
of a Shari’ah state has dropped significantly. For example, in research that was conducted in the 1990s, the rate of 
people supporting the idea of a Shari’ah state was around 20%. Although this rate has come out as 21% in our 1999 
study in consistency with other research, we have shown in that study, through asking questions comparing the laws 
of a Shari’ah state and the Turkish Civil Code, that public support for a theocratic state has decreased by half – and 
that it even zeroed in the case of the Shari’ah law punishment for adultery. We have not delved into such details 
in our current study. However, the rate of an affirmative response given to the question “Are you in favor of the 
establishment of a Shari’ah state in Turkey?”, which was always asked in the same way within the scope of all studies, 
has decreased from 21% to 9% since 1999.
The answers given to questions related to secularism display that there is remarkable tension around this issue in 
Turkey. In our research, respondents were asked to position themselves on a scale of 1-10 that we defined to extend 
from “Islamist” to “Secularist”. 20% positioned themselves as secular, 49% as Islamist, and 23% in the center of the 
scale.  However, it is observed that a group larger than only 20% who define themselves as secularist is sensitive to 
the issue of secularism. From related questions, we can infer that a group of 25-30%, in other words one-third of the 
public, is apprehensive about issues such as the rising trend of religious fundamentalism, the threat on secularism and 
the establishment of a Shari’ah state. For example, 32% of the public believe that religious fundamentalist groups that 
aim to establish an Islamic society and a Shari’ah state in Turkey is on the rise; whereas 23% believe that secularism 
is under threat. The cross-tabular analyses on which we based our conclusions have shown that people who share this 
view are people living in cities, who are better educated and who have a relatively higher socio-economic status.
On the other hand, it can also be said that the strict reactions of people who define themselves as more religious 
against secular practices have mellowed. For example, the perception that religious people are oppressed in Turkey 
has declined. While this rate was 42% in 1999, it has decreased to 17% in our current study. Similarly, while 31% of 
General Conclusions 
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respondents believed that religious people were not able to freely exercise the required practices of Islam in 1999, this 
rate has dropped to 14% in 2006. Another question indicates that this moderation in public opinion is related to the 
existence of the AKP government. Responding to the question of whether social attitudes towards religious people has 
altered, when the periods before and after 2002 were taken into consideration, 50% of the public stated that it has, 
and 60% of them said that this change was for the better. However, our study has also shown that 8% of the public 
thinks that religious circles exert pressure on secularists. In another question, we observed that the rate of people who 
do not believe that secular citizens are able to lead their lives free from the pressure of the religious sector of society 
has increased to 11%. By taking into consideration all of these results, we can state that even if not very wide-spread, 
the kind of social tension mentioned above is, in some way or another, reflected in the daily lives of ordinary people in 
both “Islamist” and “Secularist” circles.
In connection with this issue, the democratic mode of governance is supported by the majority, and 77% of the public 
believes that democracy is the best regime. At the same time, people believe that secularism can be safeguarded 
through democratic means, and the support of the military is not given priority. 54% of the public argue that 
secularism can be protected without the support of the military, while the opposing group of 25% represents only 
a quarter of the voters. Likewise, the majority of people is not of the opinion that a military regime, instead of civil 
governments, can solve Turkey’s problems. However, the opposing viewpoint, represented by 27%, cannot be 
undermined. Conversely, the Turkish Armed Forces seems to have a special position in the public’s view – a situation 
that is unique to Turkey – and the viewpoint that members of the military can criticize civil governments when 
necessary is supported by 59% of the public, while the opposing view is represented by only 18%. The priority given to 
civil politics in Turkey is, without doubt, of utmost importance for the institutionalization of democracy. However, the 
fact that opposing views, which can be interpreted as an expression of distrust in civil governments and democratic 
processes, is represented by a group of 18-27% is thought-provoking. According to the table based on our cross-
tabular analyses, the sector which opposes the military’s role in civil matters is not the religious circles, but urban and 
better-educated people who think they are not religious, who define themselves as secular and closer to leftist politics 
and who have a higher socio-economic status. As can be expected, citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin are the ones who 
most fervently oppose military involvement in politics.
Another important finding of our study is that the viewpoint that links Muslim people and terrorism – a popular 
approach that has found much support in the global community in recent years – cannot be adopted for Muslims in 
Turkey. Our research has indicated that the majority of the people of Turkey do not support terrorism for any cause. 
Furthermore, terrorist acts, even in the case of occupation of the country, are favored only by a small group of 20%, 
while 65% of the people are against it. When such terrorist acts are directed towards civilians, the rate of people who 
say they would give support to such an act decreases even further, to 8%. Even when the subject is more concretized 
and the people of Palestine or Iraq, who could be perceived as ”victims” are given as examples, the percentages 
of people who say they would not be against suicide bombings are 8% and 17% concerning Palestine and Iraq 
respectively. 81% of the public is of the opinion that such acts of terrorism are unacceptable from the viewpoint of 
Islam.
In addition to the rise of religiosity, which we have referred to above, the Sunni-Alevi cleavage also appears to be 
growing. Although the issue of religious sects has not been taken up in detail, either in the study we conducted in 1999 
or the one in 2006, the aforementioned increase can be observed in a specific question we have asked in both studies. 
In comparison to our 1999 study, the percentage of people who stated that they would oppose their daughters or 
sons marrying someone from a different sect has increased in 2006. The cross-tabular analyses indicate that people 
who are against marrying someone from a different sect are not mostly amongst Alevis, but Sunnis and those who 
see themselves closer to the “Islamist” end on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale. In almost all of our questions, Alevis 
have stated an opposing view to that of the conservative wing of the Sunni sector that is formed by people who define 
themselves primarily as Muslim, and who state that they feel closer to the “Islamist” circles. In this context, the 
preferences stated by Alevis overlap with the group of Sunnis who live in urban areas, who are well-educated people 
with a higher socio-economic status and who see themselves as ideologically closer to the left and to secular circles.
Another significant observation we have made is that Turkish voters favor sectarian democracy. In Turkey, where a 
significant majority is Sunni Muslim, issues often emphasized by the religious Sunni sector such as the covering of 
women, İmam Hatip high schools and religion classes in state schools, are evaluated within the scope of fundamental 
rights and freedom; however, the demands of groups from different religious sects or ethnic descents for rights are not 
met with the same sensitivity. The approaches we have presented in our study, with concrete examples concerning 
the various problems of Kurdish, Alevi and non-Muslim citizens in Turkey, clearly expose this sectarian attitude. In all 
of these questions, the rate of people who are sensitive about the rights of minorities is lower than the other groups. 
This approach, without doubt, poses a problem in expanding and implementing human rights and freedom within the 
democratization process of Turkey.
In relation to the above-mentioned issue, we can talk about the presence of a social cleavage that revolves around 
the distinction of “us” and “others”. This cleavage is an indicator of the introverted character of the people of Turkey.  
People do not seem to be enthusiastic about developing shared values within a multi-cultural society. Here, “us” as 
a term refers to indivuduals who are “Turkish-Muslim-Sunni” and “others” refers to Kurdish, Alevi and non-Muslim 
people. A great majority of people do not have a positive opinion of “incongruous” individuals who do not comply 
with social values and norms. For example, homosexual individuals are the most unwanted neighbors. A distant 
attitude towards people who are different from the norm is also observed with regard to evaluations about foreign 
countries. Muslim nations such as Palestine, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the nations that were described as “friends” 
with the highest rates amongst a total of 12 different nations – including Turkey’s close neighbors, as well as Japanese, 
Brazilian and European peoples.  The nation that received the lowest percentage on this list was Armenia, followed 
by Israel and the USA with the same rates, and Greece. Similarly, the percentage of people who think that there can 
be good individuals among followers of other religions has decreased to 72% in 2006, from a rate of 89% in 1999. An 
attitude that reflects xenophobic tendencies has been observed related to many subjects, from limiting missionary 
activities to controlling the economical activities of Jewish people, while an inclination to form communities in 
economical activies has also been seen.
Another important finding of our study includes a set of new data regarding the “turban” issue, which has been 
discussed in Turkey for many years. The first finding that stands out related to this issue – which has appeared 
previously in a few other studies – is that the “turban” issue does not receive the same attention from society as it 
does during public debate. While this issue appears as if it is “the most important” problem of Turkey in discussions 
led by the press and the media, it is almost never included in the public’s most important agenda items. The open-
ended question which asked respondents to indicate Turkey’s two most important problems yielded answers 
suggesting that unemployment (38%), terrorism/national security/Southeastern/Kurdish issue (14%), inflation/cost of 
living (12%), education (10%), and economic instability/crisis (7%) were the five most important problems Turkey had 
to deal with. The headcover/turban issue was mentioned only by 4% of the public. In another question, respondents 
were asked to rank five problems of Turkey that were listed by us in order to show their preference as to which one 
should be given priority.  This time, unemployment – which was the only economic problem mentioned – was the 
main priority of 70% of the people, and it was followed by the Southeastern/Kurdish issue (12%) and education (8%). 
The headscarf ban on university students (6%) was considered just a little more important than health (3%), the 
last problem on this list. “Turban” appears to be important only when it is included in a list that is made up of other 
identity issues issues and that excludes issues related to the economy, education and terrorism. On this type of list, 
the “turban” issue becomes the prioritized item (43%), followed by the entry of İmam Hatip graduates to university 
(18%), the issue of education in Kurdish (11%) and financial assistance given to Alevi Cem houses (5%). These 
conclusions can be considered as examples of the sectarian approach we have mentioned before.
Another conclusion we have reached through our study is that contrary to the general impression prevalent in the 
public, the percentage of women who cover has decreased. When we asked people whether the number of women 
who cover has increased in the last decade, 25% of the public said that there has been a significant increase, while 
39% said that there was a slight increase. These two figures add up to 64%. However, the rate of women who say that 
they cover in different ways, from the çarşaf to yemeni and turban has decreased throughout the general population. 
The most remarkable change in comparison with the results of our 1999 study is that the rate of women who had said 
that they covered at that time was 73%, while this figure has dropped to 61% in 2006. A decrease of 5% in the rate 
of women who wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni, 2% in women who wear a çarşaf and 4% in women who wear a 
turban has been observed. The rate of women who wear a  headscarf/headcover/yemeni is 53%, women who wear a 
çarşaf is 1% and women who wear a turban is 11% when the total number of women is taken into consideration. As can 
be seen from these numbers, most women who cover in Turkey prefer traditional types of covering. Moreover, the use 
of the çarşaf has almost disappeared.
According to the conclusions we have drawn from our cross-tabular analyses, this decrease in the rate of women who 
cover is higher in cities than in rural areas, as can be expected. While the rate of women throughout Turkey who do 
not cover is 37%, this rate is 46% in city centers. The covering of women also varies according to level of income.  In 
other words, as income levels increase, the percentage of women who cover decreases.  When we grouped uncovered 
women in accordance with age groups, we observed the most significant change since 1999 in the 25-39 age group. 
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The percentage of uncovered women in this age group has risen to 42%, from 28% in 1999. In summary, we can predict 
that the percentage of women who cover will gradually decrease as urbanization gains speed, as income per capita 
rises and as the younger generation replaces the older citizens.
We have observed that most covered women do so because of their religious beliefs. When they were asked why they 
covered, 72% said “because Islam commands us to cover”. This group was followed by a group of 8% that consisted 
of women who said they covered because all other women around them did. Contrary to assertions, the covering of 
women seems to be related neither to political aims nor to identity. The rate of women who said that they covered 
because covering is an “essential part of their identity” was only 4%. The rate of people who considered covering as 
a requirement of being honorable is, again, very low, at 4%. The claim that women and young girls were forced by 
their families to cover was denied by the majority of covered women. The rate of women who gave this as a reason 
was around 4%. However, 46% of covered women believe that they would be forced to cover again if they decided to 
uncover. These statements, which appear to be contradictory, can be interpreted in different ways. We must state 
here that 87% of covered women whom we asked “whether they would uncover if many women in their family or 
among their acquaintances uncovered” answered by saying “no”. On the other hand, when we asked parents who 
had at least one daughter who did not cover how they would react if their daughter decided to cover one day, 42% said 
that they would feel sad, while 55% said that they would be pleased and support her.
Similar to our first study, a significant majority of the people in our recent study said that they supported female 
students going to university even if they covered. The rate of people who are of this opinion was 76% in 1999, whereas 
in our current study the rate has decreased to 71%. Similarly, people who support female civil servants who want to 
cover has decreased to 68% in 2006 from 74% in 1999. During the seven years that have since passed, the support 
given to students who wear a turban has dropped a little, but an important majority still say that the headscarf ban 
must be lifted. 
The point that is noteworthy here is that people do not fundamentally discriminate between people who give public 
service and those who receive it.  However, another important finding of our study indicates that if the headscarf 
ban for civil servants such as teachers and judges was lifted, a group of 30%, which is not insignificant, said that they 
would feel disturbed.
Our final finding related to this issue is that a social gap does not exist in society between women who cover and 
the ones who do not, even though the women in these two groups have different social views and a different way of 
practicing their beliefs. Most covered and uncovered women state that they have both covered and uncovered women 
amongst their family, close friends and acquaintances. Men who have wives who cover, and those who do not, have 
made the same remark. These two groups do not seem to lead isolated or secluded lives. On the contrary, they are in 
close contact and interaction.
The most essential finding of our study is the presence of two different social structures, consisting of people who 
have different values, cultures, worldviews, and political preferences.1 Turkey seems to harbor two widely divergent 
societies that are clearly separated from each other. On one side are urban, better-educated people with a relatively 
high income level who do not feel extremely committed to religious values and who define themselves as secular; 
and on the other side are rural, less-educated people with a relatively low income level and who define themselves 
as Islamist and religious. Consequently, we can say that if the economy develops, urbanization gains momentum 
and educational opportunities become widespread, these two sectors will begin to converge. However, saying that, 
this dual structure – which has survived and has even become more entrenched in society despite the economic 
development and immigration to urban areas – will be spontaneously resolved through economic prosperity and 
urbanization can be seen as an overly simplistic approach. Therefore, educational policies become even more 
important as a possible way of dissolving this dual structure and enabling both sides to grow closer.
As many studies have done so before us, we would like to stress the importance of education. In almost all studies 
that are carried out, significant differences in commitment to democratic and liberal values are observed between 
people with higher and lower levels of education.  Moreover, there is a significant correlation between each successive 
level of education and commitment to democracy.  In other words, as the level of education rises, the support and 
commitment to democracy also increases.  Therefore as educational opportunies are improved and the content of 
education is enriched in Turkey, solving problems related to economic development and democratization, as well as 
the conflict between religion and politics, will gradually become easier.
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1  A similar view was first pointed out by Şerif Mardin, who mentioned the “center-periphery dilemma” and was analyzed by many people from different 
viewpoints. Mardin, Ş. 1973. “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”, Deadalus, Winter, 169-190.
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